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FOREWORD 
I am delighted to publish the extremely valuable 
e-book EUROPEANIZATION REVISITED: 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION as part of the European Gov-
ernance and Politics Programme (EGPP) housed 
at the Robert  Schuman  Centre for Advanced 
Studies. It represents the fruits of a conference held 
at the European University Institute (EUI) in 2014 
to mark 10 years of EU membership. The papers 
presented at the conference have been extensively 
up-dated so that the volume provides us with an 
important snapshot of the experience of EU mem-
bership of the countries that constituted the most 
extensive enlargement in the history of the Union 
and transformed the Union from a West European 
entity to one that was continental in scale. Euro-
peanization provides the overarching theoretical 
framework for the chapters. The objective of the 
volume is to re-visit Europeanization and explore 
the different dynamics of this phenomenon before 
and after accession. Accession was a period of ex-
ceptional Europeanization as the goal of member-
ship was so powerful.  After accession the context 
of Europeanization, both as process and outcome, 
shifts and domestic factors play an increasingly 
significant role.  
This volume is not just of academic interest but 
of relevance to the policy world as the Union 
grapples with the undoubted achievements but 
also deep concerns about the observance of EU 
values and the rule of law in the Eastern half of the 
continent.  I wish to thank the three editors Michał 
Matlak, Frank Schimmelfennig and Tomasz P. 
Woźniakowski without whom this volume could 
not have seen the light of day. 
Brigid Laffan
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Introduction
In 2004 and 2007, the European Union (EU) 
completed its Eastern enlargement, the largest 
intake of new member states in its history. EU 
accession also constituted a watershed in the 
history of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In the 
course of enlargement, the countries of the region 
have undergone pervasive “Europeanization” – 
a process of EU-driven or EU-oriented change 
of their political, economic, and administrative 
systems.
Earlier analyses of CEE Europeanization focused 
on the period, in which the Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEECs) were aspiring and 
preparing for EU membership and negotiated 
their accession. Initially, scholarship on the 
transition countries had viewed Europeanization 
predominantly as a domestically driven process 
focusing on the democratic transformation of 
political institutions and processes (e.g.  Ágh 
and Kurtán 1995). With the start of accession 
negotiations, however, Europeanization turned 
from an aspiration to an obligation and shifted 
from political institutions to public policies (Ágh 
1999; Pridham 2000; Grabbe 2001). 
The literature on the accession period broadly 
agreed that CEE Europeanization was massive, 
effective and predominantly driven by the 
incentives of membership (Sedelmeier 2011). It 
was massive because the ex-communist countries 
of CEE not only adopted EU market and policy 
rules, which constitute a major regulatory 
change for any new member state. Rather, the 
transfer of EU law was embedded in the CEECs’ 
transformation of their political, economic, 
and administrative systems towards liberal 
democracy, market economies, and accountable, 
rule-of-law based bureaucracies. It was effective 
because the CEECs’ strong desire to “return to 
Europe” accorded the EU unprecedented power to 
influence their development. Taken together, these 
conditions caused Europeanization in the CEE 
candidate countries to be more pervasive than in 
the case of older EU member states (Grabbe 2001; 
Héritier 2005). Finally, the Europeanization of 
the CEECs corroborated a rationalist bargaining 
model of Europeanization that focused on the 
conditionality mechanism and the relevance of 
EU external incentives and domestic adaptation 
costs for the effectiveness of Europeanization 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; 2005a).
This collection of working papers starts from 
two major reasons to revisit the Europeanization 
of CEE. First, it is clear that the accession phase 
was an exceptional period in the history of CEE 
Europeanization. As the CEECs have moved from 
candidate to member state status, the conditions 
and mechanisms of Europeanization have changed 
fundamentally. Conditionality has lost its centrality 
for the Europeanization of the new member states. 
On the one hand, legal enforcement replaces 
conditionality as the main mechanism of rule 
adoption and compliance for member states. On 
the other hand, where legal enforcement among 
member states is weak, conditionality is unlikely 
to be effective either, because the main incentive 
– membership – has already been consumed. 
Moreover, conditionality is also expected to be less 
effective in the remaining candidate countries for 
EU membership. For the Western Balkans, Turkey 
and potentially the countries of the Eastern 
Partnership, the perspective of EU accession has 
become less credible and the domestic adaptation 
costs have risen. 
The second reason for revisiting CEE 
Europeanization is that earlier studies focused on 
formal, institutional Europeanization. In line with 
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a strong emphasis on the political “Copenhagen” 
criteria for membership, liberal democracy, 
the rule of law, and the adoption of human and 
minority rights, and the transfer and adoption of 
the EU’s acquis communautaire, the body of rules 
that govern the internal market and the flanking 
European policy regimes. Correspondingly, most 
studies dealt with the effects of the EU’s political 
conditionality (e.g. Schimmelfennig et al. 2003, 
2006; Schwellnus 2005; Vachudova 2005) and the 
administrative and regulatory transformation of 
the CEECs (e.g. Dimitrova 2005; Grabbe 2006). 
By contrast, the literature paid less attention to 
political Europeanization: the Europeanization 
of political actors – the citizens, the parties 
and interest groups – and political processes 
(Sedelmeier 2011: 20). Economic and social 
Europeanization have played an even minor role 
in the original Europeanization concept and 
research (Epstein and Jacoby 2014: 7). 
We thus arrive at the major question for this 
collection: How has the Europeanization of CEE 
changed after accession, and how has it played out 
in the politics and the economies of the region? 
Several contributions to the volume focus on 
the first question. They examine whether the 
external incentives model of conditionality-based 
Europeanization remains relevant after Eastern 
enlargement (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
this volume), explore alternative – horizontal 
– mechanisms of Europeanization (Crouch, 
this volume) and deal specifically with the most 
obvious “Europeanization failure”: the rule-of-law 
crisis of the EU (Kochenov and Bard, this volume). 
Another contribution provide insights into the 
effects of Europeanization on the policy-making 
process (Jurje, this volume). Yet another set of 
contributions analyse economic Europeanization: 
the effects of cohesion policy (Medve-Balint, this 
volume), the differential Euro adoption (Verdun, 
this volume), and the economic development 
strategies of the region (Vukov, this volume). 
Finally, Bohle and Jacoby (this volume) contrast 
the “visible” economic development strategies 
examined by Medve-Balint and Vukov with two 
“invisible” strategies: regulatory forbearance and 
remittances.
In this introductory paper, we will provide a 
conceptual and theoretical framework for these 
contributions and give an overview of their 
findings. The conceptual and theoretical section 
introduces the concept of Europeanization and 
reflects on the changing nature of Europeanization 
after Eastern enlargement. We argue that the 
conceptual conflation of Europeanization as 
process and outcome, which was defensible in the 
CEE accession period, needs to be reconsidered. 
After the 2005 enlargement, domestic factors and 
alternative international influences have gained 
in importance vis-à-vis EU-driven policy change. 
Consequently, gaps between Europeanization as 
policy diffusion and Europeanization as actual 
policy convergence are likely to increase and 
need to be theorized. Moreover, the theorization 
of mechanisms of Europeanization needs to be 
move beyond the original focus on conditionality 
– and top-down, direct mechanisms more 
generally. After the accession period, and in the 
areas of political and economic Europeanization, 
indirect, horizontal and bottom-up mechanisms 
of Europeanization have gained in relevance. 
Europeanization: process and 
outcome 
Defining Europeanization
Originally, the concept and the study of 
Europeanization were limited to the EU and 
its member states. Moreover, Europeanization 
denoted a two-way street (e.g. Risse et al. 2001): the 
“uploading” of national policies to the European 
level and the “downloading” of EU policies to the 
national level. According to Claudio Radaelli’s 
encompassing definition, Europeanization 
comprises “processes of (a) construction, (b) 
diffusion, and (c) institutionalisation of formal 
and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
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norms which are first defined and consolidated in 
the making of EU decisions and then incorporated 
in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, 
political structures and public policies” (2003: 
30). The dominant current usage of the term – 
especially in the context of Central and Eastern 
Europe – has, however, focused on the direction 
of downloading. 
We define Europeanization as a process of EU 
policy diffusion. “Policy” is broadly understood 
to include all the objects of Europeanization in 
the Radaelli definition: beliefs, norms, rules, 
institutions, paradigms, styles, procedures, and 
routines. The potential targets of Europeanization 
are equally broad – all actors and structures in 
the member states of the EU but also in candidate 
and non-member countries affected by policy 
diffusion from the EU. 
We further note that in its common usage the 
term Europeanization denotes both process and 
outcome. The literature speaks of Europeanization 
not only as a process, in which the EU 
disseminates its policies or non-EU actors orient 
themselves toward EU policies, but also as an 
outcome, the extent or state of policy alignment 
with the EU. In principle, it makes sense to keep 
the Europeanization process conceptually apart 
from its outcomes – in the same way as definitions 
of diffusion keep diffusion as a process apart 
from convergence, similarity or harmonization 
as potential results of diffusion (Gilardi 2012). 
Diffusion can fail to produce convergence, and 
convergence can result from other processes 
than diffusion. Whereas we refrain from coining 
different terms for the process and outcomes 
of Europeanization, we likewise point out that 
Europeanization processes may lead to various 
degrees of policy adoption and convergence, and 
that policy similarity may have other causes than 
Europeanization processes. They may result either 
from parallel but independent national processes 
or from international and transnational processes 
of policy diffusion that are independent of the EU.
Process and outcome before and 
after accession
During the accession process, the conflation of 
process and outcome was forgivable, indeed, and 
it made sense to assume Europeanization as the 
main, common and effective source of CEE policy 
convergence. Even ahead of EU accession, the 
CEECs took part in international and transnational 
policy diffusion processes. In their transition from 
the Soviet bloc and from the communist party-
state and centrally administered economy, they 
took advice from international organizations and 
consultants and borrowed from institutional and 
policy models in their international environment 
(Keohane et al. 1993). At this time, however, the 
EU was only one of many sources of diffusion 
and the adoption of its policies was voluntary. 
Consequently, the Europeanization of the 
CEECs was selective and patchy in this period 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c).
By contrast, with the start of the accession process, 
Europeanization became “the only game in town”. 
In those policy areas that were subject to EU 
regulation and the EU accession conditions, the 
EU crowded out alternative policy providers. The 
adoption of EU policies became mandatory and 
absorbed the domestic policy-making process. 
Finally, thanks to the power of EU conditionality, 
Europeanization resulted in high policy 
convergence.
This exceptional period of Europeanization 
ended with accession, however. Of course, for 
the new member states, the EU has remained the 
primary source of international policy diffusion. 
Yet their Europeanization is likely to become 
“normalized” to the Europeanization experienced 
by the old member states – and as “differential” 
as Europeanization among the old member states 
(Héritier et al. 2001). Above all, this means that 
the domestic politics of the new member states 
has more leeway to shape – and limit – the 
Europeanization process. Generally, we should 
expect both less CEE convergence with EU policies 
and less policy similarity among the CEECs. More 
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needs to keep Europeanization as a process 
conceptually apart from Europeanization as an 
outcome and to theorize which factors narrow or 
widen the gap between the two.
Earlier research on CEE Europeanization during 
the accession process has given domestic politics 
short shrift (Sedelmeier 2011: 30). From the 
formation of government coalitions (e.g. Enyedi 
and Lewis 2007) via the setting of the domestic 
policy agenda to the decision-making process, the 
focus on meeting the conditions of EU accession 
was thought to overwhelm the regular domestic 
politics and policy process. At the same time, many 
of the earlier studies of CEE Europeanization 
pointed at potential longer-term weaknesses 
and backlashes of the external, top-down and 
incentives-driven Europeanization process of 
the accession period. Authors highlighted the 
problematic legacies of the executive bias and 
democratic deficit of the accession process (e.g. 
Grabbe 2001: 1029; Grzymala-Busse and Innes 
2003) or expected the incentives-driven and 
shallow policy adoption compliance to stall or 
even backslide once accession conditionality 
ended (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c). 
The rise of populism, open attacks on core features 
of “liberal” democracy, judicial independence, 
freedom of the media and the fairness of elections, 
and endemic corruption in several new member 
states appear to corroborate these concerns.
One important challenge for the study of CEE 
Europeanization in the post-accession period 
is therefore to bring domestic politics back in. 
This does not mean that a more domestically 
shaped Europeanization process will invariably 
weaken policy adoption and policy convergence, 
as suggested by the prominent examples of 
backsliding (Kochenov and Bard, this volume). 
For one, domestic actors may be satisfied with 
or indifferent to EU policies – and willing to 
implement them. Moreover, recent research 
attests to the domestic institutionalization and 
internalization of effective EU policy adoption as 
a legacy of the strong conditionality and pervasive 
Europeanization of the accession period. Börzel 
and Sedelmeier (2017) and Zhelyazkova et 
al. (2017) find that domestic factors such as 
adjustment costs, political preferences, veto players 
or general administrative capacities do not explain 
the variation in post-accession compliance across 
enlargement rounds and new member states. 
Börzel and Sedelmeier (2017) explain the positive 
compliance record of the new member states with 
the enduring institutional and attitudinal effects 
of conditionality. Jurje (this volume) confirms 
that the strong role of core executives, which 
has developed during the accession period, has 
continued to impact on policy-making processes 
afterwards. Similarly, Vukov (this volume) points 
to the “deep Europeanization” of state development 
strategies and capacities in CEE.
By contrast, Medve-Balint (this volume) 
demonstrates that the outcomes of the EU’s 
cohesion policy, the most redistributive policy of 
the EU, ultimately depend on the state capacity and 
governance quality of the new members. Likewise, 
Verdun (this volume) shows that the adoption of 
the euro, in spite of being a legal obligation for the 
new member states, depends on the willingness 
of national governments. Thus, domestic 
institutions, capacity and preferences have become 
important factors for the explanation of post-
accession Europeanization in the new member 
states. These are the same factors, however, that 
dominate explanations of Europeanization in the 
old member states.
As we move away from institutional 
Europeanization to political and economic 
Europeanization, the causal link between 
Europeanization as a process and as an outcome 
becomes ever more brittle and dubious. Political 
Europeanization beyond the consolidation of 
democratic institutions has never been an explicit 
focus of the EU’s Europeanization efforts. Given 
the top-down, intergovernmental nature of the 
accession process and European policy-making, 
even side effects of institutional Europeanization 
are most likely to occur in state institutions 
and the elites that interact with the EU – e.g. 
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by strengthening the executive or socializing 
government officials. Down at the level of the 
attitudes and behaviours of citizens, either 
we should expect few convergence effects of 
Europeanization – or that convergence is hardly 
attributable to the impact of European integration 
or EU membership. 
Finally, the earlier literature studied 
Europeanization as a process with a uniquely 
positive direction and outcome. The variation 
to be explained was between the absence 
and presence of Europeanization outcomes 
or different degrees of convergence with EU 
policies. Negative Europeanization or “de-
Europeanization” appeared irrelevant. Yet in the 
post-accession period of the new member states, 
as well as for the current candidate countries, 
de-Europeanization is an indispensable part of 
the outcome range. Indeed, de-Europeanization 
has been used explicitly first in the context of the 
stalled Turkish accession process (Yilmaz 2016). 
In case of the new member states, the study of 
de-Europeanization has focused on the issue of 
“democratic backsliding” (e.g. Greskovits 2015). 
Kochenov and Bard (this volume) examine the 
gravest case of de-Europeanization in the new 
member states so far: the dismantling of the rule 
of law in Hungary and Poland.
Mechanisms of 
Europeanization: beyond 
conditionality and direct 
Europeanization
The weakening of conditionality
During the accession process, conditionality 
clearly dominated the Europeanization of CEE. In 
conditionality mode, the EU promotes its policies 
directly and top-down vis-à-vis governments. It 
offers governments rewards – such as financial 
assistance, participation in its policy regimes 
and, ultimately, full membership – conditional 
upon adopting EU policies. In addition, the EU 
provides states with additional resources to help 
them fulfil its conditions (capacity building). 
The effectiveness of conditionality depends on 
the size of the EU’s rewards, the credibility of its 
conditionality and the domestic costs of policy 
adoption in the target state. The credibility of 
conditionality depends in turn on the credibility 
of the EU’s promise to withhold the reward if 
conditions are met and on the credibility of the 
EU’s threat to withhold the reward otherwise. The 
credibility of the threat increases with the EU’s 
bargaining power: the less the EU is in need of 
cooperation with the target state, the better it can 
afford to withhold the reward. By contrast, superior 
bargaining power may undermine the credibility 
of the promise to reward. The credibility of the 
promise is improved by transparent conditions, 
the consistent application of conditionality 
across target states, strong agreement among EU 
actors or the isolation of the rewarding decision 
from domestic and intergovernmental politics. 
Provided that conditionality is credible, the target 
state adopts the EU policy if the benefits of the 
EU rewards outweigh the costs of policy change 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b: 12-16).
In the process of Eastern enlargement, the 
conditions of effective conditionality were largely 
in place. First of all, the EU offered the CEECs full 
membership – its biggest “carrot”. Second, thanks 
to superior EU bargaining power, the threat to 
withhold membership was strong. The EU and 
its member states wanted and needed Eastern 
enlargement considerably less than the CEECs. At 
the same time, there was no fundamental political 
opposition to Eastern enlargement in the EU. Both 
public opinion and member state governments 
conditionally supported the membership of the 
CEECs. Moreover, the member states largely 
delegated the monitoring of the candidates, and 
the assessment of whether they met conditions, 
to the European Commission, a technocratic 
body. These factors enhanced the credibility of the 
membership promise. Finally, EU membership 
was the number-one foreign policy goal and 
hugely popular in the CEECs. To reach this goal, 
the elites and citizens of the CEECs were willing to 
adopt EU policies indiscriminately – and remained 
relatively insensitive to the potential costs.
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After the 2005/2007 Eastern enlargement, either 
conditionality has become inapplicable, or 
the conditions of its effective application have 
worsened significantly. For the remaining CEE 
candidate countries, the accession perspective 
has become more costly and less credible in 
comparison with Eastern enlargement. Public 
support for further enlargement has decreased 
since 2007. Member states are more divided 
over whether enlargement should continue and 
which states should be admitted. Enlargement 
has become an issue of domestic politicization 
and accession treaties with new member states 
may be subject to referendums in the old member 
states. These factors weaken the credibility of the 
enlargement promise. At the same, the domestic 
costs of adaptation have increased. The remaining 
(potential) candidate states have worse starting 
conditions and a longer and more costly way to 
go before meeting the EU’s accession conditions. 
A crisis-ridden EU is less attractive and less 
capable of generously supporting the capacity 
building of candidates, and an assertive Russia 
actively opposes the expansion of European 
integration in its former hegemonic sphere. In 
sum, whereas conditionality is still the dominant 
mechanism of Europeanization in the (potential) 
candidate countries, it is less likely to be effective 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, this volume).
For the new member states, the dominant 
mechanism of Europeanization has shifted from 
conditionality to hierarchical policy enforcement 
based on legally binding EU regulations and 
directives and legal enforcement through the EU 
Commission and the EU Court of Justice. Some 
policy areas lie outside the domain of hierarchical 
enforcement, however. First, there are remaining 
“pockets of accession conditionality”, e.g., with 
regard to the admission of the new member states 
to the Eurozone and the Schengen Area. Second, 
there are areas of the so-called “enlargement 
acquis”, such as democracy, the rule of law, minority 
rights and administrative capacity, which were 
part of the EU’s accession conditionality but are 
not, or only to a limited extent, part of the acquis 
communautaire and can therefore not be legally 
enforced in the new member states. Kochenov and 
Bard (this volume) discuss the implications of this 
lack of enforcement.
In all these areas, in which conditionality could 
still be applied, however, the conditions of 
effective conditionality have weakened seriously, 
too. This is mainly because the new members 
already received the most important reward the 
EU has on offer – membership – and threats to 
exclude them from the benefits of membership 
or membership itself are not credible. The EU 
cannot coerce membership to adopt the euro 
against their will and is unlikely to impose 
sanctions against democratic backsliding because 
of the high consensus requirements of Article 7 
procedures and the protection of illiberal regimes 
by their European party families (Kelemen 2017; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, this volume). 
Alternative mechanisms of 
Europeanization
The post-2004 context thus leads us to shift 
our attention to alternative mechanisms of 
Europeanization beyond conditionality and 
enforcement – both in the new member states and 
in the candidate countries. The Europeanization 
and policy diffusion literature has developed a 
rich taxonomy of diffusion mechanisms (Knill and 
Lenschow 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005b; Börzel and Risse 2012), from which the 
study of alternative mechanisms can draw. The 
basic distinctions in these taxonomies are, first, 
between direct mechanisms of Europeanization, 
in which EU actors pro-actively project and seek 
to transfer their policies, and indirect mechanisms, 
in which the EU remains passive and may not 
even intend to Europeanize its international 
environment. Second, the literature distinguishes 
mechanisms by their institutional logic: the “logic 
of consequences” or the “logic of appropriateness” 
(March and Olsen 1989: 160–162). Whereas the 
logic of consequences assumes actors choose 
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the behavioural option that maximizes their 
utility under given circumstances, the logic of 
appropriateness stipulates that actors choose 
the behaviour that is appropriate according to 
their social role and the social norms in a given 
situation.
Conditionality is the paradigmatic direct and 
consequentialist mechanism of Europeanization. 
By contrast, socialization is a direct mechanism 
based on the logic of appropriateness. It 
comprises all EU efforts to ‘teach’ EU policies 
– as well as the ideas and norms behind them – 
to persuade target actors that these policies are 
appropriate and, as a consequence, to motivate 
them to adopt EU policies. Studies of candidate-
country Europeanization have generally found 
socialization to be less relevant and effective than 
conditionality. Yet, European socialization may 
operate on a longer time scale and may have been 
crowded out by the short-term dominance of 
conditionality during the accession process. 
The indirect counterparts of conditionality and 
socialization are externalization, learning and 
emulation. According to the externalization or 
competition mechanism, internal EU governance 
may produce negative externalities towards third 
country governments and societal actors. External 
actors adopt and comply with EU rules because 
ignoring or violating them would generate net 
costs. Externalization is most noticeably produced 
by the EU’s internal market and competition 
policies; firms are interested in participating 
in the EU market because of its size; and in 
order to participate they must follow the EU’s 
rules. Countries whose economies are strongly 
interconnected with the EU make their internal 
rules compatible with those of the EU. 
Like externalization, learning or lesson-drawing is 
a consequentialist mechanism. Here, states learn 
without begin taught. They look around for policies 
of other states and international organizations 
in order to improve their own suboptimal or 
dysfunctional policies. They are likely to adopt EU 
policies to the extent that they are familiar with 
the EU, EU policies appear effective and efficient, 
and EU policies seem to be applicable in their 
domestic context. Emulation is the equivalent of 
learning in the logic of appropriateness. Here, the 
EU’s procedures and policies provide a legitimate 
model for other states. Non-member actors 
emulate the EU because they recognize EU rules 
and policies as appropriate solutions.
Various contributions to this collection 
show that the earlier focus on conditionality 
and other forms of direct Europeanization 
become less relevant, as conditionality loses its 
effectiveness, as we move from the accession 
to the post-accession period and as we shift 
our focus from institutional and regulatory to 
political and economic Europeanization. In the 
Europeanization of the current candidates of 
the Western Balkans, top-down conditionality 
has weak credibility (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, this volume). In this context, Crouch 
(this volume) therefore emphasizes “horizontal” 
mechanisms of Europeanization, which rely on 
transgovernmental linkages and transnational 
NGO networks as well as on socialization and 
learning. It remains to be seen, however, whether 
these horizontal mechanisms can be effective 
venues of Europeanization. Verdun (this volume) 
claims that the indirect mechanisms of learning or 
emulation rather than conditionality even shaped 
the post-accession of the euro in the new member 
states. Finally, Bohle and Jacoby (this volume) 
conceptualize and illustrate largely “invisible” 
Europeanization strategies and mechanisms 
of economic development in CEE: regulatory 
forbearance and remittances.
Overview of contributions 
and findings
The first contribution by Frank Schimmelfennig 
and Ulrich Sedelmeier (this volume) attempts 
to answer the question whether the External 
Incentives Model (EIM) of Europeanization works 
also outside the context of Eastern enlargement. 
EIM assumes that Europeanization is driven by 
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sanctions and rewards that alter the cost-benefit 
calculations of domestic actors (in contrast to the 
social learning model that stresses the normative 
authority of the EU). In order to answer their 
question, the authors consider two instances of 
Europeanization: the post-accession phase of the 
CEE countries and the pre-accession phase of 
the current Southeast European (SEE) countries 
– the Western Balkans and Turkey. With regard 
to the post-accession phase, they distinguish 
the successful record of CEE compliance with 
EU legislation and the unsuccessful record of 
sanctioning democratic backsliding. In line with 
the EIM, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue 
that the main difference between the effective 
CEE accession conditionality and post-accession 
legal compliance and the ineffective SEE accession 
conditionality and CEE sanctioning of democratic 
backsliding is the credibility of conditionality. 
The weakly credible accession promise vis-à-vis 
SEE and the weakly credible threat of sanctions 
vis-à-vis democratic backsliders explain the lack 
of Europeanization and the failure to prevent de-
Europeanization. 
The subsequent contribution by Flavia Jurje (this 
volume) examines the process of Europeanization 
from another angle: she poses the question how 
enlargement has changed the division of power 
between the executive and the legislative, and 
investigates the role of civil society actors engaged 
in policy-making. Her work draws on primary 
network data collected for Romania and by 
secondary sources for the other CEE countries. 
The empirical data gathered in Romania after 
enlargement suggests that “a substantial gap 
persists between the importance and role of core 
executives in decision-making affected by the EU 
and the rest of the actors”. (Jurje, this volume). 
This was a generally accepted finding in numerous 
Europeanization studies on the pre-accession 
period, but it was expected that the policy-making 
process would become less executive-centred 
after accession. Jurje’s analysis demonstrates 
that, although the peak of this phenomenon was 
observed before the accession, also afterwards 
the executive was strengthened by the processes 
of Europeanization – both in the case of Romania 
and the other CEE member states. Jurje’s 
explanation stresses the legacies of pre-accession 
Europeanization: the dominance of the executive 
became a routine at the time of enlargement. 
Dmitry Kochenov and Petra Bard (this volume), 
on the other hand, discuss the limits of political 
Europeanization, focus on the “rule of law 
backsliders” Poland and Hungary, and ask how 
the rule of law in the EU could be strengthened. 
The authors show how the enthusiasm for 
European values (mostly the rule of law and the 
separation of powers) in the new member states 
has decreased over time, describe the reversal of 
liberal democratic political systems and criticize 
the EU institutions for the lack of decisive actions 
against backsliding. The authors argue that the 
best answer should “necessarily involve not only 
the reform of the enforcement mechanisms, but 
the reform of the Union as such”. In the reformed 
Union “supranational law should be made more 
aware of the values it is obliged by the Treaties to 
respect and aspire to protect both at the national 
and also at the supranational levels”. 
Graeme Crouch (this volume) suggests that in 
order to fully understand how the process of 
Europeanization works, one must go beyond 
the traditional approaches of “top-down”, 
where the rules are simply imposed by the EU 
(countries viewed as “takers”) and “bottom-up”, 
where member states can influence the shape 
of the EU policies (member states as “shapers”). 
He conceptualizes and illustrates “horizontal 
mechanisms” of Europeanization in SEE 
instead: transnational networking of NGOs and 
transgovernmental cooperation of civil servants. 
His first case study is on “twinning projects”, which 
paired Croatian authorities responsible for the 
implementation of Water Framework Directive 
with their German and Dutch counterparts and 
in doing so allowed transfer of knowledge and 
better implementation of the EU directive. The 
second case study examines the cooperation of 
NGOs from Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro with 
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the World Wildlife Foundation Mediterranean 
from Italy. This initiative improved the capacities 
of Balkan NGO networks and helped to bring 
local practices closer to EU procedures and – as a 
result – membership requirements. By employing 
a third, horizontal approach the author claims to 
overcome two problems associated with theorizing 
Europeanization: the fact that hierarchy is usually 
privileged over coordination and determining 
causality - ensuring that outcomes are ascribed to 
the impact of the EU. In so doing, the author is 
able to more fully explain the domestic adaptation 
in the Western Balkans. 
The remaining contributions examine economic 
Europeanization process and outcomes. Gergo 
Medve-Balint (this volume) provides a detailed 
analysis of the workings of the EU’s cohesion 
policy in CEE between 2014 and 2017. Being one 
of three pillars of economic Europeanization, next 
to market opening and the market regulation, 
the goal of cohesion policy is to counter-balance 
the negative effects of spatial inequality that the 
two other pillars of economic Europeanization 
would bring to less competitive regions of the 
East. With one third of the EU budget devoted 
to cohesion policy, it is perhaps the single most 
important EU policy area for CEE, sometimes 
labelled as an equivalent of the post-World War 
II US Marshall Plan, from which the Communist 
countries could not benefit at the time. This 
contribution demonstrates the difficult choices 
that CEECs had to make: whether to invest in 
more developed regions in order to enable them 
to compete with their Western counterparts or in 
the most backward regions within CEECs in order 
to help them to “catch up”, if not with the Western 
member states then with the more developed 
parts of their own countries. Whereas the original 
aim of cohesion policy was equity, the Lisbon 
Strategy of 2000 emphasized competiveness and 
the efficient use of the funds. Coupled with the 
regional funds eligibility criteria in the 2007-13 
period, which put nearly all the CEE regions in 
one category, created the conditions in which the 
richer regions of CEE were generally absorbing 
more funds than the poorer ones. As a result, 
investment in the strongest regions to boost 
their competitiveness on the EU-level became 
a priority and tackling the internal disparities 
between regions within countries was neglected to 
a large extent. Nonetheless, this trend of economic 
Europeanization has been conditioned by the 
quality of government - measured using indicators 
for government effectiveness, rule of law and 
control of corruption. The contribution shows 
that the higher the governmental state capacities, 
the lower the advantage of the more prosperous 
regions. 
Amy Verdun (this volume) examines the CEECs’ 
euro adoption strategies. She identifies learning 
and emulation, both indirect Europeanization 
mechanisms, as those mechanisms that affected 
Euro adoption to the largest extent. By contrast, 
Verdun finds no evidence that coercion or 
conditionality played any role in the politics of 
Euro adoption. Moreover, external assistance 
of the EU was extremely limited as there were 
only few examples of twinning. Finally, the 
mechanisms or socialization and competition 
were rather scarce. The author examines three 
groups of countries that joined the EU in 2004: 
“the first four fast movers” Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta 
and Slovakia, the Baltic States, which adopted 
the euro after initial set-backs, and the “Euro 
outs”: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
By investigating the convergence criteria of the 
euro adoption, the author is able to differentiate 
the extent of Europeanization also among the 
states, which did not join, but met the criteria 
to different degrees. This contribution explains 
the cross-country differences by the existence 
of domestic veto players. In the two groups of 
countries that joined the euro area – the early-
ins and the Baltic countries – there was broad 
domestic agreement on the issue of euro adoption. 
While the first group met relatively quickly all the 
convergence criteria, which enabled them to join, 
the latter struggled in this regard, and missed, if 
only by a small margin like Lithuania, some of 
required criteria such as the level of inflation. 
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With regards to the Euro outs, while some of the 
met many of the criteria, the lack of political will 
prevented them from joining. Verdun argues that 
the position of sitting government is the most 
significant factor explaining the euro adoption 
or lack thereof. It is not a sufficient condition, 
however, as the convergence criteria must be met, 
too, and occasionally constitutional obstacles, such 
as Polish requirement of the two-thirds majority, 
must be overcome. 
Visnja Vukov (this volume) sets out to examine the 
influence of European integration on the economic 
state capacities building in the new member 
states. She argues that the Europeanization of 
state capacities understood as  “approximation 
to the EU policy goals and instruments”  is 
stronger in the new member states than in the 
old ones.  While in the old member states state 
restructuring came about through the creation 
of supranational sanctioning mechanisms as well 
as supranational development funds, the new 
members went through a deep transformation 
of developmental capacities which resulted in 
transnationalized, FDI-oriented economies, 
largely based on “developmental alliances with 
multinational corporations”.   Vukov’s paper 
comes to a fundamental conclusion for this 
volume: while the effects of institutional and 
political Europeanization after the accession have 
weakened (among others as a result of weakening 
conditionality), economic Europeanization 
through the state capacity building has long lasting 
results. Vukov argues that the countries said to be 
backsliding (namely, Poland and Hungary) do 
not show any signs of the reversal of economic 
Europeanization. What is more (and goes beyond 
the scope of the paper), these countries are in 
the group of  “free-marketeers”,  countries which 
traditionally support economically liberal policies 
in the Council of the European Union (the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, and still – Great 
Britain).
The final contribution, by Dorothee Bohle and 
Wade Jacoby (this volume), employs a political 
economy approach to analyse the Europeanization 
process of CEE developmental strategies and 
seeking to “rescue” the concept of Europeanization 
by making it more dynamic. The authors argue 
that the positive image of Europeanization owes 
to a large extent to the external factors that 
provided a “relaxed” political and economic 
environment and the focus on visible forms of 
this process such as capacity building and FDI 
flows. This picture, they argue, changes when 
the analysis shifts to the post-2007 environment, 
characterized by the existence of multiple crises 
– the financial crisis, the refugee crisis, and the 
Crimean crisis. This contribution analyses two 
groups of CEE countries – the Viségrad and the 
Baltic countries – over time, taking into regard 
two junctures: accession to the EU and the global 
financial crisis. Thus, their analysis compares the 
pre-accession (before 2004) and the post-crisis 
period (after 2007). They discover that some 
forms of economic Europeanization are largely 
invisible, for instance regulatory forbearance 
on inflows of portfolio capital (until 2004) and 
remittances, i.e. income earned in the West and 
sent back to CEE households (after 2007). On 
the other hand, mechanisms such as building 
capacity for membership and attracting FDI as 
a development purposes, as well as cohesion 
funds acting as buffering economic contractions 
(both national and regional) remained rather 
visible. By introducing the concept of “invisible 
Europeanization”, this contribution explains that 
Europeanization sometimes passes “under the 
radar” of both the elites and the citizens. While 
the EU accession requirements helped to build 
economic capacities in the CEECs, the adjustment 
to the EU economic model required many invisible 
changes that were suboptimal for transition 
countries. The prime example is the regulatory 
forbearance on inflows of portfolio capital, which 
is linked to the national trade account and meant 
the CEE had to run trade deficits. Moreover, 
this “outsourcing” of the governance of the CEE 
financial system made those countries, much like 
Southern Europe, exposed to the financial crisis. 
By demonstrating how dynamic, invisible forms 
of Europeanization played out in the “catching 
up” process of the new member states, this 
contribution both enhances our understanding of 
this complex process and enriches it conceptually.
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Introduction
Ten years ago, the European Union (EU) 
concluded its enlargement towards the Central 
and East European countries (CEECs). In its 
biggest enlargement round ever, the EU admitted 
twelve new member states, including ten post-
communist countries. Accession to the EU 
completed the new member states’ long ‘return 
to Europe’, which had begun together with their 
democratic and market-economic transitions at 
the start of the 1990s.
‘Europeanization’, defined as a ‘process in which 
states adopt EU rules’ (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005b: 7) paved the way for the ‘return 
to Europe’. Early scholarship on the transition 
countries viewed Europeanization predominantly 
as a domestically driven process focusing on 
the transformation of political institutions and 
processes (e.g.  Ágh and Kurtán 1995). With 
the start of the accession process, however, 
Europeanization turned from an aspiration to an 
obligation and its focus shifted from democratic 
institutions to public policies (Ágh 1999; Pridham 
2000; Grabbe 2001). 
Why and how does Europeanization occur and 
succeed? In the early 2000s, the literature drew 
heavily on the neo-institutionalist debate between 
rationalist institutionalism and constructivist 
or sociological institutionalism in International 
Relations and Comparative Politics to theorize 
Europeanization and to specify its conditions and 
mechanisms (Börzel and Risse 2000; Jacoby 2004; 
Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005a). The specification of mechanisms of 
Europeanization started with March and Olsen’s 
(1989) distinction of two institutional logics, 
the (rationalist) ‘logic of consequences’ and the 
(constructivist) ‘logic of appropriateness’. Whereas 
the logic of consequences assumes that actors 
choose the behavioural option that maximizes 
their utility under the circumstances, the logic 
of appropriateness stipulates that actors choose 
the behaviour that is appropriate according to 
their social role and the social norms in a given 
situation. In addition to these contrasting logics, 
Europeanization mechanisms differ with regard 
to whether the EU plays an active or passive role 
in the Europeanization process (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier 2005b; Vachudova 2005). 
Combining the two dimensions, we proposed a 
four-fold classification of Europeanization models 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b). The 
external incentives model (EIM) assumes that the 
EU drives Europeanization through sanctions and 
rewards that alter the cost-benefit calculations of 
domestic actors. By contrast, the social learning 
model posits that the normative authority of the 
EU and the legitimacy of its policies persuade 
domestic actors to Europeanize. Less interested 
in domestically driven Europeanization, 
we somewhat carelessly subsumed both the 
consequentialist and appropriate adoption under 
‘lesson-drawing’ (Rose 1991). By contrast, Börzel 
and Risse (2012) distinguish the instrumental 
or functional emulation of EU policies implied 
in lesson-drawing from normative emulation or 
‘mimicry’. 
The EIM found strong empirical support across 
issue-areas of Europeanization for the Central 
and Eastern European candidate countries 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a; 
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Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). Before the EU offered 
membership, Europeanization was limited and 
selective. Afterwards, EU conditionality became 
the main driver of Europeanization. The CEECs’ 
adoption of the EU’s political norms and policy 
rules depended mainly on the credibility of the 
EU’s promise to admit candidates that complied 
with its conditions, and of its threat to exclude non-
compliant candidates. The importance of additional 
explanatory factors varied across to broad sets of 
issue areas: governmental adoption costs mattered 
for political conditionality and the determinacy of 
conditions mattered for compliance with policy 
rules. While external incentives explained well 
the broad patterns of Europeanization, the social 
learning and lesson-drawing models were found 
to be useful mostly in the absence of accession 
conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005c: 210-211). 
We were, however, sceptical regarding the 
future perspectives of Europeanization after 
accession. Rule adoption had often remained 
superficial during the accession process and 
implementation could be halted, or even reversed, 
when EU conditionality weakened after accession. 
Alternatively, even if Europeanization did not 
suffer after accession, its sustainability might 
result from other mechanisms – such as social 
learning (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005c: 226-228). Finally, it was not clear whether 
the EU would be able to repeat its successful 
Europeanization policy after the completion of 
the Eastern enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007. 
On the one hand, the EU registered widespread 
‘enlargement fatigue’ and started a debate on its 
‘integration capacity’ as an obstacle to further 
enlargement immediately after the conclusion of 
accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania 
– thereby reducing the credibility of its accession 
promise to remaining candidates. On the other 
hand, the remaining candidates in the Western 
Balkans and Turkey faced higher domestic 
adoption costs than the new member states from 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) due to their 
more difficult legacies, such as recent histories 
of ethnic conflict, weaker statehood and weaker 
democratic traditions.
This paper is guided by the question how well 
the EIM holds beyond the original Eastern 
enlargement context. We consider two alternative 
contexts characterized by variation in conditions 
and outcomes: the post-accession phase of the 
previous CEE candidates and the pre-accession 
phase of the current Southeast European (SEE) 
candidates in the Western Balkans and Turkey. 
We argue that the size of the EU rewards and the 
credibility of the threat to exclude states change in 
the post-accession context but are largely the same 
across the CEE and SEE pre-accession contexts. 
By contrast, the domestic adjustment costs and 
the credibility of the promise of membership have 
changed. 
Of course, the explanatory success of the EIM 
does not depend on the Europeanization success 
of the EU’s conditionality policy. Enlargement, 
once widely hailed as the most successful foreign 
policy of the EU, appears currently as a spent force. 
Yet what counts for the explanatory power of the 
EIM is whether Europeanization succeeds for the 
reasons specified by the model, where it succeeds, 
and fails because of the theoretically expected 
conditions, where it fails. Our paper finds that this 
is still largely the case after the 2004 enlargement. 
In particular, the credibility of positive and 
negative incentives respectively stands out as the 
crucial condition explaining successes in pre-
accession compliance of the CEE candidates and 
their post-accession compliance with the acquis. 
By contrast, lack of credibility has undermined 
the effectiveness of pre-accession conditionality 
in SEE and post-accession sanctions against 
democratic backsliding in CEE.
This paper does not report original research but 
findings of studies that explicitly or implicitly 
test or refer to the EIM, accompanied by data on 
political developments in Eastern Europe. We start 
by briefly summarizing the main assumptions 
and propositions of the EIM. Subsequently, we 
turn to the post-accession Europeanization of 
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the new member states and the pre-accession 
Europeanization of current candidates. The 
concluding section provides a comparative 
assessment.
The External Incentives 
Model
The EIM is a rational bargaining model. It assumes 
independent actors who enter into a negotiation, in 
which they exchange information, promises, and 
threats to achieve their preferred outcome. They 
compare the costs and benefits of possible deals, 
reject those that produce net costs and seek to 
achieve those that maximize their utility. Whether 
they are able to attain their preferred outcome 
depends on their bargaining power. Bargaining 
power is a function of asymmetric interdependence 
between the actors. Actors who are less in need of 
agreement, or have better alternative options for 
agreement than their negotiating partners have, 
possess superior bargaining power and are in a 
better position to move the bargaining outcome in 
their favour (Moravcsik 1993).
According to the EIM, the key instrument 
of Europeanization is conditionality 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b: 10-12). 
The EU sets the adoption of its norms and rules 
as conditions that the target states have to fulfil in 
order to receive a reward. The EU is free to choose 
both the conditions and the reward. EU conditions 
comprise both political conditions (such as 
democracy and the rule of law) and regulatory 
conditions (pertaining to the EU’s public policies). 
The model distinguishes political conditionality 
and acquis conditionality accordingly. Rewards 
range from financial and technical assistance to 
membership. In general, higher rewards are linked 
to more demanding conditions. 
The target states are free to accept or reject 
compliance with the EU’s conditions. They accept 
if they perceive the benefits of the reward to be 
higher than the costs of complying with the 
conditions. The cost-benefit assessment is subject 
to domestic politics. Even though the EU negotiates 
with target state governments, these governments 
are constrained by domestic institutional and 
partisan veto-players and interest group pressures 
that may force them to accept a deal they consider 
too costly or reject a deal they would benefit from. 
If the target government rejects or fails to meet 
the conditions, the EU typically simply withholds 
the reward (without applying additional sanctions 
or coercion). It pays the reward if the target 
government fulfils the conditions.
The EIM further specifies several conditions 
under which conditionality is more or less likely 
to be effective (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005b: 12-17): the size and speed of rewards, the 
determinacy of the conditions, the credibility of 
the conditionality, and the size of the adoption 
costs. 
Rewards. Conditionality is more likely to be 
effective if rewards are tangible or material 
(increasing the state’s welfare and power) rather 
than immaterial (such as mere public praise by the 
EU). Furthermore, effectiveness increases with the 
size of the reward. Membership, which comes with 
larger financial assistance and voting power in the 
EU, is a bigger ‘carrot’ than association. Finally, 
time to rewarding matters. The closer the date 
on which the reward would be paid, the stronger 
the compliance pull. Distant rewards reduce the 
willingness of target governments to meet costly 
conditions.
Conditions. For one, target governments value 
determinacy understood as clarity. They must 
know what exactly they need to do to meet the 
conditions and get the reward. By contrast, 
vagueness causes target governments to 
procrastinate, underachieve, or take the wrong 
measures. The EU enhances determinacy by 
specifying the conditions clearly and by giving 
regular feedback. In addition, determinacy 
depends on the relevance or salience of conditions 
for the EU. The more clearly the EU signals that 
conditions are sine qua non, the more likely target 
governments are to prioritize and meet them.
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Credibility. Conditionality potentially suffers from 
time-inconsistency because target governments 
need to meet the conditions before they will 
receive the reward. Credibility refers both to the 
credibility of the EU’s threat to withhold the reward 
if conditions are not met and the credibility of the 
EU’s promise to pay the reward once they are met. 
Credibility is largely a function of bargaining power. 
The less the EU benefits from having a target state 
as a member or partner and the fewer alternative 
options to EU membership or association the 
target state has, the more credible is the EU’s 
threat. By the same token, the credibility of the 
treat increases the weaker the intra-EU consensus 
on the desirability of enlargement. At the same 
time, however, superior bargaining power and 
weaker consensus undermine the credibility of 
the promise. In addition, credibility increases with 
the EU’s coherence and consistency. The more the 
EU member states and supranational institutions 
agree on the conditions and the reward, the more 
the EU speaks with one voice, and the more 
consistently it applies its conditions over time 
and across target countries, the more credible its 
threats and promises are. Moreover, credibility 
varies over time. In that sense, the distance of 
the reward also affects its credibility. Distant 
rewards put the credibility of the EU promise in 
doubt. As negotiations progress and the EU makes 
investments in supporting and preparing the target 
states, the credibility of the promise increases and 
the credibility of the threat recedes. Finally, ‘cross-
conditionality’ – incompatible conditions set by 
other international actors who offer comparable 
rewards at lower costs – decreases the credibility 
of EU conditionality.
Costs. For any given size and speed of rewards, 
determinacy of conditions, and credibility of 
conditionality, it is the size of domestic adoption 
costs that determines whether target governments 
will meet the EU’s conditions. These costs can 
have various sources. First, target governments 
are unwilling to meet conditions if it might lead 
them to lose elections, coalition partners, and 
power as a result. Second, EU conditions may 
harm institutional or societal actors with the 
capacity to block their adoption (‘veto players’). 
Adoption costs rise with the number of negatively 
affected veto players. By contrast, if EU conditions 
and rewards are more popular among the 
electorate, interest groups, opposition parties, 
and state institutions than in the government, 
the government will be more likely to comply. 
Third, the government may be willing to meet the 
conditions, but lack the financial or administrative 
capacity and expertise to implement them. 
CEE after accession: the new 
member states
Testing the predictive power of the EIM for 
the post-accession period, when the candidate 
countries have become new member states, 
requires some adaptation of the explanatory 
factors. We discuss these factors in turn, and 
derive expectations for post-accession with regard 
to two major policy areas – the (single market) 
acquis and liberal democratic norms. We then 
establish the extent of compliance in each of these 
policy areas and assess whether compliance – and 
its variation both across issues and new members 
– is in line with the expectations of the EIM.
Conditions of post-accession 
compliance 
Rewards and credibility. Most notably, the 
incentives that EU institutions can draw on to 
elicit compliance changes after accession. Rather 
than using (conditional) rewards, EU institutions 
can only use negative incentives – sanctions – 
that vary across issue areas. In general, even the 
most sizable of these sanctions are far less costly 
than the pre-accession threat of withholding 
membership, which is precisely why the EIM leads 
to scepticism about the sustainability of incentive-
driven pre-accession compliance after accession 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c: 226; 
Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008; Sedelmeier 2008). 
With regard to rewards/incentives, a key dimension 
in which the EMI would expect variation with 
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regard to post-accession compliance in new 
member states is then across issue areas, according 
to the leverage that EU institutions can exercise 
through sanctioning non-compliance. Not only 
the size of the sanctions the EU institutions can 
use against non-compliance varies across the issue 
areas of the acquis and democracy, but also the 
credibility of the threat of sanctions. Credibility 
depends largely on the autonomy of EU 
institutions in the imposition of sanctions. With 
regard to the rules of liberal democracy, Article 7 
TEU gives EU institutions potentially extremely 
far-reaching sanctions: it allows the Council to 
‘suspend certain … rights’ of a member state 
for ‘serious and persistent’ breaches. However, 
the autonomy of EU institutions in deciding 
sanctions is extremely limited, as the member 
states themselves determine by unanimity (minus 
one) whether such a breach has occurred. The 
sanctioning power of EU institutions is therefore 
comparatively far higher with regard to the 
(single market) acquis. Article 258 and 260 TFEU 
grant the Commission high autonomy to launch 
infringement cases and to refer a member state to 
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), which can 
impose financial penalties for non-compliance. 
In sum, a focus on rewards and their credibility 
generally leads the EIM to expect a deterioration 
of compliance across the board after accession. Yet 
it would expect compliance problems to be less 
severe with regard to the acquis than with regard 
to liberal democracy.
(Determinacy of) conditions. The determinacy of 
the acquis is generally less problematic than for 
the rules of liberal democracy. The EU compliance 
process – which includes the infringement 
procedure, in which the Commission sets out 
its interpretation of the relevant acquis and 
adjudication by the CJEU - increases the clarity 
of rules that a member state is suspected to have 
infringed. Determinacy is lower for Article 7 since 
the determination of what constitutes a breach 
of liberal democratic values is carried out by the 
member states through voting rather than through 
legal reasoning of an autonomous institution. 
The Commission’s new ‘rule of law framework’ 
that mirrors the initial stages of the infringement 
procedure of Art. 258 might help in this respect, 
as does the recourse to non-EU bodies, such as the 
expert opinion of the Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission. Yet neither of these processes are 
binding on the member states. In sum, variation 
in determinacy leads the EIM to expect better 
compliance with the acquis (covered by Art. 258) 
than in the area of liberal democracy.
Costs. In contrast to sanctions, their credibility, 
and the determinacy of the EU’s conditions, which 
vary primarily across issue areas,1 compliance 
costs can vary both across issue areas and new 
member states. With regard to compliance costs, 
the study of post-accession compliance is closely 
related to the study of compliance in the EU (and 
with international institutions more generally), in 
which the ‘enforcement school’ identifies domestic 
compliance costs as a key explanatory factor 
(see e.g. Börzel et al. 2010; Tallberg 2002). Costs 
are generally higher with regard to the political 
conditions of liberal democracy than the (single 
market) acquis, since the former are more likely 
to affect the basis of a government’s hold on office 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c: 213). 
In addition, we expect that variation in member 
states’ administrative capacities is more important 
for acquis compliance, while compliance with 
liberal democracy is predominantly a matter of 
government interest. 
In the following sections, we analyse post-
accession compliance across the single market 
acquis and the EU’s liberal democratic norms. In 
each area, we first establish descriptively the extent 
to which compliance problems have emerged 
and then analyse whether these observations fit 
the expectations of the EIM with regard to the 
compliance patterns across states. In a next step, 
we analyse whether the variation in compliance 
patterns across issue areas can be accounted for by 
the EIM.
1 Notwithstanding the debate whether the threat of 
sanctions is equally credible with regard to big and small member 
states (see e.g. Bo ̈rzel et al. 2010).
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Post-accession compliance with 
the (single market) acquis
In order to establish the extent of compliance 
problems in this broad issue area, we compare the 
compliance record of the new members against 
those of the old members. It is not straightforward 
to determine what extent of non-compliance 
would count as evidence for the prediction of the 
EIM that compliance will suffer after accession: 
would compliance of the new member need to be 
worse than compliance of the worst-performing 
old member states? Or worse than the median old 
member state? However, the actual compliance 
record of the new member states makes the 
assessment more straightforward: most new 
member states outperform most old member 
states; the main exception is Poland that has 
become a compliance laggard in the enlarged EU 
(see figure 1 below). 
Figure 1: Infringements of EU law by Member 
State (average annual number of reasoned 
opinions, 2008-2015) 
The infringement record of the new member states 
thus clearly seems to contradict the expectations 
of the EIM (see also Sedelmeier 2008, 2016; Börzel 
and Sedelmeier 2017: 203). These aggregate results 
are also confirmed in studies of specific policy 
areas. Studies of the new members’ compliance in 
specific policy areas do not find much evidence 
of a deterioration (e.g. Blauberger 2009; Leiber 
2007; Sedelmeier 2009, 2012; Toshkov 2008) and 
studies that compare old and new members do 
not find more severe problems in the latter (e.g. 
Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009; Toshkov 2012; 
Zhelyazkova et al. 2017b).
At the same time, concerns have been raised that 
the new members’ unexpectedly good record 
primarily captures formal compliance that masks 
undetected problems with behavioural compliance 
in the application of EU rules (Falkner et al. 2008; 
Dimitrova 2010). Although the infringement data 
cover not only formal transposition of EU law, but 
also its correct application, there might be reasons 
to fear that undetected non-compliance with 
regard to bad application is more salient in the new 
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member states than the old members (Sedelmeier 
2008: 818-19). However, studies of the application 
of EU directives do not find evidence that it is 
generally more problematic in the new member 
states (Zhelyazkova et al. 2017b).
The findings for post-accession compliance with 
the (single market) acquis thus generally appear 
to contradict the EIM. At the same time, we 
have to bear in mind that according to the EIM, 
compliance is more likely with regard to the (single 
market) acquis than with regard to the political 
conditions. Moreover, although it is difficult to 
derive predictions from the EIM how compliance 
costs should affect cross-country variation in 
compliance at the aggregate level of the (internal 
market) acquis, some of the compliance patterns 
across countries can be plausibly explained from 
the perspective of the EIM. The observation that 
Poland is a compliance laggard, while a number of 
smaller new members are among the compliance 
leaders fits with the argument that powerful states 
need to care less about the reputational costs of 
non-compliance (Börzel et al. 2010). Sedelmeier 
(2016) provides evidence for the importance 
of administrative capacities for post-accession 
compliance: despite generally less efficient public 
administrations than in the old member states, 
those new member states that created during 
the pre-accession more sophisticated specific 
administrative capacities for the implementation 
of the acquis (Dimitrova and Toshkov 2009; Zubek 
2011) perform better after accession. In sum, 
conditionality appears to have a more durable 
positive impact on compliance with regard to the 
(single market) acquis (Sedelmeier 2016) than 
would have been expected by the EIM, although 
some of the more specific compliance patterns 
across countries fit its predictions.
Post-accession compliance with 
liberal democratic conditions
Early studies of the development of liberal 
democracy in the new member stats found no 
evidence of ‘backsliding’ (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 
2010). More recent evidence suggests that the new 
member states have experienced some backsliding 
in general (Börzel and Schimmelfennig 2017), 
but in most cases, it can be argued that this 
deterioration of democracy does not amount to 
clear non-compliance with EU rules. The upper 
line in Figure 2 shows that there is no general and 
sustained deterioration of democracy in the new 
member states. 
Figure 2: Democratic development of CEE and 
SEE 
Note: Mean of Worldwide Governance Indicators on ‘Voice and Accountability’ and ‘Rule of Law’ for the 10 Central and East-
ern European new member states (solid grey line) and for the Western Balkans and Turkey (without Kosovo).
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However, there are cases in which backsliding 
clearly breaches liberal democratic rules. In 
Hungary (since 2010) and Poland (since 2015), 
governments of new member states have 
concentrated power and undermined pluralistic 
democratic competition (see e.g. Bánkuti et al. 
2012; Scheppele 2013; Kelemen 2017; Kelemen 
and Orenstein 2016). In Romania (in 2013), the 
government openly defied the rule of law, albeit 
only temporarily (Iusmen 2016; Pop-Eleches 
2013). 
While a deterioration of liberal democracy in 
the new members would be in line with the 
expectations of the EIM, it cannot easily explain 
why the most serious cases of backsliding 
occurred in these particular countries. However, 
the EIM correctly predicts the inability of 
EU institutions to redress backsliding once it 
occurred in Hungary and Poland, due to the lack 
of credible sanctions. And while the EIM struggles 
to explain why the Romanian government broadly 
complied with the demands of the presidents of 
the Commission and the Council to cease its 
breaches of the rule of law (Sedelmeier 2014), it 
correctly predicts that compliance is more likely 
in the case of the Romanian government, than in 
the cases of Hungary or Poland. The Romanian 
government broke the rule of law to impeach a 
deeply unpopular president who was unlikely to 
win re-election in the election scheduled for the 
following year. These measures were therefore 
hardly necessary to maintain or win office, and 
restoring compliance was accordingly much 
less costly than in Hungary or Poland. The EIM 
therefore correctly predicts that the influence 
of EU institutions on compliance decreases, the 
more a government’s hold on power depends on 
its illiberal practices (Sedelmeier 2017). Moreover, 
the EIM also correctly predicts that the influence 
of the EU in the Hungarian case is strongest with 
regard to those selective issues in which illiberal 
practices also infringed the EU acquis, which 
allowed the Commission to use the compliance 
procedures under Article 258 TFEU. An example 
is the lowering of the retirement age of judges that 
the Hungarian government had used to replace 
judges over the age of 62 with party loyalists 
(Sedelmeier 2014). At the same time, eventual 
compliance with these issues did not redress the 
damage that initial non-compliance did to liberal 
democratic practices (e.g. judges forced into 
early retirement were compensated rather than 
reinstated), let alone affect the broader patterns of 
the government’s concentration of power.
In sum, post-accession compliance with regard 
to liberal democratic principles confirms the 
expectations of the EIM both with regard to a 
certain deterioration of compliance in general, 
and specifically the inability of the EU to redress 
non-compliance in Hungary and Poland, due to 
the lack of credible sanctions and high compliance 
costs for the governments concerned. At the same 
time, the EIM is less well equipped to explain 
whether compliance problems emerge in specific 
countries, but rather how likely it is that the EU can 
elicit compliance through the threat of sanctions 
once such problems arise. 
If we compare the post-accession context for 
the CEECs – both with regard to the acquis and 
liberal democracy – and the pre-accession period, 
a first main difference is that the EU’s rewards for 
compliance are generally weaker. The second, and 
crucial difference concerns the low credibility of the 
threat to use sanctions after accession with regard 
to breaches of liberal democracy even if they are 
more sizeable. The apparent absence of large-scale 
compliance problems in the new member states 
with regard to the single market acquis is then 
surprising for the EIM. But the broader patterns, 
specifically the greater severity of compliance 
problems in the area of liberal democracy than in 
the area of the acquis, fit well with the predictions 
of the EIM.  A focus on credibility and domestic 
compliance costs explains well why compliance 
has been more problematic in the former, and 
why EU institutions have been least effective in 
redressing these compliance problems in Hungary 
and Poland.
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SEE in pre-accession: the 
current candidates
Already before completing its fifth enlargement, 
the EU had begun to expand its enlargement 
policy beyond the CEE candidates. In 1999, it 
started the stabilization and association process 
with the countries of the Western Balkans and 
promoted Turkey to “official candidate” status. At 
the Thessaloniki European Council of 2003, the 
EU confirmed and reinforced the membership 
perspective for the Western Balkans, already 
declared in 1999. In 2005, the EU started accession 
negotiations with Croatia, which became a member 
in 2013, and Turkey; Macedonia achieved official 
candidate status. Since then, the EU has entered 
into accession negotiations with Montenegro 
(2012) and Serbia (2014), and accorded Albania 
(2014) official candidate status.
Conditions of pre-accession 
compliance
Rewards. As for the size of the reward, the 
conditions of conditionality do not differ from the 
CEE candidates. The EU promised all official and 
potential candidates full membership.
Credibility of the threat. Equally, the credibility of 
the EU’s threat to withhold membership in case 
of non-compliance does not differ significantly 
from CEE. Asymmetrical interdependence works 
strongly in favour of the EU, and while the EU has 
an interest in the stability and integration of the 
region, this interest will keep the EU engaged, but 
does not create an unconditional push towards 
enlargement (Vachudova 2014). 
If anything, the SEE countries are less relevant 
and attractive for the EU economies, and more 
dependent on external support, than the CEECs 
given their smaller size and lower level of economic 
development. In 2016, the Western Balkans 
account for around one percent of EU imports and 
1.5 percent of EU exports, while the EU accounts 
for almost 75 percent of the Western Balkans’ total 
trade. In spite of growing engagement of China 
and Russia, these potentially rivalling economic 
powers remain distant second and third partners 
for the Western Balkans (China 5.5% and Russia 
4.7%).2 From the perspective of the external 
incentives model, this inferior position limits the 
cross-conditionality that China and Russia could 
exercise. Whereas Turkey is in a stronger position 
as a large and growing economy and one of the 
EU’s main non-EU trading partners, it still only 
accounts for a little over four percent of the EU’s 
total external trade. Moreover, the EU is Turkey’s 
most important trade partner, covering more than 
40% of its total trade.3 
Credibility of the promise. By contrast, the 
credibility of the EU promise to admit the 
candidates if they fulfil the conditions has suffered 
in comparison with Eastern enlargement. As in 
Eastern enlargement, the EU has not specified 
any ex ante timeline either but stuck to its official 
line that candidates would join when they are 
ready. However, Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker deviated from this stance when 
he announced that there would not be any 
enlargement during his tenure (2014-2019). In 
another signal of reduced priority, the current 
Commission abolished the Directorate-General 
for Enlargement and merged it in a bureaucratic 
unit responsible for all neighbouring countries.
Beyond these general indications, Turkey has 
been affected most by the lack of a credible 
membership promise. Turkey is the most 
contested EU candidate. According to the 
Eurobarometer surveys, it is the least preferred 
among the EU’s (potential) candidates for 
membership. The share of those opposed to 
Turkish membership has ranged between 55 and 
59 percent between 2005 and 2010, and majority 
opposition is independent of whether or not 
Turkey fulfils the EU’s conditions (Dagdeverenis 
2014: 7-8). Moreover, Turkey is a distant outlier 
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Europeans (Klingemann and Weldon 2013). The 
fundamental cultural resistance revealed in the 
data is mirrored at the party level in the principled 
opposition of both radical and many centre-right 
parties towards Turkish membership. When the 
EU decided to start accession negotiations with 
Turkey, Austria and France raised the possibility 
of a national referendum on a future accession 
treaty – a very common procedure in accession 
states but hitherto rather the exception in old 
member states (France held a referendum on the 
UK’s accession). Constitutional revisions in 2005 
and 2008 introduced the obligation for France to 
hold a referendum on any further EU enlargement 
following Croatia (unless approved by both 
houses of parliament by a 3/5 majority). From the 
point of view of candidate countries, accession 
referendums in member states increase the 
number of veto players beyond the member state 
governments and thus reinforce their uncertainty 
about eventual membership.
In addition, the EU’s institutional commitment 
to Turkish membership has been weaker than in 
the case of other candidates. First, the Negotiation 
Framework of 2005 declares the accession 
negotiations as ‘open-ended’ and includes the 
possibility of permanent derogations. Second, the 
admission of a divided Cyprus to the EU imported 
the Cyprus conflict into the accession process 
with Turkey. The EU governments sceptical about 
Turkey’s accession obtained an agreement to 
make the continuation of accession negotiations 
dependent on Turkey’s implementation of the 
Additional Protocol of the Ankara Agreement 
that would extend the customs union to the new 
member states, including Cyprus. When Turkey 
failed to comply, the EU reacted by partially 
blocking the negotiations. Around half of the 
negotiation chapters are currently frozen, mostly 
based on vetoes from Cyprus and France.
Whereas Turkey is an extreme case, support for 
EU enlargement has generally eroded over time 
(Toshkov et al. 2014). ‘Enlargement fatigue’ has 
been the dominant mood since 2005. In the 2015 
Autumn Eurobarometer survey (EB 84.3), the 
share of those opposed to further enlargement 
reached 51 percent. Even though Western Balkan 
countries do not face any principled or culturally 
motivated opposition among mainstream member 
state governments and parties, particular bilateral 
conflicts with Western Balkan countries, which 
have little to do with the formal membership 
conditions, have inhibited the accession process. 
The most important example is the state name 
dispute between Greece and Macedonia, which 
has led Greece to block the start of accession 
negotiations since 2009. 
In sum, then, the credibility of the EU’s promise 
to grant membership to compliant candidates 
is currently lower than it was during Eastern 
enlargement. This reduced credibility is a result 
of the unfavourable public opinion towards 
future enlargements, the increasing threat of 
referendums, the lack of consensus and coherence 
among the member states, the existence of 
substantial bilateral conflicts between individual 
member states and the candidate countries, and 
the weakened institutional commitment of the 
Commission. 
(Determinacy of) conditions. Because the EU’s 
acquis increases over time, the conditions to be 
met by candidate countries evolve, too. However, 
the EU has only developed gradually in the past 
ten years. Major changes were limited to the euro 
area, to which new member states do not belong 
upon accession. Yet the EU has also repeatedly 
revised its enlargement strategy and conditions. 
First, the candidates of the Western Balkans are 
subject to the ‘Copenhagen Plus’ criteria, which 
relate to specific problems of the region, including 
full cooperation with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 
implementation of peace agreements, and the 
resolution of bilateral disputes. Indeed, the EU has 
not only been engaged in Europeanizing existing 
states as in CEE (and in Turkey) but in building 
and transforming states in the first place as a 
precondition even for association. According to 
Bieber (2011), the EU conditions related to state-
building not only suffered from a lack of clear 
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criteria but also from a cacophony of voices from 
other actors involved in the peace and institution-
building process.
Second, the EU has put stronger emphasis on 
democracy and the rule of law. Again, this 
emphasis on general political principles not 
specified in the EU acquis was susceptible to 
low determinacy. Yet the ‘new approach’ in EU 
enlargement strategy has increased both salience 
and precision. EU conditions in this area are 
now more detailed and better operationalized 
(by the introduction of specific opening, interim, 
and closing benchmarks) than during the Fifth 
Enlargement. The relevant negotiation chapters 
23 and 24 are now opened at the beginning of 
the negotiations and remain open until their very 
end, thereby giving the candidate states a longer 
time to adopt and implement EU conditions 
and the Commission a better chance to monitor 
compliance. In addition, the Commission can link 
the opening of other chapters to progress in the 
rule-of-law chapters. Moreover, the EU upgraded 
the economic and administrative reforms it asks 
from the candidates (Dimitrova 2016; Zhelyazkova 
et al. 2017a).  Finally, the EU announced that it 
would not treat the Western Balkans as a single 
‘enlargement round’, but judge every candidate 
on its own merit. This approach strengthened 
the credibility of the EU’s conditionality, as less 
compliant candidates cannot hope to hide behind 
the more compliant ones.
Consequently, the EU’s conditionality has 
become both more demanding and (partly) 
more determinate. The EU has broadened the 
set of conditions, especially by expanding the 
‘enlargement acquis’ beyond the regulatory public 
policy rules and into fundamental state-building, 
rule-of-law, administrative and economic reforms; 
it has improved the precision of its conditions 
in some of these areas; and it has strengthened 
its monitoring, feedback, and sanctioning 
mechanisms. Whereas higher determinacy of 
the conditions should improve the likelihood of 
successful Europeanization, more demanding 
conditions might increase the adoption costs 
and delay membership, thereby undermining the 
effectiveness of conditionality. 
Costs. As in CEE, EU membership has been highly 
popular in SEE at the beginning of the process. 
Whereas Turkish public support for membership 
has significantly cooled down over time, it has 
retained majorities in the Western Balkans 
overall (Toshkov et al. 2014). As in the previous 
enlargement, the popularity of EU accession 
generally lowers the domestic adoption costs and 
induces governments to engage in Europeanization 
and pursue accession progress. However, public 
support also reflects the credibility of the accession 
promise. Accordingly, public support in Turkey as 
well as in other SEE countries has decreased in 
line with the credibility of the process.
Political and administrative adoption costs, 
however, are generally higher for current 
candidates than in CEE. The SEE countries have 
started their transition and Europeanization 
from a lower level of fit. Many of them were still 
struggling with issues of statehood and state 
transformation at the start of the process; Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo still are. With regard 
to both democracy and governance capacity, the 
gap between the CEE countries and the EU has 
been considerably smaller than the gap between 
SEE and the EU. With the exception of Croatia, 
the Western Balkans states are among the poorest 
and least developed countries in Europe. Indeed, 
according to most indicators, the CEE countries 
have been closer to the EU than SEE has been to 
CEE (Börzel and Schimmelfennig 2017). 
Domestic adjustment cost therefore create a more 
unfavourable setting for Europeanization in SEE 
than in CEE. First, the governments of the region 
on average need to give up more power and rent-
seeking opportunities and accept more constraints 
in order to meet the EU’s conditions, in particular 
in the domain of the rule of law, in which the EU 
has strengthened its conditionality. Second, they 
need to meet the Copenhagen-Plus conditions that 
relate to recent ethnic conflict, concern identity-
sensitive issues, and thus involve potentially 
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high political costs for governments to comply 
(Freyburg and Richter 2010). Overcoming such 
costs requires substantial and imminent rewards 
(Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Schimmelfennig 
2008). Finally, political conditions, which 
generally create higher adoption costs, dominate 
SEE pre-accession. Whereas violations of political 
conditions have been limited to a few countries in 
CEE and have mostly stopped before the accession 
negotiations started, they affect virtually all SEE 
countries and continue to affect the enlargement 
process well into the accession negotiations.
In sum, the EU offered the SEE candidates the 
same membership reward as the CEE countries. 
It preserved the high credibility of its threat to 
withhold this reward in case of non-compliance 
and even strengthened the determinacy of its 
conditions and its monitoring process. On 
the other hand, however, the credibility of the 
EU’s membership promise has weakened and 
political and administrative domestic adoption 
costs have increased in general. Based on the 
external incentives model, we would therefore 
expect Europeanization to slow down and lose 
effectiveness. Governments that perceive a high 
uncertainty of obtaining membership are likely to 
be unwilling to accept the considerable political 
and administrative costs that full compliance 
would entail.  
The Europeanization of the 
Western Balkans and Turkey
How has the Europeanization of the current 
candidates proceeded and what do the outcomes 
tell us about the fit of the external incentives 
model? Figure 2 shows the democracy and 
governance trajectory of the entire region 
(Western Balkans and Turkey) in comparison 
with CEE. All indicators show an increase in the 
initial years of the period and a narrowing of the 
gap between the two subregions until recently. The 
membership perspective accorded to SEE in 1999 
clearly gave democratic development a boost, 
which continued when in CEE the ‘membership 
carrot’ was consumed and development flattened. 
Since 2014, however, we have seen backsliding.
Figure 3: SEE democratic development by 
country
Note: see Figure 2.
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Figure 3 shows the liberal-democratic trajectory 
for each SEE country. First, the data confirm that 
the EU has been largely consistent in rewarding the 
countries of the region for their progress. Croatia, 
the only new member state, clearly comes out top-
of-the-league. Serbia and Montenegro, the two 
Western Balkan countries currently in accession 
negotiations, rank behind Croatia but ahead of 
the other Western Balkan countries. At the time, 
when Turkey started accession negotiations, its 
democratic performance was better, too, than that 
of the Western Balkan countries except Croatia. 
Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Kosovo, which 
have not had official candidate status during this 
period (Albania gained it in 2014), have ranked 
lowest. Thus, the credibility problems that EU 
conditionality has in the region do not stem from 
inconsistency.
Second, EU accession conditionality has not been 
able to induce sufficient and sustainable progress 
in the political development of its candidate 
countries. The fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo have remained at the bottom of the league 
with regard to democracy and governance testifies 
to the strength of statehood as a core condition of 
Europeanization (Börzel 2013) and the failure of 
EU conditionality in state-building (Bieber 2011). 
The cases of failure are clearly overdetermined, 
combining distant and uncertain rewards with 
particularly high domestic adaptation costs owing 
to powerful internal (and external) veto players 
and low state capacity. 
Turkey and Macedonia are the two countries 
whose membership perspective has become least 
credible because of significant bilateral conflicts 
with EU member states and – in the case of Turkey 
– principled public and partisan opposition, both 
rooted in national and cultural identities. The 
effects can be seen in the trajectories of the two 
countries’ liberal-democratic performance. Initial 
progress gave way to regression when it became 
clear that the EU would not reward their efforts in 
the near future. 
In Turkey, a combination of external incentives 
and reduced political costs triggered the initial 
reforms, which earned Turkey the start of the 
accession negotiations (Kubicek 2011; Müftüler-
Bac 2005; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). The official 
candidate status of 1999 raised the credibility of 
Turkey’s membership perspective; the electoral 
victory of the AKP brought a party to power 
that had a strong self-interest in constraining 
and reforming the Kemalist state. After 2005, 
perceptions of EU double standards gained 
ground in Turkey, the political consensus behind 
the reform process broke down, and the Turkish 
government reoriented its international relations 
away from the EU focus (Kubicek 2011). Whereas 
the process of Europeanization has not come to a 
full stop after 2005, it has been limited to selective 
policy areas, driven by the government’s domestic 
political interest (Cengiz and Hoffmann 2013; 
Yilmaz and Soyaltin 2014) or socialization and 
anticipatory compliance in policy networks (Aydin 
and Kirisci 2013; Bürgin and Asikoglu 2017). 
This confirms the finding that, in the absence 
of credible conditionality, Europeanization 
may still occur as a result of social learning and 
lesson-drawing. Since 2010, however, a process of 
retrenchment or ‘de-Europeanization’ has become 
dominant (Yilmaz 2016). The Turkish case shows 
most clearly how the decrease in the credibility 
of the EU’s conditional membership promise has 
resulted in a decrease of the EU’s influence on the 
country’s general political development.
Besides Croatia, Macedonia has been an early and 
eager ‘Europeanizer’ in the Western Balkans. After 
its membership application in 2004 and obtaining 
candidate status in 2005, Macedonia engaged in 
high legislative activity to bring its institutions and 
policies in line with the EU, earning the country 
a series of recommendations by the European 
Commission to start accession negotiations, only 
to be vetoed by Greece. Since 2010, Macedonia’s 
rule adoption has slowed down, interrupted by a 
short period of heightened activity when the High 
Level Accession Dialogue appeared to be able to 
overcome the name dispute in 2012/13 (Nechev 
2017). During the same time, the Macedonian 
government of Nikola Gruevski stepped up state 
capture, revealed in the ‘wiretapping scandal’ 
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of 2015 and causing prolonged political crisis. 
In a remarkable statement after the formation 
of the new Zaev government in June 2017, EU 
Commissioner Johannes Hahn admitted that 
the EU’s handling of the name dispute between 
Macedonia and Greece ‘was clearly not helpful for 
stabilizing the country’ and that the EU ‘should 
have learned their lesson and … find a solution at 
last to start negotiations’.4 
Finally, the EU is still able to elicit compliance 
with its demands, even if they involve high 
political costs, if it offers important and imminent 
intermediate rewards in return. To give a few 
examples, when the EU made the start of 
accession negotiations specifically dependent 
on the arrest of suspected war-criminal General 
Gotovina, Croatia cooperated with the ICTY 
(Schimmelfennig 2008). When the closing of 
accession negotiations approached, the Croatian 
government demonstrated resolve in the fight 
against corruption by arresting former Prime 
Minister Sanader (from the same political party) 
in December 2010 (Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit 
2012). When the EU made clear in 2011 that 
Serbia’s path to membership would be blocked 
without a constructive dialogue with Kosovo, 
the Serbian government complied and was 
promptly rewarded with a recommendation of 
the Commission to award official candidate status 
(Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015). Whereas 
in Eastern enlargement the critical occasions for 
applying leverage on politically costly issues were 
limited to the starting and closing of accession 
negotiations (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006), the 
EU has now created many more such ‘windows 
for leverage’ (O’Brennan 2014), from the start of 
association negotiations to the decisions on closing 
benchmarks for individual negotiation chapters. 
These ‘micro-conditionalities’ have, indeed, 
helped to move the integration processes forward 
incrementally – especially in the cases of Croatia 
and Serbia, which were not durably blocked by 
bilateral conflicts with the member states. 
4 ‘EU sees “momentum” on Macedonia name dispute’, 
EU Observer, 12 June 2017, available at https://euobserver.com/
enlargement/138199. 
In the same vein, the EU has sought to compensate 
the distant and uncertain reward of membership 
with a series of smaller, sectoral agreements that 
would commit the Western Balkan countries to 
adopting a specific set of policy rules in return 
for short-term rewards in areas such as energy 
and border policy (Renner and Trauner 2009). 
Moreover, the visa liberalization for the Western 
Balkans demonstrated the effectiveness of tangible, 
credible, and imminent rewards in mobilizing 
compliance (Trauner 2009).
In sum, the major difference between CEE and 
SEE enlargement is the combination of higher 
adaptation costs with a lower credibility of the 
EU’s conditionality. The SEE countries started 
from a much greater distance from EU standards, 
faced additional prerequisites of accession but 
were given a much more distant and uncertain 
membership perspective. This discrepancy slowed 
down Europeanization in the entire region, 
especially in those countries that suffered from 
weak statehood and were entangled in bilateral 
conflicts with a member state. Credibility clearly 
stands out as the most important factor weakening 
EU conditionality. As the development of Turkey 
in the early 2000s and several instances of Croatian 
and Serbian compliance demonstrate, compliance 
is possible even in highly politicized issue areas if 
conditionality is credible.
Conclusions
In the Eastern enlargement process, the EIM 
largely explained compliance with EU norms 
and rules because the constellation of conditions 
was favourable. Rewards were high and credible, 
domestic adoption costs moderate, and in the few 
cases, in which political costs were high, they could 
be overcome by even higher imminent rewards. 
In the two post-Eastern enlargement contexts we 
have examined in this paper, however, conditions 
have changed. Table 1 offers an overview of 
Europeanization outcomes and the constellation 
of the key conditions for Europeanization across 
the two groups of countries, and different time 
periods and main issue areas for the CEE, leaving 
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aside variations in some conditions across 
countries and disregarding determinacy, which is 
generally a secondary influence.
Table 1: General configurations of conditions 
in CEE and SEE accession contexts
In the post-accession period of the new member 
states, the membership reward had been 
consumed and could not be matched by any 
(credible) EU sanctions for non-compliance. 
Otherwise, conditions vary significantly between 
the issue areas of the market acquis and the EU’s 
liberal democratic norms. The defiant stance 
of the EU’s ‘illiberal democracies’ vis-à-vis 
potential EU sanctions in the area of democratic 
norms fits the prediction of the EIM based on 
low credibility and high domestic costs – and in 
spite of a significant loss of membership rewards 
if sanctions were actually applied. By contrast, 
higher credibility of sanctions for non-compliance 
and lower compliance costs are more conducive 
to compliance with regard to the single market 
acquis in the post-accession period. Given the 
considerable change in the reward structure, the 
strong compliance record of the new member 
states is nevertheless puzzling from the EIM 
perspective. 
The main difference in the configuration of 
conditions in the CEE and SEE pre-accession 
contexts is the lack of credibility of the membership 
reward. As predicted by the EIM, it has led to a 
generally lower level of compliance. Moreover, 
compliance has varied across time and countries 
in line with variation in the credibility of EU 
rewards.
In general, the comparative evidence highlights 
the importance of credibility. Even if incentives 
(rewards and sanctions) are strong in principle, 
they fail to affect rule adoption and compliance if 
they lack credibility. In addition, highly credible 
incentives have proven capable of overcoming 
considerable domestic costs in the pre-accession 
periods. Ceteris paribus, credibility is the core 
resource of EU conditionality. Its decline is 
the most important factor in the decline of the 
Europeanization effects of the EU’s enlargement 
policy.
Incentives Credibility Costs Compliance
CEE pre-accession ++ + + (acquis) 
- (democracy)
+
CEE post-accession (acquis) - + + +
CEE post-accession (democracy) + - (threat) - -
SEE pre-accession ++ - (promise) - -
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Despite deficient institutional practices, political 
resistance, and lagging public support for 
European Union (EU) membership, as well as the 
presence of three existential EU crises—the euro 
crisis, Brexit, and migration crisis—, the states of 
Southeast Europe (SEE) continue to adapt their 
domestic policies, procedures, legislation, norms 
and values to the EU’s acquis communautaire—
Europeanization. The Europeanization literature 
explains that such processes of adaption are 
induced by incentives, and informed by the 
(limited) ability of each state to negotiate its 
membership requirements. However, given the 
degree of political and institutional weakness in 
SEE, in addition to the EU’s current apathetic 
stance towards enlargement, this article questions 
the explanatory power of traditional, hierarchical 
conceptualizations of Europeanization. In turn, it 
investigates the extent to which the EU and Southeast 
European candidates (SECs) have employed new, 
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‘horizontal’ mechanisms of Europeanization 
involving sub-governmental units and networks 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Contrary to conditionality approaches, horizontal 
mechanisms of Europeanization like twinning and 
NGO-led projects rely on cooperation, learning, 
and the co-production of outputs to overcome 
the technical and strategic problems facing the 
candidates. 
Keywords: Horizontal Europeanization, 
Enlargement, NGOs, Southeast Europe, Twinning, 
Compliance
Introduction
European Union (EU) membership for the 
former-Yugoslav countries of Southeast Europe 
(SEE) is at a cross-roads. On the surface the EU 
seems committed to the promises made at the 2003 
EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki. 
Croatia and Slovenia are already EU members, 
and Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina remain 
the only former-Yugoslav countries without 
candidacy status. At the domestic level the states 
have routinely professed their EU aspirations 
and appear, at least rhetorically, committed to 
implementing the necessary reforms. However, if 
European Commission (‘Commission’) President 
Jean-Claude Juncker’s July 2014 speech to the 
European Parliament (EP) is any indication, 
then EU membership may be ‘frozen’ at 28 – 
or at least for the length of the current term 
of the Commission President. Similarly, the 
Commission’s 2016 Enlargement Communication 
gave little indication that further enlargement was 
imminent.2
The prospect of an SEE enlargement has been 
hampered by a number of existential threats to 
the EU. In Brussels and across the European 
capitals enthusiasm for enlargement has been 
2 European Commission, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy (Brussels: 
European Commission, 2016).
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replaced by a predation for introspection—a 
‘deepening’ rather than ‘widening’.3 As a result of 
the crises and the EU’s justifiably singular focus 
on developing solutions to the crises, negotiations 
with the Southeast European candidates (SECs) 
have slowed. Indeed, Bechev noted that SEE had 
been effectively demoted to ‘the periphery of the 
periphery’.
4 At the same time the crises have made it difficult 
for the EU to justify the political and economic 
obligations embodied by the enlargement acquis. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier explain that 
in order for the proverbial ‘carrot-and-stick’ or 
‘conditionality’ principle to encourage EU-rule 
adoption the carrot must be sufficiently large.5 
However, it is unclear whether membership to an 
unstable EU still represents a substantial enough 
reward to overcome domestic political and social 
barriers.
A similar acknowledgment of the domestic 
condition of the candidates and potential 
candidates from SEE is necessary. Opinion polls 
continue to show that support for EU membership 
is falling across SEE.6 Due to the polarization of 
the populous it has become increasingly complex 
for SEE politicians to maintain political power 
while balancing EU expectations. As a result, 
several SECs have silently and purposely become 
policy laggards, preferring to play a game of 
wait-and-see. Moreover, these nations still 
struggle to meet the basic demands of modern 
3 Jean-Claude Juncker, “A New Start for Europe: My 
Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change” 
(speech, Strasbourg, July 15, 2014), European Commission, https://
ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/president-junckers-
political-guidelines_en.
4 Dimitar Bechev, The Periphery of the Periphery: The 
Western Balkans and the Euro Crisis (London: European Council of 
Foreign Relations, 2012).
5 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, 
“Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,’ Journal of European 
Public Policy 11, no.4 (2004): 661-679.
6 Dimiter Toshkov, Elitsa Kortenska, Antoaneta Dimitrova, 
and Adam Fagan, “The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europeans: Analysis of 
Public Opinion on EU Enlargement in Review,” MAXCAP Working 
Paper Series, no.2 (2014): 1-41.
functioning states. For example, on the eve of 
accession Croatia was cited by the EU for deficient 
administrative practices and suspect institutional 
arrangements.7 To varying degrees, administrative 
incapacities and deficient institutional practices 
beleaguer all SECs. Communication is difficult, 
institutional isolation common, bureaucratic 
turnover endemic, and budgetary constraints 
an everyday reality. In order to overcome these 
issues, EU membership, although significant and 
undoubtedly a key motivation for SEE politicians, 
must be accompanied by concrete plans to address 
the institutional and administrative problems that 
limit a candidate’s ability to manage the acquis. The 
issue for the SECs is not the size of the reward nor 
the desire to join the EU, but rather an inability 
to meet the obligations that come with candidacy. 
This paper acknowledges the significance of EU 
affairs and domestic contexts when considering the 
Europeanization of SEE. It sets out to investigate 
the mechanisms employed to help these states 
improve their administrative capacities, and 
bring their systems of governance in line with EU 
norms and values. The literature has suggested 
that Europeanization occurs as (1) the EU uses 
its position of power vis-à-vis its candidates to 
coerce domestic actors into complying with the 
Union’s values, norms, policies, and legislation, (2) 
domestic stakeholders contest the EU’s demands 
and attempt to integrate domestic preferences and 
norms into the accession process, or as (3) Howell 
admitted, a mixture of both processes.8 However, 
relying on these hierarchical understandings to 
explain the Europeanization of SEE overlooks 
the value of transgovernmental cooperation9, 
7 European Commission, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Main Findings of the Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia’s 
State of Preparedness for EU Membership (Brussels: European 
Commission, 2012), 4-5, 8, 15-17.
8 Kerry Howell, “Developing Conceptualisations of 
Europeanization: Synthesising Methodological Approaches,” 
Queen’s Papers on Europeanization, no.3 (2004): 1-13.
9 Transgovernmental refers to ‘cross-boundary relations 
among sub-units of national governments in the absence of 
centralized decisions by state executives’—Source: Thomas Risse, 
“Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory 
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facilitated by the EU’s Twinning Initiative, as well 
as the efforts of non-governmental organizations 
(NGO) to network with like-minded organizations 
towards acquis-compliant policy change. Using 
Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro as case studies, 
this paper assesses the impact of twinning and 
NGO-led projects to provide a more conceptually 
complete rendering of the Europeanization 
process, and highlight the immergence of 
‘horizontal’ mechanisms of Europeanization in 
SEE. These cases were chosen based on their 
common historical legacies, geographic proximity, 
and geopolitical importance to the EU. Of course 
Croatia’s experience as a candidate is discussed in 
retrospective, as it is the newest EU member state. 
Inferences made from these cases provide insights 
into twinning and NGO-led projects in SEE more 
generally, and provide a lens through which the 
integrative processes used by the EU in SEE can be 
more fully investigated.
The paper is organized into three substantive 
sections and one concluding section. The first 
section discusses the conceptual development 
of Europeanization, focusing more specifically 
on debates about its ‘direction of causality’, that 
is whether the mechanism of change originates 
from the top down, bottom-up or horizontally.10 
The second section argues that Europeanization, 
presented as a combination of ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ processes is unable to explain fully 
the processes of domestic adaptation in SEE. The 
section introduces the concept of ‘horizontal’ 
Europeanization in more detail and contextualizes 
its theoretical significance within the field. The 
third section uses evidence from Serbia, Croatia, 
and Montenegro to show how the existence of 
transnational networking and transgovernmental 
cooperation are fundamentally changing the 
way Europeanization occurs in SEE. The final 
concluding section surveys the main points of this 
paper. 
and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 34, no.1 (1996): 58.
10 Robert Ladrech, Europeanization and National Politics 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010), 3.
The Conceptual Development of 
Europeanization
A series of key debates have guided the progression 
of Europeanization research. Initially many 
scholars wondered what Europeanization was 
and how it differed from European integration 
theories. Some scholars saw Europeanization as an 
outcome of European integration, where domestic 
policies, legislation, and procedures are more 
or less ‘Europeanized’ to meet EU regulations. 
11 Some scholars even used Europeanization 
interchangeably with the notion of European 
integration.12 Still other scholars, this one 
included, saw Europeanization as a process by 
which principles of EU governance are translated 
and converted into existing systems of domestic 
policy-making.13 Another key distinction made by 
more recent scholarship has been the difference 
between the Europeanization of member states 
and the Europeanization of EU candidate states14. 
Grabbe and others have shown that the power 
asymmetry between the EU and its candidates 
make the Europeanization of EU candidates 
fundamentally different from similar processes 
11 Simon Hix and Klaus Goetz, “Introduction: 
European integration and National Political Systems,” West 
European Politics 23, no.4 (2000): 1-26; Jim Buller and Anthony 
Gamble, “Conceptualizing Europeanization,” Public Policy and 
Administration 17, no. 4 (2002): 4-24.
12 Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, and Thomas 
Risse, eds., Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic 
Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
13 Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics 
and Institutions: The Case of France,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 32, no.1 (1994): 69-88; Tanja Börzel, “Towards Convergence 
in Europe?,” Journal of Common Market Studies 34, no.4 (1999): 573-
596; Klaus Goetz, “Four Worlds of Europeanization” (presentation, 
ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Turin, Italy, 22-27 March, 2002); 
Howell, “Developing Conceptualisations”; Frank Schimmelfennig 
and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern 
Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Claudio Radaelli, 
“Europeanization: The Challenge of Establishing Causality,” in 
Research Design in European Studies: Establishing Causality in 
Europeanization, eds. Theofanis Exadaktylos and Claudio Radaelli 
(New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012), 1-16.
14 Heather Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power: 
Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern 
Europe (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006); Ulrich Sedelmeier, 
“Europeanization in New Member and Candidate States,” Living 
Reviews in European Governance 6, no. 1 (2011): 1-52.
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between the EU and its members15. More recently, 
scholars have focused on Europeanization’s 
orientation or ‘direction of causality’.16 The next 
subsection proceeds with an overview of this 
key debate and asks us to reconsider who is 
involved in the Europeanization process and what 
mechanisms they use to impact the process. 
Europeanization: From What 
Direction?
Scholars have long debated the precise ‘direction’ 
of Europeanization—does it occur top-down, 
bottom-up or from some ‘horizontal’ direction? 
The first major contribution to this debate was 
offered by Ladrech who defined Europeanization 
as: 
…an incremental process reorienting the 
direction and shape of politics to the degree 
that EC political and economic dynamics 
become part of the organizational logic of 
national politics and policy-making.17
While Ladrech maintained the primacy of 
domestic interests, he also recognized that 
supranational norms and values were quickly 
becoming interwoven with domestic and regional 
policy-making structures. In fact, ‘organizational 
logic’ was left purposefully vague so as to 
encompass all of the structural and administrative 
changes brought on by deeper EU integration 
and the new environmental inputs, resources, 
costs, and competition faced by new members.18 
Yet, this definition fails to provide any clarity on 
how EU dynamics become a part of domestic 
political processes, and thus overlooks the impact 
of non-state actors and interagency cooperation. 
Such hierarchical, top-down renderings of 
Europeanization assume that the presence of 
formal EU policies exert pressure on member 
and candidate states to conform. This of course 
15 Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power.
16 Ladrech, Europeanization, 3
17 Ladrech, ‘Europeanization of Domestic,” 69.
18 Ibid., 70.
also assumes that domestic actors are able to 
judge the ‘goodness of fit’ between domestic 
policy preferences and the requirements of EU 
membership.19  Yet, goodness of fit only explains 
scenarios where EU policy is clear and present. 
The EU does not possess one singular ‘model’ 
which candidates can simply download and merge 
with their domestic processes. Rather, it possesses 
a wealth of different political arrangements, 
each designed for unique domestic contexts. 
For instance, EU members may share monetary 
and competition policies, yet there is no such 
convergence of EU education and transportation 
policy. A set of general guiding principles 
certainly inform the policies and procedures of 
EU members, however these principles do not 
represent some higher EU model. 
Even when EU requirements are clear, the presence 
of veto players, political instability, and public 
opinion can make it difficult for those requirements 
to become part of domestic practices.20 Alternative 
forms of influence and persistence are often 
necessary for EU policies to produce their desired 
effect on domestic politics.  Therefore, reducing 
the complex process of Europeanization to an act 
of copying or downloading is simply inaccurate 
and does not take into respect the important role 
‘horizontal’ mechanisms of influence play in the 
accession process.
Elaborating on Ladrech’s definition, Radaelli 
defined Europeanization as:
 the ‘(a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) 
institutionalization of formal and informal 
rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs 
and norms, which are first defined and 
consolidated in the EU policy process and 
19 Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl, “How Europe 
matters: Different Mechanisms of Europeanization,” European 
Integration Online Papers 3, no.7 (1999): 1-19.
20 Claudio Radaelli and Roman Pasquier, “Conceptual 
Issues,” in Europeanization: New Research Agendas, eds. Paolo 
Graziano and Maarten Vink (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 
2007), 37.
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then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
(national and subnational) discourse, 
identities, political structures and public 
policies’.21 
While equally as vague about the process 
of Europeanization, Radaelli’s definition 
encompasses the plethora of outcomes caused by 
EU influence, acknowledging less formal types 
of change like norm and belief adjustment. The 
definition also highlights the prominent role 
played by the EU, without disregarding adaption 
by ‘national and subnational’ entities. Elaborating 
on this domestic dimension Börzel explains that 
in order to understand Europeanization we must 
see national governments as ‘shapers and takers’.22 
In other words, individual states maintain the 
ability to modify EU demands and attempt to 
‘shape’ EU requirements from the ‘bottom-up’. 
While it is reasonable to assume that candidate 
and potential candidates of SEE are more likely 
to ‘take’ than ‘shape’, even as the weaker members 
of an asymmetric relationship they are ultimately 
responsible for the implementation of the EU’s 
demands. It is during the implementation phase 
that candidates are given the most opportunity to 
shape the degree to which they are Europeanized. 
Börzel’s earlier work argues that states can 
participate in ‘foot dragging’, ‘pace-setting’, and 
‘fence sitting’ activities that, to varying degrees, 
enable domestic actors to affect and react to 
the EU’s demands in ways that undermine EU 
authority.23 From this perspective it is reasonable 
to assume that Europeanization occurs as a 
‘two-way process’—top-down and bottom-up.24 
However, in instances where EU directions are 
21 Claudio Radaelli, “Wither Europeanization? Concept 
Stretching and Substantive Change,” European Integration Online 
Papers 4, no.8 (2000): 4.
22 Tanja Börzel, “Shaping and Taking EU Policies: 
Member State Responses to Europeanization,” Queen’s Papers on 
Europeanization, no.2 (2003): 1-15.
23 Tanja Börzel, “Member State Responses to 
Europeanization,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 
(2002): 193-214.
24 Börzel, “Member States”.
weak or candidates lack the institutional and 
political capacities to introduce appropriate 
reforms, this two-way process fails to explain 
domestic reform processes. Coercive mechanisms 
only work if the candidates are capable of reacting 
to such pressures. Moreover, the candidates’ ability 
to upload policy preferences to the EU can only 
occur through informal channels, as they lack 
access to EU policy-making bodies. 
Although Börzel recognized that multiple actors 
take part in the Europeanization process she 
saw Europeanization as a fundamentally elite-
driven, hierarchical process. Howell on the 
other hand addressed what he called ‘horizontal 
transfer’, which ‘incorporates learning from 
and assimilating other member state policies 
without EU involvement’.25 Although he found 
it problematic that Europeanization could occur 
without an inherent EU component, he recognized 
that domestic conditions were influenced by other 
horizontal means of influence. Even Radaelli 
admitted that Europeanization may occur without 
a ‘rational layer of EU decisions’, further elaborating 
in Radaelli and Pasquier that ‘horizontal processes 
of cooperation’ and socialization have impacted 
European ideational norms and understandings.26 
Bulmer explicitly stated that ‘an understanding 
of the EU in terms of domestic actors sharing 
good practice suggests other, more horizontal, 
mechanisms of Europeanization.’27 Yet, none of the 
authors spent time elaborating on the concept of 
horizontal Europeanization, analyzing its effects, 
or extending the notion of horizontal influence 
beyond EU borders. This is problematic because 
they ignore the proliferation of transgovernmental 
25 Howell, “Developing Conceptualisations,” 5.
26 Claudio Radaelli, “Europeanization of Public Policy,” 
in The Politics of Europeanization, eds., Kevin Featherstone and 
Claudio Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 31; 
Claudio Radaelli and Roman Pasquier, “Conceptual Issues,” in 
Europeanization: New Research Agendas, eds. Paolo Graziano and 
Maarten Vink (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007), 37.
27 Simon Bulmer, “Theorizing Europeanization,” in 
Europeanization: New Research Agendas, eds. Paolo Graziano and 
Maarten Vink (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007), 51.
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cooperation and transnational networking28 in 
policy sectors where the EU and candidate states 
have identified domestic incompatibilities. It is 
thus necessary to elaborate on the increasingly 
important role played by so-called horizontal 
mechanisms of Europeanization. 
Incorporating a ‘Horizontal’ 
Dimension 
Horizontal Europeanisation—defined as the 
incorporation of formal and informal EU 
requirements and norms into the domestic 
structures and practices of member, candidate, 
and third states by way of civil servant and non-
state actor cooperation29—helps explain how, once 
motivated by the prospect of EU membership or 
financial reward, the candidates enact reforms 
compliant with the acquis. It recognizes the 
importance of exchanging institutional ‘best 
practices’ and policy alternatives between sub-
governmental units from member, candidate 
and potential candidate states (twinning). It also 
acknowledges the crucial linkages between interest 
groups, state and supranational actors, and the 
influence these networks have via lobbying and 
implementation activities. An investigation of 
these horizontal mechanisms of Europeanisation 
sheds light on how membership-required policy 
reforms are developed; who develops them; and to 
what end.   
Horizontal Europeanization understands 
institutional action to be informed by norms and 
values, as well as internal and external incentives. 
It departs from Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s 
conclusion that external incentives ultimately 
explain rule adoption, preferring to investigate 
rule adoption as the result of political socialization, 
or what the authors label the ‘social learning 
28 Transnational networks refer to ‘transboundary relations 
that include at least one non-governmental actor’—Source: Risse, 
“Exploring the Nature,” 57.
29 It is possible to extend the definition to include 
corporations, business associations, academics, and other non-
state forces. However, this paper focuses on civil servants and 
NGOs.
model’.30 Conditionality-based approaches do well 
to explain how financial and technical rewards 
motivate decision-makers to support reforms. 
However, the presence or absence of rewards does 
not explain the methods used by the candidates 
and potential candidates to develop and implement 
their reforms. Moreover, the Europeanization 
process necessarily entails convincing decision-
makers of the appropriateness and legitimacy 
of the EU project and the demands it places on 
its candidates, tasks best explained by acts of 
socialization.
Processes of socialization involve acts of 
persuasion, deliberation, and argumentation.31 
Checkel discerned between argumentative and 
manipulative persuasion.32 The latter is primarily 
used by rational-choice theorists to describe 
relationships between political elites and society. 
The former refers to interactions between 
actors where one actor attempts to influence the 
beliefs, attitudes, or behaviour of others while 
everyone maintains a degree of free choice.33 
Deliberation is the fundamental principle of 
argumentative persuasion, whereby actors are 
given the opportunity to assess reflexively their 
beliefs and positions in light of new information 
and perspectives.34 Risse suggested that when 
argument and deliberation characterize the 
communicative environment, power and social 
hierarchies become less important.35 In such 
environments, beliefs and preferences held by 
actors are open to discursive challenges and may 
change based on the arguments of others.36
Processes of socialization, like twinning and 
30 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by 
Conditionality”.
31 Jeffrey Checkel, “Why Comply? Social Learning and 
European Identity Change,” International Organization 55, no.3 
(2001): 561.
32 Checkel, “Why Comply?,” 562.
33 Checkel, “Why Comply?,” 561.
34 Checkel, “Why Comply?,” 563.
35 Thomas Risse, “Global Governance and Communicative 
Action,” Government and Opposition 39, no.2 (2004): 294.
36  Risse, “Global Governance,” 294.
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NGO-led projects, can lead to a number of 
outcomes. Checkel discerns between type I and 
type II socialization.37 Type I socialization leads to 
a type of ‘role playing’ whereby the actor(s) being 
socialized become aware of community norms, 
and begin to act in accordance with these norms.38 
Type II socialization occurs when the socialized 
actor(s) move past mere role playing and come 
to accept the community or organization’s 
norms as correct and ‘right’.39 Mechanisms of 
horizontal Europeanization represent a form of 
type I socialization. While candidate state actors 
may not be convinced that the reforms they are 
developing are ‘right’ or better than the status 
quo, they understand that in order to comply with 
EU requirements they must at least ‘play along’. 
At what point or after how long do government 
agents stop playing a part and ‘adopt the interests, 
or even possibly the identity’ of the EU is left for a 
longer-term analysis.40 
In the context of socialization, Börzel and Risse 
discussed the importance of ‘change agents’ or 
norm entrepreneurs, who seek to persuade actors 
to rethink their preferences and beliefs rather than 
increase the costs of certain courses of action.41 
One particular type of ‘change agents’ are epistemic 
communities, which Börzel and Risse described as 
networks of actors with an authoritative claim to 
knowledge and a particular normative agenda.42 
These networks use their position as experts to 
persuade key decision-makers of the value and 
appropriateness of a specific decision or behaviour. 
The Twinning Initiative clearly embodies this 
notion of influence and interaction. Civil servants 
from member states with the knowledge of and 
37 Jeffrey Checkel, “International Institutions and 
Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” 
International Organization 59, no.4 (2005): 804.
38 Checkel, “International Institutions,” 804.
39 Checkel, “International Institutions,” 804.
40 Checkel, “International Institutions,” 804.
41 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, “When Europe Hits 
Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change,’ European 
Integration Online Papers 4, no.15 (2000): 9.
42 Börzel and Risse, “When Europe Hits Home,” 9.
experience dealing with EU regulations are 
partnered with their candidate state colleagues to 
co-develop policy, procedure, and legislation in 
line with EU-requirements. Similarly, members 
of NGOs often possess the grassroots connection, 
policy knowledge, and implementation capacities 
lacking in government institutions. Their expertise 
and involvement is thus foundational to the EU 
ambitions of the SECs.
The deep degree of political and administrative 
weakness in SEE make the integration of the SECs 
uniquely challenging for the EU.43 Indeed, ethno-
nationalism, war during the 1990s, and limited 
experience of sovereignty and ‘stateness’ have 
created underdeveloped systems of governance 
across most of SEE.44 In the SECs, the acquis and 
other EU directives often require governments 
to develop policies, legislation, and procedures 
in issue areas where protocol and procedures 
are immature or nonexistent. It is when the 
basic knowledge of EU procedures, policies, and 
legislation is lacking that transgovernmental 
cooperation and transnational networks are 
critical to the successful Europeanization of 
EU candidates. In this respect, methods of 
socialization like twinning and NGO projects 
not only legitimize EU platforms but provide the 
experiential knowledge and tools necessary for 
decision-makers to form policy and procedural 
solutions.  
It is important to distinguish ‘horizontal’ from 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’. The concept of 
Europeanization—the adaption of domestic 
systems to EU legislation, norms, values, and 
procedures—is universal for all three approaches. 
Likewise, the goal of horizontal Europeanization 
is consistent with the other approaches—
improve the target states’ chances of developing 
and maintaining EU-compliant practises and 
43 Andrew Taylor, Andrew Geddes, and Charles Lees, 
The European Union and South-East Europe: The Dynamics of 
Europeanisation and Multi-Level Governance (London: Routledge, 
2013).
44 Adam Fagan, Europe’s Balkan Dilemma: Paths to Civil 
Society or State-Building? (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 3.
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legislation. However, the concepts differ greatly 
in their understanding of the key actors and 
processes involved in Europeanization. Top-down 
Europeanization highlights the dominance of the 
EU in membership negotiations, and bottom-up 
Europeanization reminds us of the importance of 
domestic systems and their ability to manipulate 
supranational processes. In contrast, horizontal 
Europeanization suggests that the catalyst for 
change can occur below and often subsequent 
to formal membership negotiations, and apart 
from state efforts to influence and ease the 
burden of membership compliance. Horizontal 
Europeanization highlights the ability of sub-
governmental units and NGOs to contribute 
to reform processes and influence the policies, 
legislations, and procedures developed to comply 
with EU membership requirements. Figure 1 
illustrates this claim in more detail.
Figure 1: Direction of Europeanisation 
(Causality)
Horizontal Europeanisation incorporates the EU’s 
asymmetric relationship with its candidates into 
a more sophisticated understanding of the actors 
and processes involved. The acquis communautaire, 
as well as the wealth of assessments, reports, and 
opinions leave little doubt that the EU plays an 
important agenda-setting function. Moreover, 
EU aid represents a significant funding stream 
available to candidate and potential candidate 
states. However, the EU’s function is much more 
complex than simply setting and downloading the 
membership requirements. The EU also acts as a 
facilitator; an actor that provides an environment 
where actors interact and exchange experiential 
knowledge, preferences, paradigms, etc., but where 
it does not formally steer these exchanges. In this 
way the EU may be most influential because it 
provides a platform for Europeanisation to occur.  
Twinning and NGO-led projects are perhaps the 
best examples of horizontal Europeanization. 
The EU’s Twinning Program was designed to 
connect civil servants from the member and 
candidate states and facilitate the co-creation of 
policy, legislation, procedures, and institutions in 
compliance with the acquis communautaire.45 It 
45 Dimitris Papadimitriou, “Exporting Europeanisation: 
EU Enlargement, the Twinning Exercise and Administrative 
Reform in Eastern Europe” (presentation, ECPR Joint Session of 
Workshops, Turin, Italy, 22-27 March, 2002), 2.
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embodies exactly the type of transgovernmental 
cooperation that horizontal Europeanization 
recognizes. As domestic actors debate the 
potentially contentious issues required by the EU 
it is not uncommon for political infighting and 
disagreement to occur. The mere act of being an 
EU candidate is a highly politicized issue, one 
that necessarily brings together a diverse set of 
actors with potentially conflicting interests and 
ideas about how the state should proceed. When 
consensus can’t be reached governmental sub-
units may reach out to colleagues from other 
states, forming transgovernmental bonds that can 
help overcome domestic and EU-level obstacles. 
These transgovernmental elements have become 
institutionalized within the accession process in 
the form of EU-financed twinning projects.
Horizontal mechanisms of Europeanization 
need not, and indeed have not, only included 
political actors from EU, member, and candidate 
state administrations. Especially in SEE, non-
governmental actors from interest groups, 
academia, business associations, and citizens 
groups possess valuable knowledge and experience 
often lacking in national institutions. Efforts to 
include these groups have increased, although 
additional steps are needed. Nonetheless, if we 
understand these actors to be vessels through 
which EU norms, values, and preferences are 
transmitted and subsequently imbedded in 
the domestic logic of the candidate states, our 
understanding of the Europeanization process 
is vastly improved. Moreover, it is together as 
networks of likeminded organizations that these 
actors have the greatest potential to influence 
policy-making processes and therefore, to 
participate in the Europeanization process.
The following section seeks to empirically 
substantiate the concept of horizontal 
Europeanization, tracing the conditions of use and 
effectiveness of twinning and NGO-led projects. 
Horizontal Europeanization 
in Action
 Echoing the sentiment of others, Bulmer identified 
four problems with theorizing Europeanization, 
two of which this paper explicitly addresses: (1) the 
‘privileging of hierarchy over coordination in the 
conceptualization of Europeanization’, and (2) ‘the 
ubiquitous methodological problem of ensuring 
that findings are attributable to Europeanization’.46 
Problem (1) has already been addressed, but it is 
the goal of this section to show that establishing 
causality—attributing an outcome to the process of 
Europeanization—is not as daunting in instances 
of horizontal Europeanization.
Twinning
The development and implementation of twinning 
projects is based upon a ‘triangular partnership’ 
between the European Commission, the member 
state (MS) partner(s), and the beneficiary country 
(BC), wherein each partner’s influence and 
responsibilities vary depending on the project 
phase.47 The roles of each partner are clearly set 
out in the ‘twinning manuals’, EU documents that 
establish the general structure and guidelines for 
twinning. The EU plays a central role in the design 
and funding of twinning projects by highlighting 
key policy issues, allocating funds, and endorsing 
projects that will deepen member-candidate 
state relations and best prepare the candidate to 
comply with the acquis. In its guidance capacity 
the EU maintains a level of control and influence 
over the candidate state’s reform agenda while 
still upholding the principle that ‘beneficiary 
countr[ies] retain ownership of the [twinning] 
project’. 48
46 Simon Bulmer, “Theorizing Europeanization,” in 
Europeanization: New Research Agendas, eds. Paolo Graziano and 
Maarten Vink (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007), 55-56.
47 Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, 
“Exporting Europeanization the Wider Europe: The Twinning 
Exercise and Administrative Reform in the Candidate Countries 
and Beyond,” Southeast Europe and Black Sea Studies 3, no.2 (2003): 
11.
48 European Commission, Institution Building in the 
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MS partners also play a crucial role. They must 
ensure that the twinning project remains a ‘joint 
project of grant nature’ not a ‘one-way delivery of 
technical assistance from a MS [member state] to 
a BC [beneficiary country]’.49 Projects are not to be 
used as vehicles through which MS administrative 
systems and legislative frameworks are replicated 
in the candidates.50 Together with the BC, the 
MS partner(s) is in charge of developing the 
project work plan and setting the budget. These 
documents detail the project’s goals, resource 
requirements, and implementation strategies. 
Each task necessary to achieve the mandatory 
results is detailed, and the responsible person or 
group is assigned.51 Every task and budget item 
is connected with an acquis-related concern and 
scrutinized to ensure the project’s feasibility and 
justify the project’s budget. 
Although the EU and MS partners play a crucial 
role in the twinning lifecycle, the BC is ultimately 
the most important stakeholder. Twinning 
projects seek to address areas identified in both 
the EU and the BC’s policy agendas.52 BCs retain 
the right to select their twinning partners, play an 
indispensable part in setting the project’s work 
plan and budget, and depending on the funding 
arrangement, must ensure the operational integrity 
of the twinning project. While the EU finances 
twinning projects, the BC’s must make practical 
commitments to supply twinning projects with 
adequate human and financial resources.53 A 
firm and consistent political commitment is also 
needed to ensure operational standards and the 
timely adoption of policy and legislative outputs. 
The proliferation of twinning projects in the 
candidates and potential candidates of SEE 
Framework of European Union Policies Common Twinning Manual, 
Revised Version (Brussels: European Commission, 2012), 11.
49  European Commission, Institution-Building, 11.
50  European Commission, Institution-Building, 14.
51  European Commission, Institution-Building, 18.
52  European Commission, Institution-Building, 11.
53  European Commission, Institution-Building, 19.
demand that we reanalyze the mechanisms and 
actors involved in the Europeanization of EU 
candidates. The following sub-section presents 
an overview of one such twinning project that 
was operational during Croatia’s candidacy. 
The project clearly shows that Europeanization 
involves a diverse set of actors who employ 
mechanisms of cooperation and learning, rather 
than coercion and manipulation, to co-design 
policy, legislation, and procedures in-line with EU 
norms. Moreover, this twinning project confirms 
that the task of establishing causality is easier in 
cases where horizontal mechanisms are used.   
CARDS 2004: Capacity Building and 
Development of Guidelines for 
the Implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive
Croatia is a country with abundant water 
resources. Bordered by the Danube River to the 
east and the Adriatic Sea to the south Croatia 
possess over 31,000 square kilometres of coastal 
areas, and nearly 60% of its land surface is covered 
by river basins. 54 Water management is thus 
an important part of Croatia’s environmental 
protection plans. In October 2000, the EU 
enacted the Water Framework Directive (WFD) 
to harmonize and update water management 
policy across Europe, and ensure the sustainable 
use of water resources.55 As an aspiring member 
of the EU, the implementation of the WFD was an 
integral part of Croatia’s compliance with Chapter 
27 of the acquis. 
Croatia’s outdated water management legislation 
and its complex arrangement of authority made the 
implementation of the WFD particularly difficult.56 
Water management in Croatia is primarily shared 
54 European Commission, Twinning Contract Number: 
HR/2009/IB/EN/01, Annex C5, Final Report (Brussels: European 
Commission, 2014), 8.
55 International Commission for the Protection of the 
Danube River, The Danube River Basin District Management Plan, 
Part A—Basin-wide Overview, Update 2015 (Vienna: International 
Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, 2015), 1.
56 Interviewee 1 (former twinning project member) in 
discussion with the author, 13 February 2014.
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between two bodies—the Croatian Ministry 
of Regional Development, Forestry, and Water 
Management (MRDFWM) and Croatian Waters 
(HV)57— with each organization working 
individually to regulate and enforce subsets of the 
larger policy area. Moreover, some tasks of water 
management are under the scope of other state 
bodies such as the Ministry for Environmental 
Protection, the Ministry of the Sea, Transport, 
and Infrastructure, and the Ministry of Health 
and Social Welfare.58 This complex system of 
management has often led to coordination issues 
and inter-agency conflict.59
Prior to the project, Croatia’s water policy was 
primarily focused on water usage, and its system 
of management was diffuse.60 Project members 
acknowledged that the main beneficiaries had 
limited knowledge about water protection and 
the ecological impact of their policy decisions.61 
Water usage fees represented a key financial 
resource for HV and thus the emphasis of their 
work was on factors related to water access and 
use.62 The MRDFWM was criticized for being 
clearly understaffed, unable to supervise HV or 
sufficiently oversee the water acquis.63 Hiring 
freezes, low wages, insufficient intra-agency 
exchange, and misplaced priorities plagued both 
organizations.64 As a result, public administration 
reform, specifically changes to the recruitment, 
promotion, and training process, as well as 
the de-politicization of the civil service were 
recommended. 65 Local and regional governments 
were also criticized for lacking the administrative 
capacity and technical knowledge to address 
water protection issues, and for their reliance 
57 Croatia Waters is a legal entity established to help with 
water management
58 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 24.
59 Interviewee 1.
60 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 23-24.
61 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 23.
62 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 24.
63 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 23.
64 Interviewee 2; European Commission, Twinning 
Contract, 23.
65 European Commission, Twinning Contact, 23.
on commercial consultants with the interest and 
means to impose their interests on local policy.66 
In this regard, a coordinaation mechanism was 
necessary to improve cooperation between the 
various administrative bodies responsible for the 
implementation and enforcement of the water 
acquis.67
The WFD introduced completely new 
procedures, methodologies, and approaches to 
water management.68 Staff were unaware of the 
technicalities of the WFD and were overwhelmed 
by the additional demands on their time and 
resources.69 The MRDFWM and HV simply did 
not have the required knowledge or experience 
to implement the WFD alone.70 These challenges 
were exacerbated by the fact that unlike the 
existing member states, Croatia had to implement 
many environmental directives simultaneously 
and within a particularly short time-frame.71 As 
a result, decision-makers felt a twinning project 
would make a valuable contribution to its domestic 
agenda, as well as its EU obligations.72
The €1.2 million project, which lasted from 
2007-2009, paired MRDFWM and HV with the 
German Federal Ministry of Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (MENCNS), an 
experienced twinning partner that had previously 
taken part in seven twinning projects focused 
on the implementation of the WFD, and the 
Dutch Governmental Service of Land and Water 
Management.73 It also sought cooperation from 
66 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 23.




71 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 8.
72 Interviewee 2.
73 Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic 
of Croatia, Twinning Project: Capacity Building and Development 
of Guidelines for the Implementation of Water Framework Directive 
(Zagreb: Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic 
of Croatia, 2007); Participation of the German Federal Ministry 
for the Environment in Twinning Projects in the Water Sector 
(PowerPoint presentation, n.d.), Retrieved from http://www.
wfd-croatia.eu/userfiles/file/presentations%20download/WFD_
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other government agencies including the Ministries 
of Agriculture, Education, Environment, and 
number of other non-governmental institutions.74 
The project was multifaceted, seeking to 
harmonize Croatia’s water management legislation 
with the EU water acquis, strengthen HV’s and 
the MRDFWM’s capacities to enforce the WFD, 
and improve communication between all relevant 
stakeholders.75 The project stressed the value of 
information exchange and relied heavily on a series 
of fourteen workshops and meetings between MS 
experts and their Croatian counterparts.76 In these 
workshops Croatian team members were exposed 
to new methodologies, solutions, assessment 
methods, and monitoring techniques that could 
help them better address their institutional and 
administrative shortcomings.77 These workshops 
were preferred over other activities because team 
members felt that they were the best medium to 
have deeper discussions about current issues and 
ways to address them.78 Croatian team members 
were also taken on study tours to Germany and 
the Netherlands to gain practical experience 
working with the equipment and methodologies 
used in the administration of the WFD, as well 
as the responsibilities of state, regional, and 
local bodies.79 An e-learning program was also 
organized by the twinning project to provide 
Croatian staff with an alternative way to deepen 
their understandings of EU water management.80
The project also emphasized the importance 
Twinning_Projects_with_German_Participation.pdf.
74 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 13.
75 Delegation, Twinning Project.
76 “Workshops,” wfd-croatia.eu, accessed 17 October 




79 “Institution Building,” wfd-croatia.eu, accessed 17 
October 2015, http://www.wfd-croatia.eu/templates/radnaEng.
asp?sifraStranica=393.
80 ‘Project Results,” wfd-croatia.eu, accessed 17 October 
2015, http://www.wfd-croatia.eu/userfiles/file/Activity%20
reports%20final/Project_results__engl.pdf.
of cooperation between state, regional, local, 
and non-governmental organizations. Project 
members maintained close contact with local 
universities and NGOs, and opened up lines of 
communication with regional organizations and 
twinning projects in other candidate states.81 
To improve public awareness the project also 
produced a number of topic-specific educational 
brochures that were discussed with and made 
available to the general public.82 
The design and implementation of this project 
stressed the importance of knowledge transfers. 
The project sought to complement its more 
technical tasks with dialogue and conversation, 
to ensure that what was being implemented was 
understood by all relevant parties. The exchange 
of technical, practical, and experiential knowledge 
was made a priority and steps were taken to 
ensure that these exchanges were wide-spread 
and enduring. Civil servants, NGOs, universities, 
and regional organizations were included so that 
knowledge could be exchanged among a variety 
of actors. The emphasis it placed on establishing 
partnerships and communities of relevant 
stakeholders demonstrates a firm commitment 
to the fundamental principles of twinning, and 
the importance of socialization in processes of 
compliance. Moreover, the project addressed the 
technical needs of the beneficiaries, exposing 
stakeholders to the methodologies, equipment, 
organizational arrangements, and administrative 
requirements of complying with the WFD. 
The project made many improvements Croatia’s 
water management system. In close collaboration 
with experts from the University of Zagreb, 
project members helped revise and upgrade 
the classification and assessment systems used 
to monitor the ecological status of Croatia’s 
81 “What We Did,” wfd-croatia.eu, accessed 17 October 
2015, http://www.wfd-croatia.eu/templates/radnaEng.
asp?sifraStranica=594.
82 “Public Awareness,” wfd-croatia.eu, accessed 17 
October 2015, http://www.wfd-croatia.eu/templates/radnaEng.
asp?sifraStranica=410.
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water systems.83 Water monitoring systems were 
installed across Croatia to access chemical and 
biological compositions, and inform future 
water management procedure.84 Based on these 
monitoring systems, HV’s database was updated 
and an agreement on the distribution of analytical 
work was achieved between HV and several other 
stakeholders.85 Work plans and economic analyses 
were produced to assist in future project planning.86 
Inter-agency cooperation and stakeholder 
involvement also improved. NGOs, national and 
regional authorities, and other key authorities 
participated in symposiums and training events 
in Zagreb.87 National authorities also participated 
in EU-wide WFD events and developed ties with 
other water management bodies in Hungary, 
Turkey, and Bulgaria.88 Perhaps most importantly, 
team members reported that a cooperative 
atmosphere defined the project, making it easier 
to understand and accept the EU ‘ways of doing 
things’.89 
Subsequent EU reports and independent reviewers 
confirmed the improvements to Croatia’s water 
management policy made possible by this twinning 
project. In its analysis of Croatia implementation 
of the WFD and its 2013 River Basin Management 
Plan (RBMP), the EU listed Croatia’s monitoring 
capacities and legislative work as a key strength in 
its broader water management policy.90 Croatia’s 
commitment to engaging its neighbours in joint 
management plans and bilateral agreements was 
applauded by the EU.91 Indeed, Croatia is an active 
83 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 38.
84 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 39.
85 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 40.
86 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 43.
87 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 23.
88 European Commission, Twinning Contract, 26.
89 Interviewee 2; Interviewee 3 (former resident twinning 
advisor) in discussion with the author, 5 February 2014; European 
Commission, Twinning Contract, 7, 48.
90 European Commission, Report on the Implementation 
of the Water Framework Directive River Basin Management Plans, 
Member State: Croatia (Brussels: European Commission, 2015), 6.
91 European Commission, Report on the Implementation, 6
participant on the International Committees for 
both the Danube and Sava River Districts, and it also 
maintains bilateral agreements with its neighbours 
on the management of the Adriatic Sea.92 The 
EU noted Croatia’s complex system of water 
management, but commended the organizations 
for following a ‘single, national approach’.93 During 
the development of its 2013 RBMP Croatia 
consulted with the public and other interested 
parties through the internet, public consultation 
meetings, and written comments.94 Of the one-
hundred and seventy-two written notes received 
from academics, water service companies, energy, 
industry, agriculture, and inland navigation and 
nature protection stakeholders, two-thirds were 
integrated in to the RBMP.95  While the EU did 
find weaknesses in Croatia’s 2013 RBMP, noting 
that it was a ‘preliminary exercise’, it and others 
have conveyed confidence in Croatia updated 
2015 RBMP.96
This project demonstrated the complimentary 
role of twinning. The project supplemented its 
more technical tasks with events that brought 
team members in contact with a wide array of 
stakeholders. These events increased the project’s 
reach, enabling deeper consultation between actors 
directly impacted by the WFD. Project members 
introduced the technical and procedural changes 
and ensured stakeholders had the knowledge 
to embrace these new changes. This project 
demonstrated that compliance requires not only 
legislative, procedural, and technical changes, but 
also knowledge transfers, and an acceptance of the 
merits and implications of these changes.
92 European Commission, Report on the Implementation, 9; 
International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, 
The Danube River Basin, 1.
93 European Commission, Report on the Implementation, 
8-9.
94 European Commission, Report on the Implementation, 9.
95 European Commission, Report on the Implementation, 9.
96 European Commission, Report on the Implementation,, 
6; Oikon LTD. Institute of Applied Ecology and Geonatura 
Ltd, Strategic Environmental Assessment Summary, River Basin 
Management Plan (2016-2021) (Zagreb: Oikon and Geonatura, 
2016), 27.





NGOs in SEE have a tumultuous history. During 
the collapse of Yugoslavia and the wars that 
followed, NGOs were a vital source of support 
for many displaced persons. Indeed, for some 
remote and minority communities, NGO services 
were essential to their livelihood. In the years that 
followed, when much of the region was under the 
control of semi-authoritarian regimes, NGOs were 
at the forefront of the political opposition.97 They 
juxtaposed themselves from formal government 
positions and worked to promote alternative values 
and interests. Consequently, NGOs were actively 
demonized by state authorities and presented by 
state-run media as anti-state or agents of foreign 
governments. These smear campaigns successfully 
turned public opinion against NGOs and most 
were forced to rely on international financial and 
technical support. As a result of their political 
opposition, NGOs in SEE have faced human and 
financial resource shortages, weak institutional 
capacities, sustainability concerns, and adversarial 
relationships with government entities for much 
of their history.  
There is reason for optimism however. Closer 
relations with the EU starting in the 2000s has 
begun to improve the state of NGO development 
in SEE. The EU has made addressing the capacities 
of NGOs and ensuring their participation in 
policy and decision-making processes an area of 
emphasis. The EU has stressed the value of deeper 
state-NGO cooperation and worked to break 
down overly centralized and hierarchical decision 
making networks. The EU continues to represent a 
significant source of foreign aid, spending millions 
of euros annually on capacity-building projects.98 
97 Jelica Minić and Miljenko Dereta, “IZLAZ 2000: An Exit 
to Democracy in Serbia,” in Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society 
and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe, eds., Joerg 
Forbrig and Pavol Demeš (Washington: The German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, 2007), 79-97.
98 Mladen Ostojic and Adam Fagan, Donor Strategies and 
Practices for Supporting Civil Society in the Western Balkans, ed. 
The EU’s emphasis on NGO development has also 
chipped away at domestic political barriers. Many 
within EU and domestic organizations understand 
that because NGOs play such an important role 
in implementation processes, their inclusion in 
the transposition of EU requirement is critical.99 
Their knowledge of local and regional interests is 
invaluable to domestic and EU efforts to consider 
an array of policy alternatives, and deliver 
comprehensive policy reform. NGOs help identify 
areas of need, coalesce support for community 
policy and act as an independent monitor of EU 
policy and projects well-after implementation.100
As the next sub-section will show, with the help 
of EU funds, NGOs have begun to address their 
capacity deficits, form international partnerships, 
and supplement state reform efforts. In this way 
it is undeniable that NGOs play and active and 
important role in the Europeanization processes.
They Can Help: ‘Partnership 
Actions for Biodiversity 
Protection in Western Balkans’
From January 2010 to late 2011 a network of 
NGOs from Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, and 
Italy led an IPA project101, ‘Partnership Actions for 
Biodiversity Protection in Western Balkans’, which 
sought to strengthen the capacity of environmental 
NGOs, entrench their networks, and promote the 
implementation of Natura 2000, a key EU policy 
Tanja Hafner Ademi (Skopje: Balkan Civil Society Development 
Network, 2014); Mladen Jovanovic and Dragan Sreckovic, “Serbia,” 
in 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and 
Eurasia, ed., United States Agency for International Development 
(2015), 218; Balkan Civil Society Development Network, EU Funds 
for Supporting Civil Society Development in the Western Balkans, 
2007-2013 (Skopje: Balkan Civil Society Development Network, 
2015).
99 Interviewee 4 (program manager for support of civil 
society at Directorate General-Enlargement) in discussion with 
the author, 20 March 2014; Interviewee 5 (advisor for project 
preparation and international cooperation at the Serbian Office 
for Cooperation with NGOs), in discussion with the author, 19 
February, 2014. 
100 Interviewee 4.
101 Mladi istraživači (Young Researchers of Serbia), 
World Wildlife Foundation Mediterranean (Italy), Green Home 
(Montenegro), Sunce (Croatia) 
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aimed at protecting European biodiversity.102 
This EU-funded but NGO-led project educated 
regional NGOs on the merits of networking, 
allowed them to meet with EU representatives 
in Brussels, and trained them to implement 
projects compliant with the EU’s Natura initiative. 
Indeed thirty-three participants from Serbia and 
fifteen from Montenegro attended key planning 
meetings and agreed to establish a regional 
network of environmental NGOs.103 Members 
of this network would attend training meetings 
with the World Wildlife Foundation in Barcelona, 
where they learned about various approaches to 
NGO networking.104 Similarly, project members 
participated in a Belgrade-based workshop 
on EU biodiversity policy, lobbying skills, and 
communication techniques.105  Policy advocacy 
and the lobbying capacities of regional NGOs was 
an area of emphasis for this project because many 
of the participating NGOs were small or organized 
around individuals for who NGO participation 
was secondary to their daily profession or run as 
a hobby.106 Therefore, introducing them to policy-
makers, fellow activists, and exposing them to 
effective ways to communicate and promote 
environmental conservation was a critical part of 
improving NGO cooperation and capacity in the 
region. 
The project also made it a priority to engage 
state policy-makers. Indeed the Europeanization 
potential of NGOs is contingent on productive links 
of communication developing between NGOs, 
local, and state policy-makers. A series of meetings 
102 “Overview of Activities on the Project ‘Partnership 
Actions for Protection of Biodiversity in the Region of the Western 
Balkans’,” Mladi Istraživači Srbije - Volonterski Servis Srbije, 
accessed 10 February 2015, http://www.mis.org.rs/vss/pages/sr/
ekoloski-programi/biodiverzitet/partnerske-akcije-za-zastitu-
biodivrziteta/aktivnosti-na-projektu-partnerske-akcije-za-zastitu-
biodiverziteta.php?lang=EN; Milka Gvozdenović, “About the IPA 
Project ‘Partnerships for the Protection of Biodiversity in the 
Western Balkans’,” ngonatura2000.blogspot.it, accessed 10 February 
2015, http://ngonatura2000.blogspot.it/2010/07/o-ipa-projektu-
partnerske-akcije-za.html.
103 Gvozdenović, “About the IPA Project.”
104 Gvozdenović, “About the IPA Project.”
105 Gvozdenović, “About the IPA Project.”
106 Gvozdenović, “About the IPA Project.”
with politicians in Belgrade highlighted the work 
of local and regional NGOs and encouraged them 
to deepen their relationship with NGO networks. 
While there is still significant need for growth 
in this area, the project’s effort to expose NGOs 
and policy-makers to the value of consultation 
and cooperation should be applauded. Indeed, 
the Minister of Environment, Mining and Spatial 
Planning for Serbia at the time commented that 
it was ‘extremely important to strengthen the 
capacity of NGOs in the field of environmental 
protection’ and he invited them to continue their 
cooperation with government and with their 
‘useful projects in the field of nature protection’.107 
Significant barriers still exist for NGOs in Serbia 
and Montenegro. However, training regional 
NGOs how to effectively communicate with and 
lobby government will serve to heighten their 
Europeanization potential and establish them 
as influential members of policy-making and 
implementing processes.
The aim of the project was not only short term 
capacity-building, but also long term planning 
on how to deepen regional cooperative networks 
and continue efforts to protect biodiversity in the 
Balkans. Workshops on Natura 2000 continued 
well-past the project’s December 2011 closure 
and new project’s targeting NGO participation 
in NATURA 2000 reforms were underway as of 
late 2016.108 More importantly, regional NGOs 
are playing an active role in policy-making 
and planning meetings with professional and 
government agencies.109 In this regard, it appears 
107 Petra Boic Petrac, “Olivic Dulic: The Ministry has a Good 
Cooperation with NGOs,” ngonatura2000.blogspot.it, accessed 27 
September 2017, http://ngonatura2000.blogspot.it/2011/12/oliver-
dulic-ministry-has-good.html.
108 Green Home, “News-Natura 2000 in Montenegro,” 
ngonatura2000.blogspot.it, accessed 27 September 2017, http://
ngonatura2000.blogspot.it/2016/09/novosti-natura-2000-u-
crnoj-gori.html; Sonja Bađura, “Workshop on “Natura 2000 and 
Forestry,” ngonatura2000.blogspot.it, accessed 27 September 2017, 
http://ngonatura2000.blogspot.it/2012/07/odrzana-radionica-na-
temu-natura-2000-i.html. 
109 “Public Hearing ‘NATURA 2000 in Serbia 2013,” 
ngonatura2000.blogspot.it, accessed 27 September 2017, http://
ngonatura2000.blogspot.it/2013/12/odrzano-javno-slusanje-
natura-2000-u.html.
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that in area of environmental protection and 
NATURA 2000 promotion, NGOs are an active 
and important part of regional policy and 
implementation processes.
As long as NGOs remain leaders in developing 
and implementing acquis-compliant projects it 
is in the interest of local and state politicians to 
nurture relationships with NGOs. It is equally 
as important for NGOs to learn techniques that 
will allow them to be productive members of 
policy-making structures. It is critical to SEE’s EU 
ambitions that NGOs and state politicians develop 
relationships based on cooperation, with a focus 
on reforming deficient policies and procedures in 
compliance with EU and international norms.
The merits of this project in terms of improving 
Serbia and Montenegro’s membership preparedness 
are two-fold. First, it significantly improved the 
communication, organization, and lobbying 
potential of NGO networks and encouraged 
them to cultivate productive relationships 
with local and state policy-makers, rooted in 
cooperation and the attainment of mutual goals. 
This project also worked to harmonize regional 
practices with EU preferences and procedures. 
Both of these goals help bring Serbia and 
Montenegro closer to meeting EU-membership 
requirements. This project embodies exactly the 
type of alternative forms of Europeanization that 
traditional approaches frequently ignore. Without 
an acknowledgement of the Europeanization 
potential of NGO-networks we are progressively 
less able to explain the Europeanization of SEE.
Conclusion
This article suggested that we expand 
traditional notions of top-down and bottom-
up Europeanization to include the emergence of 
horizontal means of influence. Transgovernmental 
cooperation, as embodied by the EU’s twinning 
initiative, has become an important mechanism 
of Europeanization, bringing civil servants from 
member and candidate states together to exchange 
experiential knowledge and ‘good practices’, 
and jointly design and implement measures 
necessary to bring SEE candidates closer to EU 
membership. In addition, the Europeanization 
potential of NGOs and their networks should not 
be understated. While they are still constrained by 
internal deficiencies and political barriers, a role 
for them in the accession process is being etched 
out. Their ability and willingness to work with 
government officials is improving, and projects 
led by NGOs are beginning to be recognized by 
local, state, and international officials as valuable 
to the accession process.
What we learn from the experiences of SEE is 
that the Europeanization process is not static; 
the concept must acknowledge the contextual 
challenges of extending EU legislation, policy, 
preferences, and norms to progressively 
more difficult political, social, and economic 
environments. EU conditionality has reached its 
functional limit. While the reward of membership 
still appeals to the candidates of SEE, a reward 
alone is not enough to realize compliance. More 
than ever, the EU must open its coffers and 
provide the SECs with financial and technical aid. 
Its venture into CEE certainly exposed the EU to 
some of the difficulties in expanding its European 
project eastward. However, the legacy of deficient 
institutional practices, corrupt politicians, and 
bloated bureaucracies in SEE, coupled with 
weak public support threatens the EU’s ability to 
‘Europeanize’ these candidates using coercion. 
As a result, it has never been more important for 
the EU to employ alternative ways of influence, 
engaging state and non-state actors in the process. 
That is to say without an acknowledgment of the 
influence of interagency cooperation and NGO-
networks we are left with a partial explanation of 
the Europeanization of SEE.
Completing this conceptual circle by 
acknowledging horizontal mechanisms of 
Europeanization opens up interesting new 
avenues of inquiry. Civil society organizations 
certainly have the motivation, and often the 
54
knowledge to contribute to the Europeanization 
process. However, internal mismanagement, 
political mistrust, and inadequate resources still 
plague NGOs, fundamentally challenging their 
ability to turn potential into action. Further 
research into domestic and international efforts to 
improve the environment of NGO-state relations 
is needed to fully understand what contributes 
to the Europeanization potential of NGOs. More 
research is also needed to evaluate the sustainability 
of results and efficiency of twinning projects. Very 
little research has looked at what variables lead to 
the success or failure of twinning projects. The EU 
is committed to furthering their capacity-building 
mechanisms, and therefore there is little evidence 
that twinning projects will disappear from SEE. 
If scholars of Europeanization are to understand 
the complexities of the EU’s inclusion of SEE 
it is imperative that they begin to analyze new 
‘horizontal’ modes of interaction that emphasize 
cooperation, networking, and the exchange of 
good practices. 
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in decision-making for the new members, and, 
also relatively new democratized CEE countries, 
are questions addressed in this analysis.
Introduction
The consequences of European integration at 
the domestic level of states have been widely 
studied under the “Europeanization” framework 
(i.e., Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, Schmidt 
2006, Graziano and Vink 2007). More generally, 
Europeanization is defined as a set of processes 
and mechanisms by which policymaking at the 
European level may cause changes at the domestic 
level (Börzel and Risse 2003). Most of the 
Europeanization literature looks at policy changes 
or to what extent domestic policies converge 
toward the EU model (see for example Héritier 
et al. 2001, Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002, Börzel and 
Risse 2003, Treib 2008, Falkner and Treib 2008, 
Agh 2004). A few studies have also investigated the 
polity and politics implications of Europeanization, 
i.e. its impact on institutions, power and conflict 
in domestic policymaking (Featherstone and 
Radaelli 2003, Sciarini et al. 2004, Schmidt 
2006, Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008, Dimitrova 
and Toshkov 2007). The main findings of those 
studies show that Europeanization generally 
weakens parliaments and interest groups, while 
strengthening the executive, i.e. it undermines the 
“horizontal division of power” (Börzel and Sprungk 
2007). However, there are very few systematic 
accounts, almost absent for CEE countries (see for 
example Sciarini et al. 2004 for a quasi-member, 
Switzerland) that explore methodically the power 
constellation changes that occurred among the 
executive, legislative, and interest groups in 
Europeanized decision-making processes. This 
study contributes to the Europeanization research 
agenda examining the polity and politics domestic 
transformations triggered by the EU integration 
process, accounting for changes that occurred 
both before and post enlargement. Based primarily 
on social network analysis, it uses quantitative 
indicators to measure the distribution of power 
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Abstract
This study examines how Europeanization has 
altered the horizontal division of power between 
the executive and the legislative, as well as, the role 
of civil society actors engaged in policy-making. It 
draws mainly on primary network data collected 
for Romania, complemented by secondary 
sources for other CEE countries. Previous 
Europeanization studies have largely highlighted 
a strengthening of executives over legislatives, 
especially during the integration process. At 
the level of civil society organizations across 
the CEE countries, authors have also signalled 
a weakening effect or an ambivalent outcome 
at best, despite EU’s efforts to empower non-
state actors. The strong executive empowerment 
effect identified during the accession period is 
explained mainly by the conditionality argument. 
After integration, this effect is expected to elapse, 
mainly as conditionality on accession and the 
time pressure to reform domestic legislation 
are no longer present, thus allowing for a more 
inclusive and representative policy-making style. 
The empirical data gathered for Romania post 
enlargement suggests however that a substantial 
gap persists between the importance and role of 
core executives in decision-making affected by the 
EU and the rest of the actors. Are these outcomes 
likely to endure and what would be the broader 
implications of power structure transformations 
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between state and non-state actors (politics) 
as well as the importance of the institutions of 
decision-making (polity) in Europeanized policy 
sectors as compared to domestic policy reforms. 
What implications do these transformations have 
for participatory democracy? Will these domestic 
changes endure post integration? What additional 
challenges would these pose for participatory 
democracy in the new Member States (MSs)? 
All these questions triggered by institutional and 
power transformations in Europeanized decision-
making processes require a closer attention.
The study will draw on primary network data 
1collected for one of the newest MS, Romania, both 
before and after integration. Nevertheless, existing 
evidence about the Europeanization process of 
polity and politics that took place in the rest of the 
CEE countries will be discussed in comparative 
perspectives. 
In the following, first the theoretical arguments 
are developed. Existing evidence on the impact of 
EU integration on polity and politics in the CEE 
members is further evaluated. The case study using 
quantitative social network analysis to investigate 
Europeanization of decision-making structures 
in Romania before and post enlargement follows. 
Finally, the main conclusions of this study are 
highlighted, addressing the overall implications 
of a strengthening of executives over other 
decision-making actors that is attributed to the 
EU integration process. 
The EU impact on domestic 
political systems 
Whereas in domestic policymaking, national 
autonomy over decision-making remains 
substantial, Europeanized policymaking is 
marked by the fact that national actors share 
authority with EU supranational bodies 
1  Comparable cross-country political network datasets are 
rare due mainly to the highly demanding process of data collection 
(it implies conducting face-to-face structured interviews with all 
the actors that form a policy network, generally more than 30 
organizations per policy process). 
(Afonso and Papadopoulos 2013). This leads 
to a series of domestic transformations, which 
can be explained following the rationalist or 
sociological institutionalism logics (Börzel and 
Risse 2003, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir 
2005). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) 
have evaluated the mechanisms and conditions 
fostering Europeanization in the 2004 Eastern 
enlargement process, by comparing the 
explanatory power of a rationalist institutionalist 
‘external incentives model’ with that of a 
sociological institutionalist ‘social learning model’ 
and a ‘lesson-drawing model’. They have asserted 
that the external incentives model (the acquis 
conditionality) is the dominant Europeanization 
method in nonmembers and accession countries. 
Turning to post-accession, the authors claim 
that depending on specific policy areas and 
the dominating mechanisms of pre-accession 
rule transfer – conditional incentives or social 
learning – a different post-accession compliance 
pathway would be identified (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier 2007).
The analysis developed by this study draws upon 
rationalist accounts of Europeanization. These 
approaches ascribe the effects of Europeanization 
to the amount of adaptational pressure the 
EU is able to exert on the respective country. 
Candidates depend strongly on the establishment 
of political and economic relations with the EU 
and will thus try to comply as much as possible 
with pre-set requirements (Knill and Lehmkuhl 
2002). Following the “logic of consequentialism” 
(March and Olsen 1998), adaptational pressure 
from the EU provides domestic actors with new 
opportunities and constraints for influencing 
policies. For example, changes in the political 
opportunity structures (Kriesi 1995, Princen 
and Kerremans 2008) of policy processes due 
to the importance and exclusive character of 
international negotiations affect the functioning 
of domestic policymaking, as it confers power to 
executive and administrative actors at the expense 
of political parties and other societal groups. 
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Europeanization can be traced also at the level 
of private actors and their respective power 
configurations. A differential empowerment 
of non-state actors is expected to arise as 
Europeanization creates a new political 
opportunity structure that ‘may offer domestic 
actors additional resource’ (Börzel and Risse 
2000, p.7). As Risse et al. (2001) notes, domestic 
actors may use the process of Europeanization 
as a favorable juncture to advance their policy 
preferences that might be otherwise difficult to 
achieve (in a national policy process). The entire 
process of adjusting to the EU acquis opens up 
opportunities for some and threatens the interests 
of others, thus creating various groups of ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’ (Grabbe and Hughes 1999, Millard 
1999). For instance, the export-oriented business 
sector that have more resources to lobby directly 
in Brussels or have similar policy preferences to 
those display at the EU level might gain more 
than other national actors that might not be so 
well organized or might face more barriers to 
access the EU institutions. Moreover, civil society 
organizations with a stronger institutional capacity 
that already benefit from privileged positions in 
policymaking domestically and transnationally 
are likely to benefit more from the opportunity 
structures created by the Europeanization process 
and further strengthen their positions and roles in 
influencing policy outcomes.
Europeanization of polity 
and politics
Europeanization literature (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005, Sedelmeier 2006, Sciarini et al. 
2004) has shown that domestic political decision-
making influenced by decisions at the EU level 
further modifies national institutions. Institutions 
are defined as political opportunity structures of 
a policy process that affect the constellation of 
actors able to influence decisions (for institutional 
opportunity structures – see also Leifeld and 
Schneider 2012). This analysis investigates the 
impact of EU integration on decision-making 
through the importance of the different stages of 
a policy process and actors’ policy constellation 
therein. More specifically, it looks at the changes 
in importance of institutional arenas of decision-
making – administrative vs. parliamentary phase 
– as well as the participation patterns of actors, 
identifying who are the actors empowered by 
Europeanization and those that lose access to 
policymaking.  
Policymaking happens in different arenas of a 
political process: administrative, consultation 
procedures, and the parliamentary phase. These 
stages comprise various institutional venues, from 
consultations and drafting of a legislative act to the 
parliamentary committees’ work and final vote in 
plenum. These institutional venues act as political 
opportunity structures, as actors’ participation 
within allows them to influence a policy project, 
create collaboration contacts with other actors, 
and possibly reduce conflict (Laumann and Knoke 
1987, Schneider et al. 2003, Leifeld and Schneider 
2012). As compared to domestic processes, the 
administrative arena of Europeanized processes 
includes international negotiations, which shift 
the center of gravity away from the domestic 
level. Taking place at the beginning of the process, 
these negotiations influence the content of the act 
substantially. The administrative arena therefore 
tends to become the most important phase of the 
decision-making process (Moravcsik 1998). On 
the contrary, the importance of the consultative 
and parliamentary arenas is expected to be 
weaker in Europeanized cases than in domestic 
processes. The fact that the substantive content of 
a Europeanized act is defined at the international 
negotiation table does not leave much room for 
domestic debates and consultations (Sciarini et 
al. 2004). State actors are expected to be more 
strongly present in Europeanized processes than 
in domestic ones, especially in the executive/
administrative phase of the policy process. 
Along the lines of the institutional changes 
described above, Europeanization also leads to 
an unequal empowerment of domestic actors 
in favour of state actors, i.e. the executive and 
EUROPEANIZATION IN NEW MEMBER STATES: EFFECTS ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL STRUCTURES - Flavia Jurje
58
its administration (Moravcsik 1994, Börzel 
and Sprungk 2007). State executives and direct 
administration can take advantage of the 
increasing importance of the administrative arena, 
where they are usually strongly present. Besides 
the changes in the institutional opportunity 
structures of the policy process, Moravcsik (1998: 
2) detects three further mechanisms by which 
political resources are redistributed in favor of 
state actors: their control of the political agenda, 
informational asymmetries, and additional 
sources of ideological legitimization presented 
by the EU. These three factors are all directly 
related to the strong presence of state actors at 
the international negotiation table. First, non-
state actors have less influence on the political 
agenda of international negotiations, which is 
defined by executive actors and their international 
negotiation partners. Second, given the absence of 
non-state actors from international negotiations, 
they suffer from a lack of information on the 
most important issues, contacts, and negotiation 
opportunities at the international level. Third, 
the discourse at the international level might 
confer state actors with additional arguments to 
legitimize their position vis-à-vis domestic non-
state actors. Putnam’s (1988) work on the two-level 
game, contending that the transfer of a domestic 
issue to the international level reinforces state 
executives, both at the national and international 
level, follows the same line of argumentation. Thus 
state actors are expected to be more powerful in 
Europeanized processes as compared to domestic 
ones.
Following the rationalist logic/conditionality 
pressure, all these effects would be stronger on a 
candidate state than a member, considering the 
extensive volume of European rules that need to 
be transposed into domestic legislation according 
to the enlargement agenda. Also, the strongest 
sanctioning mechanism the Union might apply 
in the event of non-compliance happens before 
integration, namely, postponing the accession 
date. This entire pre-accession setup might thus 
be used by the executives to ‘legitimize’ their 
strong presence in EU-related policymaking 
processes. After integration the intensity of EU 
requirements starts to diminish, which in turn 
might change the picture depicted above. The 
importance of the parliamentary phases is likely 
to gain in importance as well as the participatory 
pattern and power of non-state actors would be 
expected to increase. Less EU pressure gives room 
for more domestic debate and contestation at all 
stages of the policy process. Although drafting of 
legislation usually takes place within the executive 
arena, the entire policy process is expected to have 
a more open character with parliamentary groups, 
political parties, and other non-state actors actively 
engaging more in decision-making. To summarize, 
the main hypotheses state that Europeanization 
leads to a ‘closed’ decision-making process, it 
empowers state executives and those social actors 
whose preferences are similar to those proposed 
by the EU or have the capacity to lobby directly in 
Brussels and the strongest Europeanization effects 
are likely to occur before integration than after a 
candidate becomes a member of the EU.  
To test these hypotheses, the study will use 
social network analysis in one of the newest EU 
members, Romania. It assesses changes with 
regard to the importance of the institutional 
arena where policy decisions are taken and the 
power configuration among the relevant actors 
involved in policymaking. The analysis compares 
systematically these domestic transformations pre- 
and post-integration in a policy field influenced 
by the EU, i.e. immigration and asylum and in 
turn contrasts them to a domestic policy process, 
which is given by reforms in the area of education 
(a control case - for case selection see also below). 
Network data has been gathered throw face-to-
face expert interviews2, covering state and non-
state actors participating the cases analyzed. 
To this adds pertinent secondary literature that 
investigates the impact of European integration on 
domestic political institutions and the differential 
empowerment of state executives, parliaments, 
and interest groups across CEE countries. 
2 The author has conducted 123 face-to-face interviews for 
the cases covered in this study 
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In the next section, an overview of the studies 
assessing the EU impact on polity and politics in 
the new CEE members is delineated. After setting 
the general picture, the case study on Romania 
will unfold the Europeanization process of the 
executive-legislative-civil society organizations 
structures and their importance in decision-
making.   
De-parliamentarization and 
strengthening of executives 
in CEE countries
The work carried out for CEE candidates find 
that Europeanization had a strong and systematic 
impact on domestic institutions (Zubek and 
Goetz 2010). As a result mainly of functional 
pressures to negotiate with the EU and implement 
policies, national core executives have been 
substantially affected by the EU integration. 
Europeanization studies have assessed these 
national transformations by looking at the EU 
impact on party politics, civil society, or the role 
of parliaments vis-à-vis governments in decision-
making (Mair 2004, Innes 2002, Fagan 2005, 
Fagan and Tickle 2001, Börzel 2010). Authors 
like Dimitrova and Toshkov (2007), Fink-Hafner 
(2005), Goetz (2001, 2005) have also explored the 
EU impact on domestic public administrations. 
Analyzing the types of rules and institutional 
location where coordination on EU matters 
takes place, Dimitrova and Toshkov’s study of all 
new CEE members shows to what extent there 
is an administrative led coordination system 
(council composed only of high-ranking civil 
servants or government officials), a political one 
(encompassing also political figures such as the 
prime ministers, chief negotiators), or rather 
a mixture of both. Their results of the before-
after integration analysis find that EU policy 
coordination rely exclusively on the Council of 
Ministers in Slovenia; on political-level collective 
bodies in Lithuania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic 
prior to 2003, and Poland prior to 2004; on 
administrative-level collective bodies in Estonia, 
Bulgaria prior to 1999, Romania prior to 2003, 
and the Czech Republic after 2004; and on the 
coexistence of political- and administrative-level 
collective bodies in Hungary, Latvia, Poland after 
2004, Bulgaria after 2002, and Romania after 2003. 
Regardless of the final configuration, all these 
changes reflect the domestic struggle for power 
between the different parties involved (prime 
minister, foreign minister, other members of the 
government as well as the ruling political parties), 
with the administrative institutions at the top of 
the entire coordination machinery, setup that is 
further enhanced by Europeanization. 
The strengthening of executives vis-à-vis 
legislatures (see for example Dimitrova and 
Pridham 2004, Goetz 2005, Grabbe 2006, Raik 
2002, Sadurski 2006) has been critically discussed 
by Europeanization scholars. This is clearly 
underlined by Sadurski (2006: 7) in a contribution 
to post enlargement in the CEE countries where 
he states: “Enactment of EU-related laws was often 
fast-tracked, with little or no serious parliamentary 
discussions, and with the executive controlling 
the process throughout. This was perhaps no 
bad thing, given the notorious inefficiency and 
incompetence of parliamentary institutions in 
post-communist states, and was arguably the only 
way to ensure that the enormous body of EU law was 
transposed into domestic legislation... [However], 
it strengthened the executive bodies over their 
parliamentary equivalents, a secretive procedure 
over fully transparent ones, and the quick-fix 
pace of decision-making over comprehensive 
deliberation. [The goal of accession] gave the 
executive more power to by-pass parliament and 
to justify the centralisation of decision-making 
by the emergency-like circumstances.” Börzel 
and Sprungk (2007) show that this effect is even 
present in old members, thus reinforcing the 
strong EU impact on national political systems. 
Using Germany as a critical case study, the authors 
find that the executive branch of the government 
is strengthened and national parliaments are faced 
with a severe loss of competencies, even in areas 
where parliamentary participation is required. 
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The disempowerment of parliaments is reinforced 
through the impact of European integration on 
the vertical division of power, namely a loss of 
power on the side of regional governments. Not 
denying the positive impact of the EU integration 
on democratization processes that took place 
in old members like Germany, Greece, Spain, or 
Portugal, and even more for the former communist 
states in CEE, their study highly questions this 
undermining effect of Europeanization on 
democratic governance structures. 
Authors looking into the national institutional 
reforms aiming to restore parliamentary control 
over administrative bodies generally argue that 
although there are mechanisms set in place for 
legislatures to hold governments accountable 
(access to information, right to draft resolutions, 
creation of specialized EU committees, etc.), 
these seem to play rather a formal role and do 
not improve the de facto capacity of parliaments 
to create an impact on EU politics (Börzel and 
Sprungk 2007, Auel 2007, Holzhacker 2007). In a 
cross-national comparison, Winzen (2012) shows 
that formally, levels of national parliamentary 
control over EU matters have increased over time 
due to a series of institutional reforms and means 
to improve access to formal documents. However, 
despite these potential improvements, it appears 
that legislatures are still reluctant to develop more 
forceful control mechanisms to hold governments 
accountable and formulate their own strategies in 
EU affairs. When comparing only the CEE new 
members, the results are even more pervasive. 
As Agh (2007) states: “the national public 
administrations, the parliamentary parties and, 
even more, the interest organizations were also 
rather weak in EU policymaking […] ECE 
governments still tried to control the entire 
Europeanization process, and they were not ready 
to assign a greater role to parliaments.” Already 
weak parliamentary structures and incipient civil 
society organizations got even more marginalized 
in EU-related policymaking processes.   
Looking at national party systems in CEE countries 
during the accession process, Mair (2004) has called 
the general domestic consensus on integration a 
de-politicising effect, which hollows out political 
competition. In the same vein, Innes (2002: 101-
102) argues that the EU had a “debilitating effect, 
arresting party developments by excluding from 
political competition those substantive, grass-
roots, ideological policy conflicts around which 
western European party systems have evolved”. 
The EU impact on civil society organizations 
across the CEE countries has also been portrayed 
in rather negative terms. Paradoxically, although 
one of the EU objectives was to strengthen civil 
society in post-communist countries, it turned out 
to produce (most of the time and unintentionally) 
exactly the opposite effect. Börzel (2010) and 
collaborators to a special issue on EU enlargement 
and civil society in Central and Eastern Europe 
talk about an ambivalent effect produced by 
EU enlargement on societal groups from CEE 
countries (see also Wunsch 2016 on differential 
empowerment of NGOs in Croatia). Although 
the EU did constitute a new opportunity structure 
offering civil society actors additional rights, 
money, and networks, empowerment of non-
state actors depended on their capacity to make 
use of these new opportunities. Most of the times, 
NGOs that had already a favorable position with 
access to decision-making, links to Brussels and 
part of transgovernmental networks were further 
empowered by Europeanization.      
All the above-mentioned studies reveal the 
strong Europeanization impact that transformed 
domestic political systems, strengthening state 
actors (already quite dominant in post-communist 
CEE countries) and other civil society groups 
with strong links to Brussels. Nevertheless, these 
assessments have been rather general in approach, 
looking at the country level, rarely going deeper 
into specific Europeanized policymaking 
processes or evaluating changes of domestic power 
configurations over time. There is no systematic, 
quantitative assessment of these Europeanization 
processes so strongly present in the CEE countries. 
In the following, the case study on Romania will 
use quantitative network indicators to measure 
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institutional changes and domestic actors’ power 
constellations across time. This research design 
allows exploring how the EU integration process 
has altered decision-making structures pre- and 
post-enlargement, clearly mapping all actors that 
gain more decision-making powers, or on the 
contrary, were excluded from decision-making in 
EU policy matters. After integration (absence of 
conditionality) the national democratic balance 
could be struck. The longitudinal dimension of 
the study thus enables a comprehensive analysis 
of the EU domestic impact, evaluating whether 
Europeanization goes beyond conditionality, 
producing much longer-term effects than initially 
anticipated. 
EU impact on decision-making 
procedures in a new member 
state: Romania as a case 
study
This section investigates the Europeanization 
effects that occurred at the level of polity and 
politics in a new MS before and after integration. 
Using Romania as a case study and relying on 
quantitative network data, it compares two 
decision-making processes that were affected by 
Europeanization (before and after integration 
respectively) with two domestic reforms, during 
the same time frame: 2003-2005 the period before 
integration, and 2007-2010 the timespan after 
enlargement. The four cases analyzed are given 
by important decision-making processes: the 
Europeanized cases belong to the field of asylum 
and immigration (one reform taking place before 
integration and the other one after), while fiscal 
decentralization in the primary education sector 
represents the domestic reforms/control cases 
(similarly, one policy process took place before 
enlargement and the other one post integration). 
The Europeanized decision-making processes 
stem from the former first EU pillar. Based on the 
principle of acquis conditionality, the EU imposes 
various rules and is thus able to put pressure on 
member states or candidate countries. Policy 
projects related to immigration and asylum were 
among the most important legislative changes 
within this field in Romania for the specified time 
frame. This policy area was part of the acquis, 
Chapter 24 on Justice and Home Affairs, strongly 
reformed in order to adopt binding EU directives. 
Important changes brought by the immigration and 
asylum reform, as part of the acquis conditionality, 
before integration, refer to the implementation of 
various EU directives regarding aliens and asylum 
regulations. The reform of the immigration and 
asylum sector continued after integration as well, 
and the main policy transformations addressed 
aspects related to the status of third member states 
who are residents on a long term, the conditions 
for third member states to study (including 
student exchange) or engage in voluntary work. 
Additionally, various EU directives regarding 
the family reunification or air transit were 
incorporated into the domestic legislation. The 
establishment of the alleged Romanian Office 
for Immigration (ORI) was also part of the after 
integration reform and the unit was designated as 
the national specialized institution for migration 
management, following the EU practices and 
regulations in the area of immigration. 
The fiscal decentralization reform in primary 
education refers to introducing a per capita formula 
for financing the primary education sector. This 
new legal framework aimed at a financing system 
based on standard costs and increased school 
autonomy in managing and allocating funds. The 
main steps for introducing a per capita formula 
for financing the primary education sector were 
taken by the 2004 Government. After integration, 
the fiscal decentralization reform continued with a 
new law regarding the allocation of funds from the 
central and local budget, addressing the division 
of financial responsibilities among the central 
and local governments, based on the number of 
students enrolled in each education unit. These 
policy processes were domestically driven (no EU 
conditionality) and constitute control cases. As 
introduced before, the decision-making processes 
taking place in these fields were compared both 
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before integration, i.e. Romania as a candidate 
state (during 2003-2005) and after enlargement, 
i.e. Romania as a member state (2007-2010). 
These latter policy networks represent control 
cases that allow contrasting instances where the 
EU effect is present with situations where this 
is absent, thus allowing to rule out potential 
alternative explanations about the observed 
outcome (Saurugger and Radaelli 2008, Haverland 
2008). Analyzing Europeanized cases pre- and 
post-enlargement and comparing the findings 
with domestic policy reforms that happened 
during the same time period, provides solid 
evidence about the variation over time of the EU 
domestic transformations.
Comparing various policymaking processes 
within a single country follows a most similar 
system design (Frendreis 1983, Landman 2003). 
This refers to a theoretically selection of cases that 
allows controlling for other potential explanations 
of the variance on the dependent variable, thus 
securing the internal validity of the research design 
(see also Haverland 2008). Applying Mill’s method 
of difference for case selection assures that the 
identified domestic changes are a consequence of 
the European-level factor, rather than other global 
or domestic forces.
Data and measures
To test the EU impact on executive-legislative-
interest group organizations, this study uses 
network analysis (see Wassermann and Faust 
1999). The structural network analysis is regularly 
employed by researchers in the field of policy 
analysis to learn about the structures and power 
configuration that are formed in decision-making 
processes, i.e. policy networks (Laumann and 
Knoke 1987, Knoke and Pappi 1989, Knoke 1990, 
Schneider 1992, Scott 1997). As Börzel notes, the 
general understanding of policy networks is ‘a 
set of relatively stable relationships […] linking a 
variety of actors, who share common interests with 
regard to a policy and who exchange resources to 
pursue these shared interests acknowledging that 
co-operation is the best way to achieve common 
goals’ (1998, p.254). The basic assumptions of 
the social network method are that actors are 
interdependent and their relational ties constitute 
channels for transfer or flow of resources, 
providing opportunities or constraints on actors’ 
actions. Following a similar operationalization of 
the concept, this analysis employs policy networks 
as an analytical tool to describe and explain the 
complex relationship between actors in various 
sectors of public policy making3. 
For data collection, face-to-face, semi-structured 
interviews with more than 120 domestic elites were 
conducted. A comprehensive list of all actors (e.g. 
various ministries and governmental agencies, 
political parties, parliamentary committees, 
civil society organizations, trade, and business 
organizations) involved in the policymaking 
processes was elaborated. The questionnaire 
included a section on the perceived importance of 
the various stages of the decision-making4. Each 
policy process was broken down in two main 
parts: the pre-parliamentary and parliamentary 
stage. Given the general importance attributed to 
the pre-parliamentary stage, this was divided in 
other two main phases: drafting of the legislative 
act within working groups and committees at the 
ministerial level and consultation procedures with 
other government bodies and non-state actors. 
The parliamentary stage also consists of two main 
sub-parts, the committee work and final vote in 
plenum. For each policy process, a list with the 
respective phases and sub-phases of the decision-
making was elaborated. Based on this list, the 
interview partners had to evaluate whether a 
certain sub-phase was among the three most 
important for the legislative outcome5.
3 The ‘governance school’ approach that defines policy 
networks as non-hierarchical relationships between public-private 
actors is also acknowledged, however, the stance taken by this study 
is a methodological one to analyze the decision-making process.
4 The question covering importance of stages of a policy 
process was formulated as follow: “I would like to ask you to 
indicate in which three phases of the process the most important 
decisions were taken, in your view, with respect to the output of the 
decision-making process x.”
5 A similar research design was developed by Fischer et 
al. (2002), Sciarini et al. (2004), however, employing only a cross-
sector analysis for a non-EU member, Switzerland.
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In order to measure the impact of the EU 
integration on power configuration a series of 
indicators were developed. On the one hand the 
questionnaire included a section on the evaluation 
of power an actor has according to the other 
members of the network – reputational power6. 
On the other hand, a social network measure, e.g. 
betweenness centrality, was tested. This shows to 
what extent an actor has a ‘broker’ or ‘gate-keeper’ 
role for the connection with the other actors in 
the collaboration network. Methodologically, the 
betweenness centrality of an actor measures the 
percentage of actors that have to transit through 
that actor in order to collaborate/connect with 
other actors from the network (see also see also 
Borgatti 2005). Consequently, the actors with a 
high score of the betweenness centrality measure 
are considered powerful actors, being in a favored 
position and having the capacity to ‘obstruct’, or 
‘enhance’ the possibilities of other actors to make 
connections with the rest from the network. The 
actors that participated in each process were 
grouped as state officials (core executives and 
the central public administration) and non-state 
actors (various civil society organizations, political 
parties, parliamentary committees, employers’ 
organizations, trade unions, experts outside 
the government). The reputation and centrality 
indicators were expressed as percentages of the 
overall power scores. 
6 The question covering reputational power was formulated 
as follow: “I would like to ask you to indicate which actors were, in 
your view, among the three most influential actors in the decision-
making process x
Analysis
In the following, the results of the EU impact 
on the institutions and power configurations 
are discussed. The analysis compares the scores 
computed for each case of Europeanization 
with the values identified in the domestic policy 
processes, before as well as after integration.
Table 1 shows the importance of the different policy 
stages in each decision-making process analyzed, 
before and after Romania joined the EU. The 
aggregate values indicate that the pre-parliamentary 
stage is the most important institution, in all of 
the sectors investigated. The highest values are 
identified in the Europeanized case, especially for 
the period before enlargement. Post-accession, 
the administrative arena (particularly drafting 
operations) remains the most important stage as 
compared to the domestic case (where a relatively 
even distribution of the importance of each 
sub-stage of the decision-making process was 
identified), although with a slightly decreasing 
patter of the relevance attributed to it. The other 
sub-stages of the decision-making that rest within 
the parliament are considered less important in 
the case of Europeanized policymaking processes 
relatively to the domestic reforms. For example, 
the parliamentary committees’ work, which is a 
very important phase of a policy process in the 
control case, receives less than half of the score 
in the Europeanized sector before enlargement 
and does not gain much in importance after 
integration either. 
Table 1 Importance of the phases of a decision-
making process, before & after integration
Importance of the institutions of (%)
Policy Sectors Education reform
(Control Case)
Immigration & asylum reform
(Europeanized Case)
Before After Before After
Pre-parliamentary stage
Drafting 43%  41% 91% 84% 
Consultations 21%  21 % 4% 7% 
Sub-total pre-parliamentary phase 64% 62% 95% 91%
Parliamentary stage
Committee 27% 31 % 4% 7% 
Plenum 9%  7 % 1% 2% 
Sub-total parliamentary phase 36% 38% 5% 9%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
N (no. of respondents) 32 30 29 32
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When the legislation is EU-driven, the decision-
making process has a more closed character, 
being almost entirely handled by the bureaucratic 
apparatus in the pre-parliamentary phase, mostly 
during the drafting activities. At this initial level, 
a policy proposition is formulated by the law 
initiator and further developed into a legislative 
proposal generally by various executive bodies and 
EU experts (if these are involved in the reform). 
This leaves little space for social participation, 
national debate or contestation in Parliament; it is 
rather an administrative-led process. This pattern 
was consistently identified in the Europeanized 
cases before and after enlargement. Although 
before integration the effect is the strongest, a 
similar impact seems to persist after accession, at 
lest for the timeframe recorded. The administrative 
arena is ranked the most important also in the 
control case, nevertheless, the very high scores 
of importance attributed to this institution in 
Europeanized instances clearly indicates a strong 
EU effect.
The restricted character of Europeanized decision-
making is further reflected by the composition of 
actors that participate in the administrative arenas. 
State actors dominate the Europeanized decision-
making processes when compared to the domestic 
ones. In the immigration and asylum sector the 
important non-state actors that had access to 
the administrative stage are the International 
Organization for Migration Bucharest (OIM), 
UNHCR, and the Romanian Forum for Refugees 
and Migrants (ARCA). Nevertheless, organizations 
like UNHCR and IOM are intergovernmental 
agencies that provide assistance and consultancy 
for state executives, thus having close ties to the 
bureaucratic apparatus. Looking at the figures 
in Table 2, in Europeanized policy processes the 
number of non-state actors actively engaged in 
drafting and consultations is less than half when 
compared to the domestic reforms assessed.  
Table 2 Access of non-state actors in the 
administrative phase, before & after integration
The EU impact on power 
configuration
As already implied by the ‘closed’ nature of the 
decision-making, a powerful executive tends to 
dominate the political scene in sectors affected by 
the EU. This is further confirmed by the centrality 
measures employed to assess the importance of 
various actors (Tables 3 and 4 below). Both the 
reputational power (reflecting power of actors as 
evaluated by the other actors from the network) 
and the indicator based on the position of an 
actor in the cooperation network, betweenness 
centrality, show that state actors (core executives at 
the national level) substantially outweigh non-state 
actors (political parties/members of parliamentary 
committees, civil society organizations, etc.) in 
the Europeanized cases relatively to the domestic 
cases. 
Policy Sectors No. of non-state actors that participated in 
the pre-parliamentary stage
In % of all non-state 
actors
In % of all actors that participated in 
the pre-parliamentary stage
Before After Before After Before After
Control case 9 10 56% 67% 35% 40%
Europeanized case 3 4 25% 20% 15% 14%
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Table 3 Reputational Power (before and after 
the EU integration)
In the Europeanized cases, the role played 
by state technocrats is considered the most 
important. Similar to the polity shifts identified 
across time in the importance of institutions, a 
strong executive dominates the decision-making 
process before, as well as, after integration. While 
in the domestic reform processes on the fiscal 
decentralization in primary education, state actors 
tend to share policymaking prerogatives with 
various non-state actors (such as labor unions, 
business organizations, political parties among 
others), the executive is much more powerful in 
the Europeanized processes, as confirmed both 
by all the actors forming the respective policy 
network (reputational power, Table 3) and the 
network betweenness centrality measure (Table 
4). In particular, during the accession period core 
executives were almost solely coordinating the 
entire decision-making process. The formation 
of a cohesive group of the central administration 
can be explained by the required effort to timely 
cope with the entire EU legislative technicality 
and rigorousness, rules that had to be transposed 
in the national legislation in order to meet the 
integration deadlines. This opportunity structure 
fostered by Europeanization enabled government 
bodies to nearly monopolize EU-related policy 
reforms. Besides some well-established social 
partners working on a regular basis with the 
government due to their expertise, none of the 
civil society organizations or political parties were 












Central public administration (key governmental bod-
ies)
44% 46% +2% 90% 83% -7%
Local public authorities 8% 11% +3% 0% 1% +1%
Total state actors 52% 57% +5% 90% 84% -6%
Civil society organizations 6% 6% 0% 1% 6% +5%
Trade unions 26% 22% -4% 0% 0% 0%
Employers’ organizations 8% 9% +1% 0% 0% 0%
Political parties 7% 5% -2% 0% 2% +2%
Experts (EU, IOs) 1% 1% 0% 9% 8% -1%
Total non-state actors 48% 43% -5% 10% 16% +6%
Total 100% 100%
N (no. of respondents) 30 32
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Table 4 Betweenness Centrality (before and 
after the EU integration)
Overall, the empirical results on the actors’ 
power – both in terms of reputation and network 
centrality – show the strong EU effect on 
empowering executive actors and a diminished 
importance of non-state actors. The very high 
importance scores attributed to state actors, 
together with the ‘closed’ Europeanized decision-
making processes, both pre- and post-accession7, 
bring systematic empirical evidence about the EU 
impact on domestic governance structures. The 
lack of social participation and representation in 
important policy matters triggered to a large extent 
by Europeanization processes questions the basic 
principles of democratic policymaking. How can 
the consequences of this executive empowerment 
of the former communist, state-led and centralized 
CEE administrations, now democracies and EU 
member states, be addressed? 
7 At least until 2010, when the social network data is 
available
Conclusions  
The findings support the argument that European 
integration has a strong impact on national 
political systems. While executives are clearly 
strengthen, the parliament and civil society 
actors have not gained much importance in 
Europeanized decision-making processes. These 
effects are stronger in candidates, nevertheless, 
similar outcomes seem to persist post integration 
in areas where the EU is present.  In the domestic 
reforms, besides state actors, various non-state 
stakeholders have access to the legislative process. 
The results thus support the view that when the 
EU is involved in decision-making, a shift from 
the interventionist to the regulatory state that is 
dominated by technocratic, non-majoritarian 
and non-elected bodies occurs (Kohler-Koch and 
Rittberger 2008, Lavenex 2013). Although one of 
the EU’s objectives for the CEE countries was to 
strengthen and build capacities of civil society, 
enabling non-state actors to participate more 
actively in decision-making, what is observed 





Immigration & asylum reform
(Europeanized pressure)
Before After Change (before/
after)
Before After Change (before/
after)
Central public administration (key governmental 
bodies
57% 54% -3% 97% 93% -4%
Local public authorities 5% 6% +1% 0% 0% 0%
Total state actors 62% 60% -2% 97% 93% -4%
Civil society organizations 6% 11% +5% 0.5% 2% +1.5%
Trade unions 16.5% 16% -0.5% 0% 0% 0%
Employers’ organizations 5% 4% -1% 0% 0.5% +0.5%
Political parties 7.5% 7% -0.5% 0.5% 1.5% +1%
Experts (EU, IOs) 3% 2% -1% 2% 3% +1%
Total non-state actors 38% 40% +2% 3% 7% +4%
Total 100% 100%
N (no. of respondents) 30 32
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Especially during the integration process, the vast 
amount of EU legislation that had to be transposed 
in domestic policies in a relatively short time 
period did not allow for a consistent involvement 
of non-state actors beyond occasional assistance 
in drafting the laws (see also Börzel 2010). 
This alleged domestic ‘democratic deficit’ together 
with the already contested EU-level ‘democratic 
deficit’ pose a series of questions about the input 
and output legitimacy of EU decision-making and 
subsequent impact on member states. While the 
EU institutional reforms, culminating with the 
Treaty of Lisbon, meant precisely to address the 
issue of democratic deficit by giving more powers 
to the European Parliament and member states’ 
citizens directly, the question of whether this will 
also translate into a more democratic governance 
process across member states still requires a more 
nuanced answer. Developments for enhancing 
parliamentary participation in EU matters could 
also come from the implementation and use of the 
diversified tools already in place across member 
states that enable national legislatures to control 
their governments (see also Winzen 2012).    
The case study on Romania shows with systematic 
data that the domestic changes identified at the level 
of polity (institutions of decision-making) highly 
corroborate with the shifts observed at the politics 
level (power configuration): a strengthening of 
the administrative arenas of decision-making and 
empowerment of state actors. As depicted from 
secondary literature this tends to be the dominant 
picture for all CEE countries (and often for 
Western democracies), with the strongest effect 
observed before integration. The network analysis 
has identified only a small decrease of these effects 
post enlargement. One possible explanation 
might be that policy styles that became routinized 
during the accession period were kept in place 
afterwards, but this might change as time elapses. 
Also, politically salient issues are more likely to 
attract contestation from strong domestic interest 
groups and thus stimulate greater national political 
debate. As well, the EU institutional reforms and 
political commitment to achieve greater civic 
involvement and national parliaments scrutiny 
in European matters might incite participation 
and help alleviate the gap between executives-
legislatures-civil society.   
This study has addressed a number of questions 
identified in the Europeanization literature. It has 
developed an innovative inquiry area, looking 
at the effects of the EU pressure on polity and 
politics, across sectors and over time. The research 
designed employed a control cases (a domestic 
reform), thus, allowing a systematic comparison 
of the Europeanization impact with cases where 
the EU effect is absent. Furthermore, relaying 
on the tools of social network analysis, the study 
has constructed a unique data set that enabled a 
thorough analysis of the policy-process. To bring 
additional evidence for the post enlargement 
question of whether the domestic changes 
identified so far will continue to persist, further 
research should be carried out, by monitoring and 
assessing the after integration consequences, on 
a longer time span and/or in different domestic 
milieus and policy areas. Collecting additional 
data about how the EU level interferes with the 
national policymaking context also in the light 
of the current EU institutional reforms would 
strengthen the analytical model and bring 
additional evidence about the consequences of the 
EU integration process.
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Introduction
The European Union (EU) and the Member States 
seem to be doing as little as they can to combat rule 
of law backsliding in some of the EU’s constituent 
parts. Each of the EU institutions came up with 
their own plan on what to do, inventing more 
and more soft law of questionable quality. All 
that is being done by the institutions appears to 
reveal one and only one point: there is a total 
disagreement among all the actors involved as to 
how to sort out the current impasse. This inaction 
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assists the powers of the backsliding Member 
States in consolidating their assault upon the 
EU’s values even further. At least four key legal-
political techniques are used to consolidate the 
undermining of the rule of law and democracy, as 
the present work shall demonstrate. 
The core question is how to ensure the upholding 
of the EU’s own rule of law. We argue that the 
most mature answer to the problems at hand 
necessarily requires a long-term perspective and 
involves, besides the reform of the enforcement 
mechanisms, also the reform of the Union as such. 
Supranational law should be made more aware of 
the values it is obliged by the Treaties to respect 
and protect, both at the national and supranational 
levels. EU law should embrace the rule of law as 
an institutional ideal, which implies, inter alia, 
eventual substantive limitations on the acquis of 
the Union, as well as taking EU values to heart in 
the context of the day-to-day functioning of the 
Union, elevating them above the instrumentalism 
marking them today. 
Poland2 has now joined Hungary,3 doubling the 
number of the Member States where rule of law is 
not safeguarded. While more states could follow, 
the Union’s position is, apparently, very weak: new 
soft law of questionable quality has been produced 
by each of the institutions,4 while positive 
2 Most importantly: T.T. Koncewicz, ‘Of Institutions, 
Democracy, Constitutional Self-defence’ (2016) 53 Common 
Market Law Review 1753. All websites were accessed on 20 July 
2018; T.T. Koncewicz, ‘The Capture of the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal and Beyond: Of institution(s), Fidelities and the Rule of 
Law in Flux’ (2018) 43 Review of Central and East European Law 
116; W. Sadurski, ‘How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of 
Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding’ (2018) Sydney Law School 
Research Paper No. 18/01.
3 K.L. Scheppele, ‘Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional 
Revolution’, in A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds), 
Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area: Theory, 
Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania (Hart Publishing, 2015); 
Z. Szente, ‘Challenging the Basic Values – The Problems with the 
Rule of Law in Hungary and the EU’s Failure to Tackle Them’, in 
A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law 
and Values (Oxford University Press, 2017) 456; K.L. Scheppele, 
‘Constitutional Coups in EU Law’, in M. Adams, A. Meeuse and 
E. Hirsch Ballin (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: 
Bridging Idealism and Realism (Cambridge University Press, 
2017).
4 Council of the EU Press Release no. 16936/14, 3362nd 
Council meeting, General Affairs, [2014] 20–21; European 
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change is nowhere to be seen, notwithstanding 
even the belated activation of the Article 7(1) 
Treaty on European Union (hereinafter: TEU) 
mechanism.5 Indeed, the situation seems to be 
evolving extremely fast and only in the direction 
of the deterioration of the rule of law and abuse 
by the executive of the independent institutions.6 
It seems that there is a total disagreement among 
essentially all the actors involved concerning what 
should be done, and the political will to sort out 
the current impasse is lacking at the level of the 
Member States, too. Supranational political party 
groups, instead of helping, seem to aggravate 
the situation.7 This inaction helps the powers of 
the backsliding Member States consolidate their 
assault upon EU’s values even further. 
Commission, ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of 
Law’ [2014] COM(2014)158; European Parliament, ‘Report with 
Recommendations to the Commission on the Establishment of an 
EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental 
Rights’ [2016] (2015/2254(INL)). Cf. on all these instruments, D. 
Kochenov, A. Magen and L. Pech (eds), ‘The Great Rule of Law 
Debate in the European Union’ (2016 symposium), (2016) 54(5) 
Journal of Common Market Studies.
5  K.L. Scheppele and L. Pech, ‘Poland and the European 
Commission’ (Parts I, II, and III), 3 January, 6 January, and 3 
March 2017, available at http://verfassungsblog.de/author/laurent-
pech/; D. Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘Better Late Than Never? On the 
Commission’s Rule of Law Framework and Its First Activation’ 
(2016) 24 Journal of Common Market Studies 1062; P. Oliver and J. 
Stefanelli, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law in the EU: The Council’s 
Inaction’ (2016) 24 Journal of Common Market Studies 1075; but 
see, E. Hirsch Ballin, ‘Mutual Trust: The Virtue of Reciprocity – 
Strengthening the Acceptance of the Rule of Law through Peer 
Review’, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of 
Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University 
Press, 2016).
6 U. Sedelmeier, ‘Anchoring Democracy from Above? The 
European Union and Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and 
Romania after Accession’ (2014) 52 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 105; J.-W. Müller, ‘The EU as a Militant Democracy, or: 
Are There Limits to Constitutional Mutations within the Member 
States’ (2014) 165 Revista de Estudios Políticos 141; A. von 
Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds), Constitutional Crisis in the 
European Constitutional Area, op. cit.; C. Closa and D. Kochenov 
(eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016); A. Jakab and D. Kochenov 
(eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Methods to Achieve 
Compliance (Oxford University Press, 2017); L. Pech and K.L. 
Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’ 
(2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3.
7 R.D. Kelemen, ‘Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: 
National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union’ (2017) 
52 Government and Opposition 211.
A previously unimaginable situation arose whereby 
the EU harbours Member States which, besides 
obviously not qualifying for Union membership if 
they were to apply today, work hard to undermine 
key principles the EU was created to safeguard 
and promote: democracy, the rule of law, and the 
protection of fundamental rights.8 The underlying 
issue is the creation of a modus vivendi where the 
EU’s own instrumentalist understanding of the 
rule of law, including principles such as mutual 
trust or the autonomy of EU law, reinforces and 
not jeopardises respect for values enshrined in 
Article 2 TEU.9 
The paper starts out by defining the problem, 
focusing on the nature, and gravity of rule of 
law backsliding in Hungary and Poland in order 
to outline four key techniques deployed by the 
autocratic regimes in order to consolidate the 
constitutional capture and massive assault on 
European values. These techniques to achieve, 
legitimise, and consolidate the destruction of the 
rule of law include: appeals to national sovereignty; 
fetishisation of ‘constitutional identity’ taken out 
of context; appeals to national security complete 
with the harassment of the media, NGOs, and 
independent educational institutions; and 
international disinformation campaigns (Part 1). 
We proceed by discussing the state of the art with 
regard to values in the EU legal system (Part 2); 
followed by undergoing a normative assessment of 
how these values should preferably be approached 
(Part 3). Looking at supranational law, we argue 
that the root of the problem is the lack of a sufficient 
upgrade of the role played by values – including the 
rule of law – when the Union transformed from an 
ordinary treaty organisation into a constitutional 
system (Part 4). The EU’s powerlessness is among 
8 As well as other values expressed in Art. 2 TEU; L. Pech, 
‘“A Union Founded on the Rule of Law”: Meaning and Reality of 
the Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’ (2010) 
6 EU Constitutional Law Review 359; D. Kochenov, ‘The Acquis 
and Its Principles: The Enforcement of the “Law” Versus the 
Enforcement of “Values” in the EU’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov 
(ed), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, op. cit.
9 M. Klamert and D. Kochenov, ‘Article 2’, in M. Kellerbauer, 
M. Klamer tand J. Tomkin (eds), EU Treaties and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 
2019).
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the root causes of letting Member States slide into 
authoritarianism (Part 5). We conclude by arguing 
for shifting the focus of the discussion from the 
enforcement of the rule of law to the reform of the 
Union as such as a long-term solution (Part 6). 
There is time: illiberal regimes seem to be there 
to stay, and the options in regard to changing this 
reality, either supranationally or from a grass-roots 
level, are limited, if not non-existent: we might 
need to wait ten years – or thirty, for that matter – 
before Hungary and Poland are back on track. In 
the meantime, EU institutions should come to a 
more subtle realisation of the EU’s constitutional 
role and should not insist on the specificities 
of EU law trumping all other considerations, 
including respect for the values the EU and the 
Member States are supposed to share, but should 
instead acknowledge the possibility of potential 
limitations so as to let the foundations of the EU, 
as provided for by the Lisbon Treaty, evolve. This 
could definitely be done in the context of a soft 
quarantine of Poland, Hungary, and any other 
backsliding states.
1. The EU: From high 
expectations to jeopardy?
Whereas all Member States suffer from 
deficiencies in at least some elements of the rule of 
law, in light of a pattern of constitutional capture 
we focus on rule of law backsliders and follow 
the definition proposed by Pech and Scheppele, 
according to which rule of law backsliding is a 
‘process through which elected public authorities 
deliberately implement governmental blueprints 
which aim to systematically weaken, annihilate or 
capture internal checks on power with the view 
of dismantling the liberal democratic state and 
entrenching the long-term rule of the dominant 
party.’10 In what follows we shall focus on the 
two Member States that presently satisfy these 
10 L. Pech and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within’, op. cit., 
at 8.
definitional elements, i.e. Hungary11 and Poland.12 
Even though countries acceding to the EU in 
2004 had high hopes for joining the democratic 
world after the political changes, the enthusiasm 
for European values on the side of certain Central 
Eastern European Member States vanished on the 
way – a phenomenon which was unthinkable during 
the 1989 Eastern European ‘velvet revolutions’. In 
all these countries, the separation of powers had 
been realised where parliamentary lawmaking 
procedure required extensive consultation with 
both civil society and opposition parties and 
crucial issues of constitutional concern required a 
supermajority vote of the Parliament. Independent 
self-governing judicial power ensured that the 
laws were fairly applied. Constitutional scrutiny 
played a special role in transitional democracies.
After the regime change, Hungary was the first 
‘post-communist’ country to join the Council of 
Europe and abide by the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR or Convention) in 1990. Poland gained 
membership in the Council of Europe in 1991 
and became party to the ECHR in 1993. Hungary 
and Poland established official relations with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter: 
NATO) already in the early 1990s and became 
NATO members in 1999. They also started 
accession talks with the European Union Member 
States and signed the EU Association Agreements 
in the early 1990s, which paved the way for full 
EU membership.13 The Treaty of Accession to the 
11 L. Sólyom, ‘The Rise and Decline of Constitutional 
Culture in Hungary’, in A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds), 
Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area, op. cit.; 
M. Bánkuti, G. Halmai and K. L. Scheppele, ‘Hungary’s Illiberal 
Turn: Disabling the Constitution’ (2012) 23 Journal of Democracy 
138. 
12 For an overview of political court-packing and other 
Polish developments, see, e.g., T. T. Koncewicz, ‘The Capture of the 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal and Beyond’, op. cit.; W. Sadurski, 
‘How Democracy Dies (In Poland)’, op. cit. See also The Venice 
Commission for Democracy through Law, Opinion on amendments 
to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of 
Poland, CDL-AD(2016)001, Venice, 11 March 2016, available 
at: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
AD%282016%29001-e. 
13 K. Inglis, ‘The Europe Agreements Compared in the 
Light of Their Pre-Accession Reorientation’ (2000) 37 Common 
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European Union was signed in 2003. Hungary, 
Poland, six other Central and Eastern European 
countries as well as two Mediterranean islands 
became members of the European Union on 1 
May 2004 as part of the biggest enlargement in 
the Union’s history.14 The European Union played 
an important role in the transformation of all 
the Eastern European states and in the context 
of their democratisation.15 The principle of 
conditionality was used to achieve this, coupled 
with the presumption that any democratic or 
rule of law ‘backsliding’ would not be possible 
once the transformation was in place.16 Alongside 
the Europe Agreements, the Union applied 
the Copenhagen criteria adopted by the 1993 
Copenhagen European Council.17 Clearly going 
beyond the scope of the Europe Agreements,18 
these criteria became the cornerstone of Hungary’s 
and Poland’s transformations throughout the 
first decade of this century, reshaping the core of 
EU constitutionalism in the process, too.19 The 
shocking rate at which the deconstruction of the 
rule of law occurs in Poland and Hungary today 
demonstrates the importance of a constitutional 
culture beyond black letter law including 
constitutions, institutions, and procedures. 
The shift came rather abruptly when, in April 
2010, in a free and fair election the centre-right 
political parties Fidesz Hungarian Civic Union 
Market Law Review 1173.
14 A. Ott and K. Inglis (eds), Handbook on European 
Enlargement (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002).
15 Cf. M. A. Vachudova: Europe Undivided (Oxford 
University Press, 2005).
16 D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of 
Conditionality (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2008).
17 C. Hillion, ‘The Copenhagen Criteria and Their Progeny’, 
in C. Hillion (ed) EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach (Hart 
Publishing, 2004)
18 P.-C. Müller-Graff: ‘Legal Framework for Relations 
between the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: 
General Aspects’, in M. Maresceau (ed), Enlarging the European 
Union: Relations between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe 
(Longman, 1997) 42; M. Maresceau, ‘The EU Pre-Accession 
Strategies: A Political and Legal Analysis’, in M. Maresceau and 
E. Lanon (eds), EU Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies 
(Palgrave, 2001).
19 W. Sadurski, Constitutionalism and Enlargement of 
Europe (Oxford University Press, 2012).
(Fidesz) and the Christian-Democratic People’s 
Party (in Hungarian: Kereszténydemokrata 
Néppárt, KDNP)20 got 53% of the votes, which 
translated into more than two-thirds of the seats in 
the unicameral Hungarian Parliament under the 
election law then in force.21 The ruling party did not 
tolerate any internal dissent, and after forming the 
second Fidesz government22 it eliminated – at least 
in the domestic setting – all sources of criticism 
by both the voters and state institutions, effectively 
disposing of any effective checks and balances. 
Should a discontent electorate now wish to correct 
deficiencies, it would be difficult for it to do so 
due to the novel rules of the national ballot, which 
fundamentally bring into question the fairness 
of future elections. Judicial oversight and most 
importantly the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s 
room for correcting the failures of a majoritarian 
government have been considerably impaired, 
along the powers of other fora designed to serve 
as checks on government powers. Distortions 
of the media and lack of public information 
lead to the impossibility of a meaningful public 
debate and weaken the chances of restoring 
deliberative democracy. Support by the electorate 
is enhanced through emotionalism, revolutionary 
rhetoric, catchphrases such as ‘law and order’, 
‘family’, ‘tradition’, ‘nation’, symbolic lawmaking, 
and identity politics in general. The friend/foe 
dichotomy is artificially created through punitive 
populism and scapegoating, partially through 
building on pre-existing prejudices, and partially 
by creating new enemies such as multinational 
companies or persons challenging Hungarian 
unorthodoxy on the international scene. 
The changes can be traced back to the government’s 
ideological roots. But unlike in Poland, ideology 
20  The cooperation between Fidesz and KDNP shall not be 
regarded as a coalition, rather as a party alliance created already 
before the elections. According to their self-perception their 
relation is similar to the party alliance between CDU and CSU in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. KDNP is a tiny party that would 
probably not get into Parliament on its own. The insignificance of 
KDNP allows us to abbreviate for the sake of brevity: whenever 
the term ‘Fidesz government’ is used, the Fidesz–KDNP political 
alliance is meant. 
21 Act C of 1997 on the Election Procedure.
22 Fidesz first governed between 1998 and 2002.
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by the government is chosen by way of political 
convenience. Turning towards illiberalism was 
a necessity, for a government wishing to retain 
political and economic power at all costs, and 
capture the state to this end, cannot reconcile 
its ideological stance with the concept of liberal 
democracy. So Fidesz had to search for other role 
models than the democratic world, and found 
its allies in countries such as Turkey, and most 
importantly Russia. Even though illiberalism was 
relabelled as ‘Christian democracy’ after Fidesz 
was re-elected in April 2018, the same form 
of governance remains. Representing harshly 
opposing views within a short period of time 
never hurt Fidesz politicians, who are brilliant at 
explaining their reasons for a volte-face. The party, 
originally with strong anti-Russian sentiments, 
became pro-Putin – and still managed to retain 
public support.
Poland followed the path of illiberalism when the 
Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 
PiS) entered government in 2015. The country 
experienced a very serious departure from liberal 
democratic principles and is going through the 
reversal of the rule of law in various fields. 
The tools employed and the outcome are very 
similar to the ones in Hungary, but certain 
elements of the Polish case also make it distinct, 
illustrating that there was no Central Eastern 
European or even Visegrád pattern. First, unlike 
in Hungary, the Polish government does not have 
a constitution-making nor -amending majority, 
therefore – for the time being – it engages in rule 
of law backsliding by way of curbing ordinary 
laws; as Ewa Łętowska put it, the government 
has been ‘trying to change the system through 
the back door’.23 Second, Hungary is essentially 
23 P. Pacula, Poland’s ‘July Coup’ and What is Means 
for the Judiciary, 19 July 2017, available at: http://euobserver.
com/justice/138567. Taking the President’s announcement of a 
2018 constitutional referendum into account, this might change 
in the future: L. Kelly, Polish President Wants Referendum on 
Constitution in Nov 2018, 24 May 2017, available at: http://
www.reuters.com/article/poland-politics-president-constitution-
idUSL8N1IQ6P0. For an immediate analysis see M. Matczak, 
Why the Announced Constitutional Referendum in Poland is not 
a Constitutional Referendum after all, 13 May 2017, available at: 
http://verfassungsblog.de/why-the-announced-constitutional-
referendum-in-poland-is-not-a-constitutional-referendum-after-
a kleptocracy,24 where the government may pick 
any ideology available on the political spectrum to 
acquire and retain economic and political powers. 
By contrast, the Polish government and especially 
PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński, the de facto ruler 
of Poland, are more likely to truly believe in what 
they are preaching in terms of national interests. 
When justifying rule of law backsliding, a whole 
new worldview is developed, rewriting the 
democratic transition and the post-1989 Polish 
history as something fundamentally corrupt and 
poised by foreign interest in contravention to 
national ones.25 For him, post-1989 Polish history, 
including the roundtable talks in 1989, is the 
result of an indecent compromise between the 
individuals and movements bringing about regime 
change and the outgoing Communist forces. Along 
these lines he sees all democratic institutions as a 
‘sham’; for him, ‘the Third Republic is not a real 
state, but a phantom state built on the intellectual 
corruption of political elites, bribery, dysfunctional 
government caving Brussels and selling off Poland 
to strangers for peanuts.’26 For PiS ‘repolonisation’ 
means taking over power, banks, land, and other 
property, and means reclaiming Poland from both 
foreigners and the corrupt political elites so as to 
bring about a true regime change.27 Seemingly all 
means are allowed, and any checks or controls 
on power are seen as unnecessary burdens the 
state shall be freed from, so as to accomplish this 
purging exercise. 
Illiberal governments are very well aware of the 
irreconcilability of their politics with European 
values. The states in question therefore lobby for 
exemptions. 
all/.
24 Also referred to as a mafia state. See B. Magyar, Post-
communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary (CEU Press, 2016). 
25 J. Conelly, T.T. Koncewicz, Who are Today’s Polish 
Traitors? Of Politics of Paranoia and Resentment and Missed 
Lessons from the Past, 15 November 2016, available at: http://
verfassungsblog.de/who-are-todays-polish-traitors-of-politics-of-
paranoia-and-resentment-and-missed-lessons-from-the-past/.
26  Id. 
27 Freedom House, Pluralism under Attack: The 
Assault on Press Freedom in Poland, available at: https://
freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/assault-press-freedom-
poland#sdendnote21anc.
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a. Invocation of national 
sovereignty to undermine the 
institutions
A first technique is the invocation of national 
sovereignty without any further justification. 
Polish capture of the Constitutional Tribunal, 
the Supreme Court, the National Council of the 
Judiciary, and ordinary courts happened under 
the pretext that ‘reform’ of the judiciary was a 
matter for the Member States and the EU acted 
ultra vires if it interfered. The Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal was the first institution to fall victim to 
state capture at the end of 2016.28 Its powers have 
been considerably cut, changes were introduced 
to its structure and proceedings, budget cuts took 
place, and three justices elected constitutionally 
by the 7th Sejm (the lower chamber of the Polish 
Parliament) were not permitted to take oath, 
whereas three justices elected unconstitutionally 
by the 8th Sejm after PiS had won the elections 
were permitted to do so. After having rendered the 
Constitutional Tribunal irrelevant in upholding 
the rule of law, the government has done the same 
with the Supreme Court, the National Council for 
the Judiciary, and ordinary courts. The changes 
related to the reorganisation of the Supreme 
Court empower the executive to: prematurely end 
the tenure of judges, meaning forcefully retire 
them; determine the conditions and procedure 
for becoming a Supreme Court judge; control 
disciplinary procedures, amending the rules of 
procedure of the Supreme Court; change the 
total number of judges serving on the Supreme 
Court; reorganise the chambers in which Supreme 
Court justices are to serve; and restructure case 
allocation.29 Ordinary court capture happened 
by subordinating all Presidents and Directors of 
courts, i.e. persons who decide on administrative 
28 T.T. Koncewicz, ‘Of Institutions, Democracy, 
Constitutional Self-Defence’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law 
Review 1753.
29 In disregard of national and international criticism, on 8 
December 2017, the laws on the Supreme Court and the Council 
were adopted by the Sejm, and on 15 December 2017 they were 
approved by the Senate. 
and financial issues, to the Minister of Justice.30 Even 
this short enumeration of government intrusions 
in to the powers of the courts which highlights 
only some of the milestones in judicial capture 
shows, in the words of the Venice Commission 
– the most authoritative body in Europe on the 
issues of the rule of law and judicial independence 
– that ‘the constitutionality of Polish laws can no 
longer be guaranteed’.31 Another example from 
the same jurisdiction is the dispute related to the 
felling of trees in the Białowieża Forest, a UNESCO 
World Heritage Site. In Białowieża, pending the 
judgment in the main proceedings, the Court 
of Justice ordered Poland to stop the forest 
management operations.32 The Polish response 
was an intensified logging of trees, and Poland even 
asked for removing the forest in question from 
the UNESCO World Heritage List.33 Reference 
to national sovereignty often comes without any 
further justification. As the above controversy 
shows, by questioning the powers of the EU 
the Polish government does not aim to initiate 
a legitimate discussion about the delineation 
between national and EU powers. It much rather 
wishes ‘to break free from the supranational 
machinery of control and enforcement. Following 
the trajectory from the “exit in values” to the 
“exit in legality” reveals an inescapable logic. All 
institutions, domestic and supranational, are seen 
to be standing in the way, and their rejection is 
part of the comprehensive constitutional doctrine 
– the politics of resentment.’34
30 Ustawa z dnia 23 marca 2017 r. o zmianie ustawy – 
Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych [Law amending the act on 
the organization of common courts system], OJ 2017, item 803, 
available at: http://www.dziennikustaw.gov.pl/DU/2017/803 (in 
Polish). 
31 European Commission, ‘Recommendation of 26.7.2017 
regarding the rule of law in Poland’ [2017] C(2017)5320, para. 10.
32 Case C–441/17R Commission v Poland [2017] 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:877.
33 In Case C–441/17 Commission v Poland [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:255, of 18 April 2018, the Court ruled that by 
carrying on with the logging in the Białowieża Forest, Poland failed 
to fulfil its obligations under EU law.
34 T.T. Koncewicz, The Białowieża case. A Tragedy in 
Six Acts, Verfassungsblog, 17 May 2018, available at: https://
verfassungsblog.de/the-bialowieza-case-a-tragedy-in-six-acts/. 
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b. Appeals to constitutional 
identity to undermine the 
institutions
The second and more sophisticated technique is 
the attempt to package departures from the rule 
of law in the name of constitutional identity.35 
Back in 2017, the Hungarian Parliament failed to 
acquire the necessary quorum to constitutionally 
entrench the concept of constitutional identity, 
but after the Fidesz and its tiny coalition partner 
the Christian Democratic People’s Party acquired 
a two thirds i.e. constitution amending majority, 
a modification to Article R) of the Fundamental 
Law referring to ‘Hungarian cultural and Christian 
identity’ has again been tabled. But the amendment 
is somewhat redundant, since the already captured 
Hungarian Constitutional Court (hereinafter: 
HCC) came to rescue the government, and 
developed its own theory of constitutional identity 
after the failed attempt to embed the concept 
into the Fundamental Law. When delivering its 
abstract constitutional interpretation in relation 
to European Council decision 2015/1601 of 22 
September 2015 establishing provisional measures 
benefitting Italy and Greece, to support them 
in better coping with an emergency situation 
characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals 
of third countries in those Member States, the 
HCC invoked constitutional identity.36 However 
tautological this may sound, according to the HCC 
‘constitutional identity equals the constitutional 
(self-)identity of Hungary’.37 Its content is to be 
determined by the HCC on a case-by-case basis 
based on the interpretation of the Fundamental 
Law, its purposes, the National Avowal contained 
therein, and the achievements of the Hungarian 
historical constitution. This definition is so vague 
that it can be considered as an attempt of granting 
a carte blanche type of derogation to the executive 
and the legislative from Hungary’s obligations 
35  G. Halmai, ‘Abuse of Constitutional Identity. The 
Hungarian Constitutional Court on Interpretation of Article E) 
(2) of the Fundamental Law’ (2018) 43 Review of Central and East 
European Law 1, 23–42. 
36  22/2016 (XII. 5.) HCC decision.
37  Id.
under EU law.38 Once Fidesz acquired a two thirds 
majority again in the 2018 parliamentary elections, 
it finally incorporated the constitutional identity 
to the Fundamental Law by way of the so-called 
seventh constitutional amendment.39 Questioning 
claims of constitutional identity might well be 
criticised by those concerned as being ignorant 
or lacking respect, but European supervisory 
mechanisms should be well-suited and confident 
enough to tell the bluff apart from genuine claims 
of constitutional identity.40
c. Invocation of national 
security to undermine the 
institutions
The third technique is reference to national 
security. Labelling virtually anyone still capable of 
formulating dissent as foreign agents is a technique 
long used, but in Hungary it was taken to a whole 
new level in 2017 with the adoption of Lex CEU 
and Lex NGO,41 targeting a private university and 
foreign-funded civil society organisations that are 
38 For English language analyses see G. Halmai, The 
Hungarian Constitutional Court and Constitutional Identity, 
10 January 2017, available at: http://verfassungsblog.de/the-
hungarian-constitutional-court-and-constitutional-identity/.
39 See inserted Article R) Fundamental Law. The official 




40  R.D. Kelemen, ‘The Dangers of Constitutional Pluralism’, 
in M. Avbelj and G. Davies (eds), Research Handbook on Legal 
Pluralism and EU Law (Edward Elgar, 2018); V. Perju, ‘On Uses 
and Misuses of Human Rights in European Constitutionalism’, in S. 
Vöneky and G. L. Neuman (eds), Human Rights, Democracy, and 
Legitimacy in a World in Disorder (Cambridge University Press, 
2018); G. Halmai, Abuse of Constitutional Identity, op. cit.
41 Act XXV of 2017 on the Modifications of Act CCIV of 
20011 on National Higher Education and Act LXXVI of 2017 on 
the transparency of foreign-funded organisations. According to 
the law on NGOs, any association or foundation receiving foreign 
support above the amount of 23.200 EUR per year will have 
to notify the courts about this fact. EU money is exempted, but 
only if distributed by the Hungarian state through a budgetary 
institution. The respective organisation will be labelled as a so-
called ‘organization supported from abroad’, which will need to 
be indicated at the entity’s website, press releases, publications, 
etc. The law is disturbing in many aspects: it mimics Russian 
worst practices, which have been condemned by international 
organisations as violations of freedom of association and free 
speech.
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independent of government funds and thereby fit to 
express government criticism. The explanations of 
the laws attempting to force CEU out of the country 
and to limit public space for NGOs respectively 
attempt to delegitimise these entities by claiming 
they pose national security threats to the country. 
The phenomenon of a shrinking space for civil 
society can be traced in both Hungary and Poland. 
The narrative surrounding NGOs got very hostile. 
We are witnessing orchestrated smear campaigns 
against civil society members that are criticising 
the government or simply not fitting its ideological 
agenda.42 In some cases, the smear campaigns 
are followed by investigations undertaken by law 
enforcement or tax authorities, which may create 
an even more hostile environment for NGOs.43 
Governments deprive civil society of effective 
functioning by limiting their access to funding, 
including state but also foreign funding, as the 
Hungarian law obliges NGOs to indicate that they 
are ‘organisations receiving support from abroad’, 
and to display this stigmatising label on all their 
materials published.44 This is getting very close 
to demonising dissenters as terrorists and indeed 
the government claims that NGOs receiving 
foreign support – i.e. the most professional ones 
– are helping asylum seekers, and among them 
terrorists, enter the country. A modification 
of the Hungarian Criminal Code ensures that 
criminal sanctions can be imposed on NGOs and 
individuals that provide legal or other types of aid 
to migrants arriving at to the Hungarian borders.45 
42 Associated Press in Warsaw, Police Raid Offices of 
Women’s Groups in Poland After Protests, 5 October 2017, available 
at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/05/police-raid-
offices-of-womens-groups-in-poland. 
43 Hungarian Helsinki Committee et al., ‘Timeline of 
Governmental Attacks Against Hungarian NGO Sphere’, 7 April 
2017, available at: https://tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/timeline_of_gov_
attacks_against_hu_ngos_07042017.pdf.
44 For more details see M. Szuleka, ‘First Victims or Last 
Guardians? The Consequences of Rule of Law Backsliding for 
NGOs: Case Studies of Hungary and Poland’ (2018) CEPS Paper in 
Liberty and Security No. 2018-06.
45 Article 353/ of Act C of 2012 on the Hungarian Criminal 
Code. For the official government position see: Website of the 
Hungarian Government, Strong Action is Required Against the 
Organisers of Migration, 24 May 2018, available at: http://www.
kormany.hu/en/news/strong-action-is-required-against-the-
National security claims might not only fit into the 
ruling party’s nationalistic, exclusionary rhetoric 
and scapegoating, but it can serve (i.e. be abused) 
as the basis for lobbying for exemptions from 
European standards. As Uitz points out, reference 
to national security, which is the sole responsibility 
of the Member States according to Article 4(2) 
TEU ‘can be a much stronger centrifugal force in 
Europe than cries of constitutional identity could 
ever be. […] Therefore, it is all the more important 
that European constitutional and political actors 
realize: The carefully crafted new Hungarian laws 
use the cloak of national security to stab the rule 
of law, as understood in Europe, in the heart.’46
d. Disinformation campaigns at 
the service of the backsliding 
regimes
The fourth technique the autocrats use to 
undermine the rule of law is disinformation or 
misinterpretation of the laws and policies of 
the government. Again Hungary took the lead 
in 2011 when they sent a wrong translation to 
Brussels of their controversial new Constitution, 
the Fundamental Law, which looked more in 
conformity with EU laws and values than the actual 
text.47 From a more substantive view, the Polish48 
organisers-of-migration. 
46 R. Uitz, The Return of the Sovereign: A Look at the Rule 
of Law in Hungary – and in Europe, 5 April 2017, available at: 
http://verfassungsblog.de/the-return-of-the-sovereign-a-look-at-
the-rule-of-law-in-hungary-and-in-europe/.
47 For a detailed enumeration of the discrepancies see a 
joint document by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, the Eötvös 
Károly Policy Institute, and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, 
Full List of Mistakes and Omissions of the English Version of the 
Hungarian Draft-Constitution, available at: https://tasz.hu/files/
tasz/imce/list_of_all_the_omissions_and_mistranslations.pdf. 
This technique is also employed the other way round: when the 
Venice Commission delivered its highly critical opinion of the 
Fundamental Law, it was interpreted by the Government, as if the 
Hungarian constitution was being praised. See, The Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee, NGOs Analyze Government Reactions 
Concerning the Venice Commission’s Opinion on the New 




48 See: Chancellery of the Prime Minister, White Paper 
on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary, 7 March 2018, available at: 
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and Hungarian49 responses to the Commission50 
and the European Parliament51 invitation for a 
Council Decision on the determination of a clear 
risk of a serious breach by Poland and Hungary 
of values enshrined in Article 2 TEU also contain 
factual mistakes and deliberate deceit.52 Up-to-
date information following the fast legislative 
changes that sometimes happen literally overnight 
and solid legal research may deconstruct the fake 
information these texts contain and challenge the 
contention that these political forces engage in a 
dialogue, when all they do is produce documents 
or make some cosmetic changes in order to gain 
time and press on with their illiberal agenda. 
Such ‘anti-Member States’ that abuse the law 
and Constitution to create autocracies take 
full part in governing the Union, benefit from 
unprecedented direct financial support, and abuse 
the international prestige which is associated 
with the membership of this organisation.53 
https://www.premier.gov.pl/files/files/white_paper_en_full.pdf. 
49 See, as made public by MEP Ujhelyi, ‘Information Sheet 
of the Hungarian Government on the Issues Raised by the Draft 
Report of Judith Sargentini on ‘A Proposal Calling on the Council 
to Determine, Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European 
Union, the Existence of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by Hungary 
of the Values on which the Union is Founded’, 2018, available at 
http://ujhelyi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Information-sheet-
of-the-Hungarian-Government-on-the-issues-raised-by-th....pdf.
50 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision 
on the Determination of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by the 
Republic of Poland of the Rule of Law’ [2017] COM(2017) 835 
final.
51 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 
‘Draft report on a Proposal Calling on the Council to Determine, 
Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the 
Existence of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by Hungary of the 
Values on which the Union is Founded [2017] (2017/2131(INL)), 
Rapporteur: Judith Sargentini).
52 For an assessment of the Polish White Paper by the 
Polish Judges Association ‘Iustitia’, together with a team of experts, 
see, Response to the White Paper Compendium on the Reforms 
of the Polish Justice System, Presented by the Government of the 
Republic of Poland to the European Commission, 2018, available at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/mar/pl-judges-association-
response-judiciary-reform-3-18.pdf. For an assessment of the 
Hungarian information sheet see the lengthy criticism by R. 
Labanino and Z. Nagy, The Social and Political Situation in 
Hungary, 17 May 2018 available at: https://drive.google.com/file/
d/1OcIlFUtg9s1-FLMRo_qF4MbywRxAAbt5/view. 
53 C. Closa, ‘Reinforcing EU Monitoring of the Rule of Law’, 
in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing the Rule of Law 
Poland will have received 86 billion euros under 
the current budgetary framework by 2020 and 
Hungary 24 billion, which is an unprecedented 
transfer of resources from democracies to illiberal 
regimes, which unquestionably contributes to the 
entrenchment of the regimes in power.
The international reactions to the current situation 
underline one thing: the Union is either content 
with the current situation or entirely powerless. 
The former is hardly convincing given both the 
size of direct economic transfers to Hungary and 
Poland as well as the dangers that these Member 
States bring into the Union, as fully expressed in 
the numerous public statements of the members 
of the College of Commissioners and heard 
during European Parliament debates. If a Member 
State breaches the EU’s fundamental values, this 
is likely to undermine the very foundations of the 
Union and the trust between its Member States, 
regardless of the field in which the breach occurs.54 
Beyond harming the nationals of a Member State, 
Union citizens residing in that state will also be 
detrimentally affected. Moreover, the lack of 
limitations on ‘illiberal practices’55 may encourage 
other Member States’ governments to follow suit 
and subject other countries’ citizens to an abuse of 
their rights. In other words, violations of the rule 
of law may, if there are no consequences, become 
contagious.56 Finally, all EU citizens will to some 
extent suffer due to the given state’s participation 
in the EU’s decision-making mechanisms. At the 
very least, the legitimacy of the Union’s decision-
making process will be jeopardised. Therefore, 
Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 13. 
54 European Commission Communication, ‘On Article 7 of 
the Treaty on European Union – Respect for and Promotion of the 
Values on which the Union is Based’ [2003] COM(2003)606 final, 
p. 5.
55 The term ‘illiberal democracy’ was coined long ago, but it 
gained practical relevance in the EU after Hungarian Prime Minister 
praised the concept in his speech given in Tusnádfürdő on 25 July 
2014. Cf. Frans Timmermans’ speech to the European Parliament: 
‘There is no such thing as an illiberal democracy’. F. Timmermans, 
EU Framework for Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental 
Rights, Strasbourg, Speech/15/4402, 12 February 2015, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-4402_en.htm.
56 s.a., Politico, Viktor Orbán: The Conservative Subversive, 
Politico 28, 2015, 12–15, 15.
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the latter explanation, i.e. the EU’s powerlessness, 
seems to be the core of the matter. Such 
powerlessness is a consequence of a combination 
of the real difficulties, conceptual as well as 
practical, related to the enforcement of EU values,57 
but also, equally importantly, to the systematic 
misrepresentation of the Union’s capacity by the 
Member States and the institutions unwilling to 
act, as a clear consensus on forceful dealing with 
the rule of law backsliding is apparently lacking.
The claims that little to nothing can be done 
under the current legal framework – which are 
heard with remarkable regularity, confirming the 
second supposition above – are entirely baseless, 
as Hillion, Besselink, and other scholars have 
consistently pointed out.58 In making such claims, 
the Commission and other institutions point to 
the fact that this powerlessness is not caused by 
an absolute lack of Treaty instruments that would 
warrant intervention. Rather, the instruments 
that are available are apparently considered too 
strong, or, to put it differently, too toxic, to be used. 
Among possible instruments, the EU’s ‘nuclear’ 
option stands out, we are told: Article 7 TEU could 
not be activated for a long time in fear that the 
fallout would have been too terrible and because 
the hurdles for starting the procedure were 
allegedly too insurmountable. Such justifications 
for inaction or engaging in substitute activity, like 
the invention of the new soft-law procedures, are 
difficult to reconcile with the radical deterioration 
of constitutionalism on the ground in the 
backsliding states.59 Now that the Article 7(1) TEU 
57 Cf. G. Itzcovich, ‘On the Legal Enforcement of Values. 
The Importance of the Institutional Context’, in A. Jakab and D. 
Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, op. cit.; 
M. Avbelj, ‘Pluralism and Systemic Defiance in the EU’, in A. Jakab 
and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, 
op. cit. 
58 C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: 
Legal Mandate and Means’, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), 
Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight, op. cit; L. Besselink, ‘The 
Bite, the Bark and the Howl: Article 7 TEU and the Rule of Law 
Initiatives’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of 
EU Law and Values, op. cit.
59 D. Kochenov, ‘Busting the Myths Nuclear: A Commentary 
on Article 7 TEU’ (2017) EUI Working Paper LAW 2017/10.
procedure has been triggered against Poland,60 
and there are serious attempts to have it initiated 
against Hungary,61 the opposite preoccupation 
comes to the fore, namely the inefficiency of the 
tool,62 which leads to the reinvention of other 
tools in place. For instance, Article 258 TFEU 
or 259 TFEU has been given a broader appeal 
in the backsliding context,63 as evidenced by the 
infringement proceedings pursued against Poland 
in the context of its destruction of the Supreme 
Court, which build on the newly-found effet utile 
and EU law scope-shaping significance of Article 
19(1) TEU (as well as Article 47 CFR, read in 
conjunction with the former),64 in opposition 
to the Pyrrhic victories in the otherwise similar 
Hungarian context.65 Scholars expected this 
development,66 which infuses Article 258 TFEU 
with clear new potential, all the necessary caution 
in interpreting it too broadly notwithstanding.
Some, like Vice President Timmermans, compare 
the present situation to that of the Austrian 
crisis at the turn of the millennium and fear that 
60 European Commission, ‘Reasoned Proposal in 
Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union 
Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland – Proposal for a Council 
Decision on the Determination of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach 
by the Republic of Poland of the Rule of Law’ [2017] (COM(2017) 
835 final.
61  Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 
(2017/2131 (INL)), op. cit. 
62 As a consequence, the institutions see the solution in 
the power of the purse to provide disincentives for rule of law 
violations. See European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
the Union’s Budget in Case of Generalised Deficiencies as Regards 
the Rule of Law in the Member States’ [2018] COM(2018)324 final.
63 K. L. Scheppele, ‘The Case for Systemic Infringement 
Actions’, in Closa and Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law, op. 
cit.; D. Kochenov, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the 
Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to Make it a Viable Rule of Law 
Enforcement Tool’ (2015) 7 The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law, 
153.
64 Case C–64/16 Associação sindical dos juízes portugueses 
[2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:117; M. Krajewski, ‘Associação sindical 
dos juízes portugueses: The Court of Justice and Athena’s Dilemma’ 
(2018) 3 European Papers 295.
65 Case C–286/12 Commission v Hungary [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:687 (compulsory retirement of judges). U. 
Belavusau, ‘Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary’ (2013) 50 
Common Market Law Review 1145.
66  C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU’ op. cit.
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triggering Article 7 would similarly backfire.67 
The parallel drawn between the Austrian and 
current situations is misleading, however, for 
numerous reasons. The most obvious point is 
that the institutions could not have made use of 
the then non-existent preventive arm of Article 
7 – currently Article 7(1) TEU – at the time the 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) entered 
government, and there was no reason to make use 
of the provision as it then stood, i.e. to invoke the 
sanctioning arm.68 Given the lack of a legally pre-
defined preventive procedure, a political action 
was opted for that need not – but, very importantly, 
could – be taken vis-à-vis Hungary or Poland in 
light of Article 7. The political quarantine vis-à-
vis Austria started right after the formation of the 
government, before those in power could have 
eroded European values, and once the situation 
was thoroughly investigated, the Three Wise 
Men commissioned with this task did not find a 
violation of EU values, and accordingly suggested 
lifting the political sanctions.69 EU Member States’ 
hostile intervention against Austria was not 
backed by either a proper legal basis or political 
necessity: an illegal ad hoc action triggered by a 
democratic election result. The current Hungarian 
and Polish situations cannot be compared to the 
former Austrian one, since the former are long in 
the state of constitutional capture, which is well 
documented both by European institutions and in 
the academic literature. 
67 F. Timmermans, The European Union and the Rule 
of Law – Keynote Speech at Conference on the Rule of Law, 




68 K. Lachmayer, ‘Questioning the Basic Values – Austria 
and Jörg Haider’, in Jakab and Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of 
EU Law and Values, op. cit. 
69 M. Ahtisaari, J. Frowein and M. Oreja, ‘Report on the 
Austrian Government’s Commitment to the Common European 
Values, in Particular Concerning the Rights of Minorities, Refugees 
and Immigrants, and the Evolution of the Political Nature of the 
FPÖ’ (2001) 40 International Legal Materials: Current Documents 
1, 102–123, (The Wise Men Report).
2. The place of values in 
the system of EU law
Article 2 TEU, which makes reference to 
democracy, the rule of law, and a series of other 
(interrelated) values of the Union, is somewhat 
different in nature from the rest of the acquis. The 
same unquestionably applies to the violations of 
values: Article 2 TEU violations are not the same 
as ordinary acquis violations. Such differences are 
particularly acute in the context of one specific 
type of chronically non-compliant states, where, 
like in Hungary, non-compliance is ideological 
and cannot be explained by reference to the 
lacking capacity, ‘simple’ corruption, and outright 
sloppiness70 – arguments one might deploy in the 
context of some South-East European countries.71 
Where chronic non-compliance is ideological, 
Article 260 TFEU becomes the crux of the whole 
story, as simple restatements of the breach under 
Article 258 TFEU (or Article 259 TFEU, for that 
matter)72 will presumably not be enough,73 even if 
the recent innovations mentioned in the previous 
section would probably allow for hope even in 
the context of the most cautious reading of the 
potential of these provisions.74 The question of the 
effectiveness of the ideological choice favouring 
non-compliance made by the relevant Member 
States will remain open for the years to come, as 
70 R. Uitz, ‘Can You Tell When an Illiberal Democracy is in 
the Making? An Appeal to Comparative Constitutional Scholarship 
from Hungary’ (2015) 13 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 279.
71 E.g. M. Ioannidis, ‘The Greek Case’, in Jakab and 
Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law, op. cit.
72 See e.g., D. Kochenov, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: The 
Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to Make it a Viable 
Rule of Law Enforcement Tool’ (2015) 7 The Hague Journal of the 
Rule of Law 153.
73 On the main deficiencies of the system, see, most 
importantly, B. Jack, ‘Article 260(2) TFEU: An Effective Judicial 
Procedure for the Enforcement of Judgments?’ (2013) 19 European 
Law Journal, 19 (2013) 420; P. Wennerås, ‘Sanctions Against 
Member States under Article 260 TFEU: Alive, but not Kicking?’ 
(2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 145; P. Wennerås, ‘Making 
Effective Use of Article 260 TFEU’, in Jakab and Kochenov (eds), 
The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, op. cit.
74 E.g. L.W. Gormley, ‘Infringement Proceedings’, in A. 
Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and 
Values (Oxford University Press, 2017).
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the Court in consort with other institutions is in 
search of a more effective means of deploying the 
current instruments in the context of rule of law 
backsliding.
While the literature has focused on restating the 
EU’s presumed rule of law nature,75 as well as 
the issue of the enforcement of EU rule of law 
and other values in the defiant Member States,76 
it is crucial to realise that Europe’s structural 
constitutional vulnerability stretches far beyond 
enforcement issues per se. Instead, it is rooted in 
the discrepancies between the EU’s proclaimed 
constitutional structure as we find it in the Treaties 
and the reality marking the development of EU 
integration, as outlined above, fostering doubt as 
to whether the Union is actually abiding by the rule 
of law.77 In the light of this structural deficiency, 
one can argue that the much-analysed systemic 
deficiency78 in the area of values and especially the 
rule of law was bound to emerge sooner or later, 
whether in Hungary, Poland or elsewhere, as the 
Union matured.79 Dealing with it will necessarily 
require moving beyond preoccupation with 
enforcement, which has engulfed all the recent 
literature on the subject – quite understandably, 
75 M. L. Fernández Esteban, The Rule of Law in the 
European Constitution (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1999); L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle’; W. 
Schröder (ed), Strengthening the Rule of Law in Europe: From a 
Common Concept to Mechanisms of Implementation (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2016).
76 E.g., the contributions in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), 
Reinforcing Rule of Law, op. cit.; A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), 
The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, op. cit.; A. von Bogdandy 
and P. Sonnevend (eds), Constitutional Crisis in the European 
Constitutional Area (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2015); J.-W. Müller, 
‘Safeguarding Democracy inside the EU: Brussels and the Future of 
Liberal Order’ (2013) Transatlantic Academy Working Paper No. 3.
77 G. Palombella, ‘The Rule of Law and its Core’, in G. 
Palombella and N. Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009); G. Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality 
– Before Democracy: Rule of Law Caveats in a Two-Level System’, 
in Closa and Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law, op. cit.; D. 
Kochenov, ‘EU Law Without the Rule of Law. Is the Veneration of 
Autonomy Worth It?’ (2015) 34 Yearbook of European Law.
78  A. von Bogdandy and M. Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency 
in the Rule of Law: What it is, What Has Been Done, What Can Be 
Done’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 59.
79 See, for a broad discussion, D. Kochenov, G. de Búrca 
and A. Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2015).
given the astonishing speed of the constitutional 
deterioration in both Hungary and Poland – and 
reforming the integration project at the core,80 
ensuring that democracy and the rule of law are 
endowed with a more important role to play in the 
context of the supranational law of the Union.
In this general context where the acquis and 
values are not synonymous, the application of the 
Copenhagen criteria in the context of the recent 
enlargement rounds particularly teaches a lesson 
of caution: the Commission has emerged as an 
institution that, when given all the responsibility 
regarding the preparedness of the new Member 
States for accession (values compliance outside the 
scope of the acquis included) failed the exercise.81 
Here, to the void of substance the lack of the 
capability to generate such a substance was also 
added, the lack of virtually any limitations emerging 
from the scope of the law notwithstanding. Besides 
illustrating the EU’s built-in limitations with 
regard to its ability to generate the substance of 
Article 2 TEU rules, the pre-accession context also 
sounds the alarm bell on institutional capacity: 
the Commission is probably not the best actor to 
entrust with the internal monitoring of Member 
States’ compliance with Article 2 TEU. 
3. How to approach the 
rule of law in the current 
context?
The essence of the rule of law, distinguishing it 
from legality, democracy, and other wonderful 
things, is that the law is constantly in tension with 
and controlled by law – how the EU is falling short 
of such institutional ideal will be demonstrated. 
Palombella’s rule of law, which is dialogical in 
essence since it presupposes and constantly relies 
upon a constant taming of law with law, ‘amounts 
80  For a much more critical restatement of this particular 
argument, see, D. Kochenov, ‘Is There EU Rule of Law?’, in C. Closa 
and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law, op. cit.; J.H.H. 
Weiler, ‘Epilogue: Living in a Glass House: Europe, Democracy and 
the Rule of Law’, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing 
Rule of Law, op. cit.
81 D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of 
Conditionality, op. cit.
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to preventing one dominant source of law and 
its unconstrained whim, from absorbing all the 
available normativity’.82 On this count the rule of 
law implies that the law – gubernaculum – should 
always be controlled by law – jurisdictio – lying 
outwith the sovereign’s reach.83 The tension is 
necessarily dialogical in nature since the absolute 
domination of either gubernaculum or jurisdictio 
necessarily destroys the core of the rule of law, 
which is the tension between the two. It goes 
without saying that making use of such a definition 
should necessarily be qualified by the wise words 
of Krygier: ‘whatever one might propose as the 
echt meaning of the rule of law is precisely that: 
a proposal’.84 The rule of law is a classic example 
of an essentially contested concept:85 the EU is 
seemingly as hopeless at defining what it means 
as its Member States and the broad academic 
doctrine.86 The debate is constantly ongoing,87 but 
82  G. Palombella, ‘The Principled, and Winding, Road to 
Al-Dulimi. Interpreting the Interpreters’ (2014) 1 Questions of 
International Law 17, 18. Similarly, see, D. Georgiev, ‘Politics of 
Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in International Law’ 
(1993) 4 EJIL 1, 4.
83 For an analysis of this perspective, see, id.; G. Palombella, 
È possibile la legalità globale? (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012); G. 
Palombella, ‘The Rule of Law and its Core’, in G. Palombella and N. 
Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2009) 17. See also, G. Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality – Before 
Democracy, op. cit.
84 M. Krygier, ‘Inside the Rule of Law’ (2014) 3 Rivista di 
filosofia del diritto 77, at 78.
85  For a brilliant outline of the history of contestation, see, 
J. Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept 
(in Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 127. 
86 For a multi-disciplinary overview see e.g., G.K. Hadfield 
and B. R. Weingast, ‘Microfoundations of the Rule of Law’ (2014) 
17 Annual Review of Political Science 21; L. Pech, ‘The Rule of 
Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union’ (2009) 
Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 04/09 (NYU Law School), and 
the literature cited therein. See also L. Pech, ‘Promoting the Rule 
of Law Abroad’, op. cit., on the ‘holistic understanding’ of the rule 
of law. For a special ‘Eastern-European’ perspective, which is 
particularly important in the context of the on-going developments 
in the EU, see, J. Přibáň, ‘From “Which Rule of Law?” to “The Rule 
of Which Law?”: Post-Communist Experiences of European Legal 
Integration’ (2009) 1 The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 337.
87 For key contributions, see, W. Schröder (2015), op. cit.; 
L. Morlino and G. Palombella (eds), Rule of Law and Democracy 
(Boston: Brill, 2010); G. Palombella and N. Walker (eds), Relocating 
the Rule of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009).
the last available definition,88 inspired by the Venice 
Commission’s guidelines,89 could provide a solid 
illustration of the current state of the definitional 
debate. Whether one agrees with the Commission’s 
approach or not, it seems to be beyond any doubt 
what the rule of law is not. It is not democracy, the 
protection of human rights, nor similar wonderful 
things, each of them definitely boasting its own 
sound claim to existence as a notion independent 
from the rule of law.90 And it is not mere legality, 
which is adherence to the law.
Once the rule of law and legality are distinguished, 
the basic meaning of the rule of law comes down to 
the idea of the subordination of the law to another 
kind of law, which is not up to the sovereign to 
change at will.91 This idea, traceable back to 
mediaeval England,92 is described with recourse to 
two key notions in order to reflect the fundamental 
duality of the law’s fabric, indispensable for the 
operation of the rule of law as a principle of law:93 
jurisdictio – the law untouchable for the day-to-
day rules running the legal system and removed 
from the ambit of the purview of the sovereign – 
and gubernaculum, which is the use of the general 
rule-making power.94 As Krygier put it in his 
88 Commission, ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the 
Rule of Law’ COM (2014) 158.
89 Venice Commission Document CDL-AD(2016)007-e 
‘Rule of Law Checklist’ (adopted in 106th Plenary Session, Venice, 
11–12 March 2016), as well as in the earlier version thereof: Venice 
Commission Document CDL-AD(2011)003rev-e ‘Report on the 
Rule of Law’ (adopted in 86th Plenary Session, Venice, 25–26 March 
2011).
90 One should not forget the wise words of Joseph Raz: 
‘We have no need to be converted into the rule of law just in order 
to believe … that good should triumph’: J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law 
and Its Virtue’, in J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and 
Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 210.
91 G. Palombella (2015) ‘Beyond Legality – Before 
Democracy’, op. cit.
92 J.P. Reid, Rule of Law: The Jurisprudence of Liberty in 
the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth Centuries (DeKald: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 2004).
93 G. Palombella (2012) Legalità globale?, op. cit.
94 For a detailed exposé, see G. Palombella (2015) ‘Beyond 
Legality – Before Democracy’, op. cit. See also G. Palombella, ‘The 
Rule of Law and its Core’, in G. Palombella and N. Walker (eds), 
Relocating the Rule of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 17, 
at 30, emphasising that this duality should not be disturbed by 
democratic outcomes and ethical choices.
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commentary on Palombella’s work, ‘the king was 
subject to the law that he had not made, indeed 
that made him king. For the king – for anyone – to 
ignore or override that law was to violate the rule 
of law’.95 Even in the contemporary age of popular 
sovereignty, this statement is obviously true, since 
democracy should not be capable of annihilating 
the law. Indeed, this is one of the key points made 
by the defenders of judicial review.96
Unlike despotic or totalitarian regimes, where 
the ruler is free to do anything he pleases, or 
problematic EU Member States such as Hungary, 
where the constitution is a political tool, or Poland, 
where the executive ignores the constitution to 
undermine the separation of powers, or pre-
constitutional democracies, which equate the law 
with legislation,97 the majority of constitutional 
democracies in the world today recognise the 
distinction between jurisdictio and gubernaculum, 
thus achieving a sound approximation of 
Palombella’s rule of law as an institutional ideal, 
in terms of maintaining and fostering the constant 
tension between these two facets of the law. The 
authority should be itself bound by clear legal 
norms which are outside of its control. Indeed, this 
is the key feature of post-war constitutionalism. 
The jurisdictio–gubernaculum distinction, lying at 
the core of what the rule of law is about, can be 
policed either by courts or even by the structure 
of the constitution itself through removing certain 
domains from gubernaculum’s scope.98 The 
ideology of human rights is of huge significance 
in this context.99 Furthermore, the existence of 
95 M. Krygier, ‘Inside the Rule of Law’ (2014) 3 Rivista di 
filosofia del diritto 77, 84.
96 Cf. M. Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation’, op. cit.
97 In a pre-constitutional state, the Rechtsstaat shapes a 
reality, in the words of Gianfranco Poggi, where ‘there is a relation 
of near-identity between the state and its law’: G. Poggi, The 
Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978) 238 (as cited in M. 
Krygier, ‘Inside the Rule of Law’, op. cit., at 84).
98 Y. Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: 
The Limits of Amendment Powers, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017) 179–196.
99 G. Frankenberg, ‘Human Rights and the Belief in a Just 
World’ (2013) 12 I-CON 35.
international law and, 100 of course, supranational 
legal orders,101 definitely contributes to the 
policing of the aforementioned duality.102 The 
policing of the jurisdictio–gubernaculum divide is 
thus possible both through the means internal and 
external to the given legal system.
4. Supranational law and 
the instrumentalisation of 
values
From Lord Mackenzie Stuart103 to Les Verts, which 
characterises the Treaties as ‘a constitutional 
charter based on the rule of law’,104 what we have 
been hearing about on the subject of the rule of 
law in the EU actually amounts to compliance with 
own law.105 This is an established understanding of 
legality.106 Legality is not enough to ensure that the 
100 R. Dworkin, ‘A New Philosophy of International Law’ 
(2013) 41 Philosophy and Public Affairs 2.
101 For an argument that numerous Central and Easters 
European states were actually motivated by the desire for external 
legal checks on their laws – a jurisdictio – when joining the Council 
of Europe, see, W. Sadurski, Constitutionalism and the Enlargement 
of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
102 Palombella (2012) Legalità globale?, op. cit., ch. 2.
103 Lord Mackenzie Stuart, The European Communities 
and the Rule of Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1977). See also 
G. Bebr, Rule of Law within the European Communities (Brussels: 
Institut d’Etudes Européennes de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, 
1965).
104 Case 294/83 Partie Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament 
[1986] ECR 1339, 23. See also Opinion 1/91 EEA Agreement 
[1991] ECR 6097.
105  M.L. Fernandez Esteban, The Rule of Law in the 
European Constitution (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1999); also, U. Everling, ‘The European Union as a Federal 
Association of States and Citizens’, in A. von Bogdandy and 
J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd 
ed.) (Oxford/Munich: Hart Publishing/CH Beck, 2010) 701; M. 
Zuleeg, ‘The Advantages of the European Constitution’, in A. von 
Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional 
Law (2nd edn) (Oxford/Munich: Hart Publishing/CH Beck, 2010) 
763, 772–779. EU institutions’ own accounts of what is meant 
by the rule of law beyond the tautology of ‘being bound by law’ 
present a most diverse account, which found an expression in the 
EU’s external action: L. Pech, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad’, 
in D. Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink (eds), The European Union’s 
Shaping of the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 108.
106 E.g. the contributions in L.F.M. Besselink, F. Pennings 
and S. Prechal (eds), The Eclipse of Legality in the European Union 
(The Hague: Kluwer, 2010).
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EU behaves like – and is – a true rule of law-based 
constitutional system. Should one submit that 
equating the rule of law and legality is a legitimate 
move, then, as Palombella correctly notes, our 
thinking ‘shifts the issue from the rule of law to 
the […] respect for the laws of a legal system’.107 
Yet ‘the rule of law cannot mean just the self-
referentiality of a legal order’,108 which is the reason 
why contemporary constitutionalism is usually 
understood as implying, among other things, 
additional restraints through law:109 restraints 
which are, crucially, not simply democratic or 
political.110
By and large, the rearticulation of the Union 
from an ordinary treaty organisation into a 
constitutional system was not accompanied by a 
sufficient upgrade of the role played by the core 
values it is said to build upon.111 These values do 
not inform the day-to-day functioning of EU law, 
107  G. Palombella (2015) ‘Beyond Legality – Before 
Democracy’, op. cit.
108  Id. Compare with M. Krygier: ‘To try to capture this 
elusive phenomenon by focusing on characteristics of laws and 
legal institutions is, I believe, to start in the wrong place and move 
in the wrong direction’: M. Krygier, ‘The Rule of Law. An Abuser’s 
Guide’, in A. Sajó (ed), The Dark Side of Fundamental Rights 
(Utrecht: Eleven, 2006) 129. See also B. Tamanaha, Law and Means 
to an End (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
109 For a clear discussion of the relationship between 
constitutionalism and the rule of law, see, M. Krygier, ‘Tempering 
Power: Realist-idealism, Constitutionalism, and the Rule of Law’, 
in M. Adams et al. (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: 
Bridging Idealism and Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017) 34–59.
110 Naturally, this is not to say that we should do away 
with the political restraints. Indeed, the virtually complete 
depoliticisation of the law has been one of the key criticisms of the 
EU legal order: J. Přibáň, ‘The Evolving Idea of Political Justice in 
the EU: From Substantive Deficits to the Systemic Contingency of 
European Society’, in D. Kochenov, G. de Búrca and A. Williams 
(eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) 193 
and M.A. Wilkinson, ‘Politicising Europe’s Justice Deficit: Some 
Preliminaries’, in D. Kochenov, G. de Búrca and A. Williams (eds), 
Europe’s Justice Deficit? op. cit..
111 A. Williams, ‘Taking Values Seriously: Towards a 
Philosophy of EU Law’ (2009) 29 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
549.
neither internally112 nor externally.113 Let us not 
forget that the promotion of its values, including 
the rule of law, is an obligation lying on the Union 
in accordance with the Treaties.114 Indeed, unless 
we take the Commission’s scribbles for granted, 
the EU’s steering of countless issues directly 
related to the values at hand is more problematic 
than not. The EU is not about the values Article 2 
TEU preaches, which any student of EU law and 
politics will readily confirm.115 The EU’s very self-
definition is not about human rights, the rule of 
law or democracy.116 EU law functions differently: 
there is a whole other set of principles that actually 
matter and are held dear: supremacy, direct effect, 
and autonomy are the key trio coming to mind.117 
Operating together, they can set aside both 
112 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Europa: “Nous coalisons des Etats nous 
n’unissons pas des hommes”’, in M. Cartabia and A. Simoncini 
(eds), La sostenibilità della democrazia nel XXI secolo (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 2009) 51; A. Williams, The Ethos of Europe: Values, Law, 
and Justice in the EU (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012).
113 For critical engagements, see, M. Cremona, ‘Values in 
EU Foreign Policy’, in M. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds), Beyond the 
Established Legal Orders: Policy Interconnections between the EU 
and the Rest of the World (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 275; P. 
Leino and R. Petrov, ‘Between “Common Values” and Competing 
Universals’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 654.
114 Art. 3(5) TEU. 
115 The crucial argument in this vein has been made, most 
powerfully, by Andrew Williams: A. Williams, ‘Taking Values 
Seriously’, op. cit. See, also, J.H.H. Weiler’s unpublished paper 
‘Europe Against Itself: On the Distinction between Values and 
Virtues (and Vices) in the Construction and Development of 
European Integration’ (2010) Integration Paper for the International 
Legal Theory Colloquium.
116 See, most recently, Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) 
[2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 170, which states that the 
fundamental right in the EU are ‘interpret[ed] [...] within the 
framework of the structure and objectives of the EU’. 
117 Procedural principles cannot possibly replace the lack 
of substantive attention to the core values encompassed by Art. 2 
TEU, including the Rule of Law, threatening to cause justice deficit 
of the Union: D. Kochenov, G. de Búrca and A. Williams (eds), 
Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015). Cf., D. 
Halberstam, ‘“It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defence of 
Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward’ 
(2015) 16 German Law Journal 105; and P. Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 2/13 
on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy 
or Autarky?’, Fordham International Law Journal, 38 (2015), 955; 
D. Kochenov, ‘Citizenship without Respect’ (2010) Jean Monnet 
Working Paper (NYU Law School) No. 08/10.
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national constitutional118 and international human 
rights,119 as well as UN law constraints.120 In the 
current crisis-rich environment,121 the Union 
frequently stars as part of the problem, rather than 
part of the solution. The problem is, it behaves like 
a constitutional system endowed with authority 
relying on the ECJ to police this claim – a natural 
expectation of any legal order122 – while failing, 
at the same time, to boast the necessary ABC of 
constitutionalism: when push comes to shove, its 
values play a foundational role in outlining neither 
the scope nor the substance of the law.123
Bringing the values back in is indispensable in 
order to infuse the EU’s constitutional claims with 
credibility. In practice, this would mean a return to 
the promise of EU integration made in the days of 
the Union’s inception.124 A fédération européenne 
(the one mentioned in the Schuman Declaration) 
to be brought about via the creation of the 
internal market, stood for a line of developments 
significantly more far-reaching than the idea of 
economic integration as such. The former is value-
based – while the latter is probably not (at least, 
not based on the values of Article 2), as Andrew 
118 Case C-399/11, Melloni [2013] 107.
119 Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454; Kochenov ‘EU Law without the Rule of 
Law’.
120 On the Kadi saga, see, G. de Búrca, ‘The European Court 
of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi’, Harvard 
International Law Journal, 51 (2010), 1. See also, of course, 
C-584/10 Kadi II [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:518.
121  Three equally important facets of the current crisis can be 
outlined: values; justice; and economic and monetary. On the crisis 
of values, see e.g., Williams, ‘Taking Values Seriously’ and Weiler, 
‘On the Distinction’. On the crisis of justice: Kochenov, de Búrca 
and Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit. On the economic side 
of the crisis, see e.g., A. Menéndez, ‘The Existential Crisis of the 
European Union’, German Law Journal, 14 (2013), 453; M. Adams, 
F. Fabbrini and P. Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalisation of 
European Budgetary Constraints (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014).
122 J. Lindeboom, ‘Why EU Law Claims Supremacy’, 38 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2018, 328.
123 G. Peebles, ‘“A Very Eden of the Innate Rights of Man”? 
A Marxist Look at the European Union Treaties and Case Law’, 
Law and Social Inquiry, 22 (1998), 581; D. Kochenov, ‘On Tiles and 
Pillars’, in D. Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The 
Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 3.
124 On the key aspects of dynamics of EU’s legal history see, 
B. Davies and M. Rasmussen, ‘Towards a New History of European 
Law’, Contemporary European History, 21 (2012), 305.
Williams explained in his seminal work.125
Not the whole story was negative, though. 
Although, the Union’s ambition has gradually been 
scaled down to the market – call it a hijacking of 
the ends by the means126 – the Union started de 
facto playing, mostly through negative integration, 
the role of the promoter of liberal and tolerant 
nationhood, as rightly characterised by Kymlicka 
– advancing a very clear idea of constitutionalism 
based on proportionality, tolerance, and the 
taming of nationalism.127 Besides, at the core of the 
Union there lay basic mutual respect among the 
Member States: the Union would be impossible 
should they obstruct the principle of mutual 
recognition.128 This came down to frowning upon 
the ideology of ‘thick’ national identities, however 
glorified in some schoolbooks. The ultimate 
result is that the EU, sub-consciously as it were, 
emerged as a promoter of one particular type of 
constitutionalism,129 which is based on the rule 
of law understood through national democracy 
and the culture of justification implying human 
rights protection and strong judicial review. To be 
a Member State of the EU in the context of these 
developments came to signify one thing: to stick 
to this particular type of constitutionalism, which 
is now reflected in Article 2 TEU and which also 
represents the most important condition to be 
fulfilled before joining the EU, as hinted at in 
125 Williams, The Ethos of Europe, op. cit.
126 D. Kochenov, ‘The Citizenship Paradigm’, Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 15 (2013), 196.
127 W. Kymlicka, ‘Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan 
Justice’, in S. Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p. 134. See also G. Davies, ‘Humiliation 
of the State as a Constitutional Tactic’, in F. Amtenbrink and P. 
van den Bergh (eds), The Constitutional Integrity of the European 
Union (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010).
128 M. Poiares Maduro, ‘So Close Yet So Far: The Paradoxes 
of Mutual Recognition’, Journal of European Public Policy, 14 
(2007). For a very sophisticated analysis of the Union’s effects on the 
Member States see A. Somek, ‘The Argument from Transnational 
Effects I’, European Law Journal, 16 (2010), 315 and A. Somek, ‘The 
Argument from Transnational Effects II’, European Law Journal, 16 
(2010), 375.
129 V. Perju, ‘Proportionality and Freedom – An Essay on 
Method in Constitutional Law’, Global Constitutionalism, 1 (2012), 
334.
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Article 49 TEU.130 
The EU thus emerged as a vehicle of the negative 
market-based approach to the ‘values’ question. 
Clearly, creating a market and questioning 
the state is not sufficient as a basis for a mature 
constitutional system, potentially creating a 
justice nugatory at the supranational level131 – 
and perpetuating the Union’s inability to help the 
Member States labouring hard to inflict a justice 
void on themselves, either through an outright 
embrace of Putin-style ‘illiberal democracy’, 
recently proclaimed as an ideal to strive for by the 
Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán,132 an attack on 
the judiciary and the media, as in contemporary 
Poland,133 or through failing to build a well-
ordered and functioning modern state, as it the 
case in Greece134 and Romania,135 for instance. 
Outright defiance is thus not required to fall out 
of adherence to Article 2 TEU aspirations. 
5. Supranational 
powerlessness as an element 
of Member State-level 
Belarusisation
The Union is thus generally powerless concerning 
the enforcement of values and, more importantly, 
is also indecisive as to their content. The very fact 
that we are now concerned with enforcing them 
seriously amounts to nothing else but a concession 
that the presumption that there is a level playing 
field amongst all Member States in terms of the 
rule of law etc. – i.e. the fact that all of them actually 
adhere to the specific type of constitutionalism the 
130 See e.g., D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure, 
ch. 2.
131 S. Douglas-Scott, ‘Justice, Injustice and the Rule of Law 
in the EU’, in Kochenov, de Búrca and Williams (eds), Europe’s 
Justice Deficit?, p. 51.
132  For the full text of the speech, see, The Budapest Beacon, 
27 July 2014, http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-
of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-
july-2014/10592.
133 Cf. Venice Commission, Report of 11 March 2016.
134 M. Ioannidis, ‘The Greek Case’, in Jakab and Kochenov 
(eds), The Enforcement of EU Law, op. cit.
135 V. Perju, ‘The Romanian Double Executive’, 246.
EU set out to promote – does not hold (any more). 
This is something the European Court of Human 
Rights has already clearly hinted at in M.S.S. 
v. Belgium and Greece.136 Acknowledging this 
alongside the EU’s obvious powerlessness as far 
as values are concerned is a potentially explosive 
combination in the Union built on Member State 
equality and the principle of mutual recognition. 
In a situation where the core values are not 
respected by Hungary, for instance, we are not 
dealing with a Member State that is revolting for 
one reason or another against a binding norm of 
European law. At the level of values, we are dealing 
with a principally different Member State, with the 
Belarusisation of the EU from the inside.137
Once the values of Article 2 EU are not observed, 
the essential presumptions behind the core of the 
Union do not hold any more, undermining the 
very essence of the integration exercise: mutual 
recognition becomes an untenable fiction, which 
the Member States are nevertheless bound by 
EU law to adhere to. This is the core of what the 
autonomy of EU law stands for, as confirmed by 
the Court in the infamous Opinion 2/13 vetoing 
EU accession to the ECHR.138 In this Opinion on 
the draft accession agreement of the EU to ECHR, 
the Court of Justice highlighted the principle of 
mutual trust between Member States, which forms 
the cornerstone of the area of freedom, security 
and justice. In the Court of Justice’s interpretation, 
this means that a Member State shall presume all 
other Member States to be in compliance with 
EU law, including the respect for fundamental 
rights. To be fair, it should be mentioned that 
the Court also referred to so-called ‘exceptional 
circumstances’, which would warrant deviations 
from the mutual trust principle,139 but the exact 
nature of these exceptional circumstances was 
136 MSS v. Belgium and Greece [2011] Application No. 
30696/09.
137 U. Belavusau, ‘Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary’, 
Common Market Law Review, 50 (2013), 1145.
138 This point has been forcefully restated in the ECJ’s 
Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
See, e.g., para. 192.
139 Id.
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left open.140 So as a general rule, the Court insists 
that autonomy considerations in the context of 
EU law are usually prone to prevail over human 
rights and other values – including the rule of 
law – cherished in the national constitutional 
systems of the Member States. Indeed, it would 
probably not be incorrect to argue that this would 
be the shortest possible summary of Opinion 
2/13, which summarised EU law as it stands. 
The consequences for the rule of law are drastic: 
all the principles invoked by the ECJ to justify 
giving EU law the upper hand in Opinion 2/13 are 
procedural, while the problems that the reliance 
on the ECHR is there to solve are substantive. 
Curing substantive deficiencies of the EU legal 
order with the remedies confined to autonomy 
and direct effect is a logical flaw plaguing the EU 
legal system, which puzzles the most renowned 
commentators.141 One cannot quarrel about the 
roses when the forests are burning. To agree with 
Eleanor Sharpston and Daniel Sarmiento, ‘in the 
balance between individual rights and primacy, 
the Court in Opinion 2/13 has fairly clearly sided 
with the latter. The losers under Opinion 2/13 are 
not the Member State of the signatory States of 
the Council of Europe, but the individual citizens 
of the European Union’.142 This is so, one must 
add, not only because of the potential reduction 
of the level of human rights protection. Rather, 
it is due to the fact that the EU, as Opinion 2/13 
made clear, boasts an overwhelming potential to 
undermine the rule of law at the national level and 
this potential impact is not an empty threat.143 
140  In Aranyosi and Căldăraru, the Court of Justice had 
an opportunity to clarify what those exceptional circumstances 
might be and it made an attempt to do so, but ultimately opened 
more questions than it answered: see Joined Cases C-404/15 and 
C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft 
Bremen [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:198. For an analysis see W. Van 
Ballegooij, and P. Bárd, ‘Mutual Recognition and Individual Rights: 
Did the Court get it Right?’ (2016) 7 New Journal of European 
Criminal Law 439–464.
141  E.g. P. Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 2/13’, op. cit.; D. Halberstam, 
‘It’s the Autonomy’, op. cit.
142  E. Sharpston and D. Sarmiento, ‘European Citizenship 
and its New Union: Time to Move on?’, in D. Kochenov (ed), EU 
Citizenship and Federalism, op. cit.
143  See, further, D. Kochenov ‘Is There EU Rule of Law?’, op. 
6. Enforcement is not a 
panacea: as a conclusion
The core question which emerges in the light of the 
discussion above, is how to ensure that the EU’s own 
approach to the rule of law does not undermine, 
if not destroy, adherence to the principle of the 
rule of law in the Member States, which are, in 
fact, compliant with the values listed in Article 2 
TEU. We submit that such an understanding of 
the rule of law cannot possibly lead to the much-
needed solution of the outstanding problems. 
Instead, the most mature answer to the problems 
should necessarily involve not only the reform of 
the enforcement mechanisms, but the reform of 
the Union as such, as the supranational law should 
be made more aware of the values it is obliged 
by the Treaties to respect and also, crucially, 
to aspire to protect at both the national and 
supranational levels. Instead of hiding behind the 
veil of the procedural purity banners of autonomy, 
supremacy and the like, EU law should embrace 
the rule of law as an institutional ideal.144 This 
implies, inter alia, eventual substantive limitations 
on the acquis of the Union as well as taking 
Article 2 TEU values to heart in the context of the 
day-to-day functioning of the Union, elevating 
the values above the instrumentalism marking 
them today. The result would be an emergence 
of a supranational constitutional system at the 
EU level, which would be truer to the glorious 
‘constitutional’ label, and which would play a 
significantly more productive role in solving the 
backsliding challenges in Hungary and Poland, 
where the war against all what we believe in is 
currently on-going.
cit.
144  Cf. G. Palombella, È possibile la legalità globale?, op. cit.
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Abstract
To what extent have Europeanization processes 
influenced development strategies in Central and 
Eastern Europe? Scholarship on the region has 
restricted the concept of Europeanization to the 
process of membership preparation, which took 
place in the years prior to EU enlargement in 2004. 
This conceptualization leaves out a lot. In this paper, 
we add to that highly visible Europeanization a 
focus on less visible Europeanization processes 
around capital flows that occurred in this same 
pre-enlargement period. We also establish that 
Europeanization continued after enlargement 
occurred and even intensified with the onset 
of the post-2008 period of lingering financial 
crisis. Here again, we identify both highly visible 
Europeanization processes, including buffering 
the crisis by adapting the Structural Funds 
programs, and largely invisible Europeanization, 
for example through remittance flows. Empirically, 
we establish the differential importance of capital 
inflows, buffering and remittances for the different 
development strategies of two clusters of Central 
and East European states, the Baltic and Visegrád 
states. Conceptually, we rescue the notion of 
Europeanization from its heretofore overly static 
deployment in the EU enlargement literature for 
Central and Eastern Europe.
1. Introduction
How does one ‘revisit’ a concept as fuzzy as 
‘Europeanization’? For a concept to flourish, it 
needs to name something that many observers 
agree does exist. Yet an initial flourishing hardly 
guarantees long-term durability. Some concepts 
initially win people over and then fade from use. 
For example, there was a time scientists thought 
‘phlogiston’ was something contained in flammable 
materials that entered the air upon combustion, 
that ‘caloric’ was a liquid that caused heat, and that 
disease was caused by bad air containing ‘miasma.’ 
Subsequent investigation suggested that these 
previously-successful concepts were no longer 
useful or convincing. 
By the mid-2000s, the scholarly community 
had little doubt that ‘Europeanization’ was a 
real thing.1 Will that consensus stand the test of 
time? This paper tries to enhance the durability 
of the concept of Europeanization, which we still 
find very useful. It does so primarily by moving 
beyond its dominant usage in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), which has emphasized how states 
prepared for membership in the EU during the late 
1990s and early 2000s.2 Instead, this paper looks 
also at processes of Europeanization that postdate 
membership and, in particular, postdate the onset 
of a devastating economic slump that has plagued 
European economies for a decade, setting back the 
developmental goals of many states. It also looks 
at Europeanization processes that occurred out of 
the spotlight of enlargement, with annual reports 
that, for a time, helped shape the electoral fortunes 
1 E.g. Cowles et al. 2001, Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, 
Knill 2001, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005. This paper 
adopts one of the simpler definitions of Europeanization, namely 
that it is ‘the change within a member state whose motivating logic 
is tied to a EU policy or decision making process’ (Ladrech 201: 2). 
We add the familiar notion that Europeanization processes can also 
affect aspirant member states (see e.g., Jacoby 2006).
2 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, Vachudova 2005, 
Epstein 2008; Jacoby 2006. 
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of parties across the region.3
Our broader focus attempts to lend a sense of 
dynamism to the concept of Europeanization 
as it applies to Central and Eastern Europe. To 
be sure, there has already been a certain attempt 
to inject dynamism by looking at ‘backsliding’ 
in the course of membership. This literature is, 
however, mostly concerned with identifying 
how Central and Eastern European countries 
have complied with accession obligations once 
they have become members.4 We develop the 
Europeanization literature in two directions. First, 
we look at new dimensions of Europeanization 
that have appeared after accession in 2004 and 
after the onset of economic troubles in 2007. 
This way, we lend a dynamism to the concept 
of Europeanization and tie it less directly to the 
immediate pre-enlargement period. Arguably, 
this also brings the notion of Europeanization in 
CEE closer to the broader scholarly discussion 
about Europeanization more generally. Second, 
rather than looking at how well older membership 
obligations have been met, we look at unexpected 
ways that European policies and instruments have 
impacted on Central and Eastern Europe. To this 
aim, we also add a novel ‘invisible’ dimension of 
Europeanization. This choice seeks to stretch the 
Europeanization notion beyond the well-known 
and visible process of membership preparation.5 
To develop our dynamic and multifaceted 
concept of Europeanization, we look at how 
Central and Eastern Europe’s models of economic 
development have become Europeanized. 
Catching up with Europe’s more developed West 
has been an important motivation for Central 
and Eastern European countries to apply for EU 
membership, and arguably, some of the current 
disenchantment with European integration in 
the East is the fact that more than a decade of EU 
membership has not yet brought about substantial 
3 See, for example, the ‘managerial competence’ debates 
summarized in Grzymala-Busse 2002.
4 Levitz and Pop-Eleces 2010, Sedelmeier 2014.
5 Radaelli 2000.
economic convergence.6 Furthermore, while the 
EU has insisted on its new member states taking 
on existing policies and regulatory models, it has 
also acknowledged the need for special policies 
addressing the new members’ weaker state 
capacities, competitiveness, modernization gap 
and the related vulnerabilities.7 Yet while there 
has been a lively debate about how European 
integration might affect Eastern Europe’s potential 
for catch up development in the 1990s and early 
2000s, the literature on Europeanization has 
largely ignored this question.8 
Focusing on the Europeanization of developmental 
models also allows us to spell out more 
precisely what we mean by visible and invisible 
Europeanization. Visible Europeanization 
refers to policies that explicitly address the 
developmental gap between East and West. To be 
sure, many traditional tools of European states, 
such as channeling investments to favored firms 
or sectors, also have successively been ruled out 
of bounds by Europeanization processes since 
the late-1980s. We argue below, however, that a 
number of interesting tools remain that, following 
Bruszt and Vukov (2017), amount to a quite visible 
“liberal developmental state,” which Central and 
Eastern European states clearly did pursue in the 
run-up to membership and beyond. 
Invisible Europeanization, by contrast, consists 
of – partly unintended – consequences stemming 
from the EU’s own economic model, which 
affect East Central Europe differently than old 
and more developed member states. In other 
words, though the definition of Europeanization 
requires the ‘motivating logic’ of national change 
to be ‘tied to EU policies or decision making 
processes’ (Ladrech 2010:2), these changes need 
not be (and often are not) always visible to elites, 
let alone to ordinary citizens. Indeed, the Central 
and East European states signed up for such a 
6 Epstein 2010, Podkaminer 2013, Grodzicki and Geodecki 
2016.
7 Bruszt and Vukov 2017. 
8 E.g. Delhey 2001, Dunford and Smith 2000, Ellingstad 
1997, Baldwin 1994.
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massive list of institutional and policy changes 
in the run-up to membership that many of the 
most consequential changes could occur mostly 
‘under the radar’ of even careful observers. Our 
distinction further points to a contradiction of 
economic Europeanization that was highlighted 
early on by Heather Grabbe, namely that EU 
policies and regulatory models have been mostly 
created by and for advanced capitalist economies 
and thus might lead to suboptimal (or at least 
unanticipated) outcomes for transition countries.9 
We combine our focus on visible and invisible 
Europeanization over time with an analysis of 
how the different developmental paths in CEE 
have become Europeanized, thus connecting 
our conceptual innovations to existing accounts 
of basic economic strategies. For the sake of 
simplicity, we will offer some insight on how the 
development paths of two groups of countries 
have been affected: the Visegrád countries 
and the Baltic States. As we have shown in our 
previous work on comparative political economy 
and small-state strategies, these countries have 
adopted different developmental strategies. The 
Baltic States have pursued a ‘lean’ strategy that 
mostly relies on orthodox macroeconomics and 
microeconomic efficiency and is associated with 
a strong deregulatory agenda and a limited state. 
In contrast, the Visegrád countries have much 
more built on the creation and defense of durable 
comparative advantages.10 We recognize that by 
history and by treaty the basic economic choices 
of members states – outside the EU-dominated 
domains of trade negotiations, monetary policy 
and certain dimensions of anti-trust regulation 
– have largely been left to the discretion of 
democratically-legitimated governments.11 We 
9  Grabbe 1999.
10 We developed this distinction for the small East 
European States, arguing that these were the ways they coped 
with the challenges of smallness. We also distinguished a third – 
‘consensual’ – strategy. For reasons of space, we confine our analysis 
in this paper to the ‘lean’ and ‘special’ state clusters. See Bohle and 
Jacoby 2017 and also Bohle and Greskovits 2012.  
11 Indeed, even the Single Market, which requires goods 
authorized for sale in one member state to be allowed in all member 
states, relies on the principle of ‘mutual recognition’ of different, 
argue however that crucial economic policy 
choices of CEE countries, nevertheless, have 
become Europeanized in important ways during 
their EU accession, that such influences persisted 
well after membership commenced, and that 
some of the influences were largely beyond the 
perception of most voters and indeed even of 
many elites.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: section 
two spells out our arguments for a more dynamic 
concept of Europeanization and introduces our 
own conceptualization. Sections three to six look 
at cases of visible and invisible Europeanization 
both before accession and in reaction to the 
economic downturn of the last years of the 
2000s. For the purpose of the paper, we hone 
in on a key challenge for economic latecomers, 
namely raising capital for development. Thus, 
the third section briefly sketches how the EU 
has encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI) 
to provide much needed capital for its new EU 
members. The fourth section introduces our 
concept of invisible Europeanization by looking 
at how aspirant member states were required to 
show regulatory forbearance on capital inflows 
and how these flows have profoundly shaped 
CEE’s developmental capacities in both positive 
and negative ways. The fifth section turns to 
newer form of Europeanization that has become 
important during the crisis, namely buffering 
through structural funds. The sixth section 
looks at how remittances, stemming from labor 
mobility, have emerged – largely invisibly – as a 
new European source of finance. The final section 
concludes. 
2. Why ‘Europeanization’ 
in CEE Risks Becoming Overly 
Static
In retrospect, Europeanization’s reputation in CEE 
benefited from a series of structural factors, some 
of which are much easier to see in retrospect than 
they were at the time. First, the entire process 
nationally-determined regulations.
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culminated in EU membership for all the countries 
that both seriously aspired to such membership 
and had the cross-party consensus needed to 
make membership preparation a priority. Second, 
the cumbersome and demanding process of 
membership preparation occurred during a time 
of economic growth and plentiful liquidity, which 
increased both investment and consumption 
simultaneously.12 Europeanization came to mean 
prosperity in the minds of many citizens. Third, 
the Europeanization process took place against the 
backdrop of a larger period of geopolitical stability. 
Russia appeared weak, and authoritarian regimes 
in the Middle East and North Africa appeared 
strong. The result was that Eastern Europe was 
threatened neither on the existential grounds 
of a threat to its sovereignty nor on the difficult 
pragmatic grounds of major refugee inflows or 
other forms of regional instability.13 Overall, the 
pre-accession process took place in a much more 
relaxed atmosphere than had prevailed in prior 
decades. 
To say that ‘structural reasons’ boosted the 
reputation of the Europeanization process is not 
at all to deny that this process had a coherent logic 
that made it both attractive to potential member 
states and also reasonably well-managed at the 
EU level. Brussels technocrats invented a series 
of conditional tools more or less on the fly, and 
these ‘screening’ mechanisms, along with more or 
less intrusive annual reports met willing national 
officials more or less halfway. The result was that 
eight states were ready for membership by 2004, 
albeit with uneven levels of preparation despite 
the uniform targets set by the Commission.
Moreover, Europeanization didn’t just work in the 
run-up to 2004, it also appeared to prove itself in 
the first big test faced by the new EU members, 
12 That running such a capital account surplus meant 
running a corresponding current account deficit was not widely 
appreciated at the time, a point we take up below.
13 The Yugoslav Wars of the early 1990s had been indicative 
of just how disruptive major refugee flows could be, but these flows 
generally halted well before the explicit Europeanization process 
was launched in the late 1990s.
namely the global financial crisis (GFC).14 In the 
GFC, the CEE states were hit hard and early. All 
CEE states except Poland saw sharp contractions 
in domestic economic activity and had extremely 
painful adjustment processes. These adjustments 
worked in very different ways, but all of them 
resulted in a restoration of basic economic 
balances.15 Some CEE states needed official 
European rescues (always together with the IMF 
and World Bank), many needed assistance with 
liquidity through channels both official ECB (for 
those who were EMU members) and unofficial 
(e.g., Vienna Initiative), and all of them receive 
substantial buffering from the EU Structural 
Funds.16 Indeed, so apparently successful was the 
cluster of stabilization policies in CEE that the EU 
has tried for nearly a decade to get roughly the 
same mix of assistance and austerity to work in 
Southern Europe. 
Were the Europeanization story to stop here, 
that story would be misleadingly positive 
and misleadingly static. For when we revisit 
Europeanization today, neither the successes of 
first-stage institution building and investment 
nor the successes of second-stage economic 
stabilization dominate our perception. Instead, we 
see Hungary with its surly transgression of multiple 
European economic (and political) norms. We 
see the Commission opening infringement 
procedures against Hungary, Poland, and the 
Czech Republic for their unwillingness to take 
refugees as part of the European quota system. 
We see, in other words, the violation both of 
what we might call ‘established Europeanization’ 
and also of ‘contemporary Europeanization.’ Past 
commitments are broken, new commitments are 
elided and avoided. 
Moreover, we do not just see negative outcomes—
outcomes that call into question the extent 
and durability of Europeanization. We also 
14 The first big test these countries faced as Nato members 
had been the bombing of Serbia in 1999, weeks after most of the 
first wave new EU member states had joined Nato.
15 Bohle and Jacoby 2017
16 Henning 2017.
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see a profound shift in the conditions external 
to CEE that arguably enhanced the power of 
Europeanization in the first place. The resurgence 
of geopolitical questions and big power 
confrontation, the rise of economic nationalism, 
regional destabilization resulting in the arrival 
of waves of refugees all shake the structural 
foundations on which Europeanization rests. Our 
goal in this paper is to broaden the account of 
Europeanization such that it speaks to these broad 
and important events. We then seek to empirically 
illustrate this broader conceptualization as a way 
of deepening the conversation in this special issue 
and in the field more broadly.
Towards a More Dynamic Concept  
of Europeanization
To reanimate the concept of Europeanization, we 
begin with two basic conceptual distinctions. The 
first, already alluded to, is to divide Europeanization 
into pre- and post-accession periods, or, more 
precisely, a pre-accession and post economic crisis 
period, as the crisis ushered in the shake-up of 
the foundations on which Europeanization rests.17 
The second distinction is then between processes 
of Europeanization that are highly visible and 
politicized, such that relatively few citizens are 
ignorant of them, and the opposite case in which 
Europeanization proceeds under the radar of 
most citizens and even many political elites, but, 
as we will argue crucial for visible aspects of 
Europeanization to succeed. 
Juxtaposing these two dimensions, we see, in 
principle, four basic combinations, as depicted in 
Table 1:




17 There have been a number of attempts to capture this 
distinction, e.g. Sedelmeier 2014, Levitz and Pop-Eleces 2010.  
We propose to explore these four cells in the 
field of economic Europeanization as a way of 
moving beyond the rather mechanical ‘success 
story’ of pre-enlargement Europeanization 
processes represented by the upper left cell of 
Table 2 below. In addition to briefly revisiting the 
notions of Europeanization as capacity building18 
or Europeanization as multiplex upgrading by 
‘liberal developmental states,’19 we also address the 
closely-related surge of FDI that helped make this 
developmentalism possible. Europeanization prior 
to membership was not just concerned with the 
highly visible construction of national institutions 
to fulfill aspects of the acquis communautaire. As 
indicated in the upper left cell, while citizens may 
have been unaware of any individual project, few 
could be unaware that their country’s pursuit of 
EU membership was leading to wholesale changes 
in domestic legislation and institutions, and to a 
surge of job-creating FDI.
Parallel to these visible efforts, however, the lower 
left hand cell indicates a process both less visible 
and less understood, namely the sharp increase 
in portfolio capital inflows to the region. Our 
contention is not that the inflows themselves 
were invisible. Indeed, these inflows were widely 
understood as a fruit of EU association, were 
known to many citizens, and arguably helped 
provide the conditions for unprecedented catch-
up growth. In this way, the capital inflows helped 
provide a key structural precondition for the 
success of the more visible Europeanization of 
capacity building. What was little seen and poorly 
understood, however, was the way these capital 
inflows made CEE states vulnerable to the crisis 
and how little elected officials could do to dampen 
or shape these flows. In particular, neither citizens 
nor even their elected leaders clearly understood 
that capital inflows are always tied directly to 
current account deficits.20 Few knew that EU 
18 Vachudova 2005, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 
Epstein 2008, Jacoby 2006, Grabbe 2006.
19 Bruszt and Vukov 2017, Bruszt and McDermott 2012, 
Bruszt and Greskovits 2009. 
20 The size of a country’s current account balance is exactly 
equal to the size of its capital account and in the opposite direction. 
Thus, large capital inflows always mean equally large deficits in the 
current account (which is composed mostly of the trade account).
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commitments forbade most state interventions in 
this domain, the ‘free flow of capital’ having been 
made sacrosanct only in recent years. This ‘under 
the radar’ dimension of the pre-accession process 
would have extreme consequences for CEE states, 
who reacted in markedly different ways to the 
same ‘sudden stop’ in credit.
Europeanization also continued after membership 
and the economic crisis that followed shortly 
after. An old agenda of macroeconomic stability 
and structural adjustment linked to – in principle 
mandatory – euro adoption was reinforced after 
the crisis to counter ballooning public debt and 
deficits. However, compliance was made much 
easier by ‘buffering’ through structural funds 
provided by the EU in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. Structural funds inflow have 
become highly visible after the crisis, and the way 
domestic policy makers draw on them has become 
highly politicized. 
Finally, just as some important pre-accession 
Europeanization trends occurred mostly out of 
sight, some post-crisis Europeanization has also 
occurred below the radar. For example, the EU’s 
free movement policies have contributed to trends 
in which some CEE countries experience labor exit 
on a large scale, as labor migration goes hand in 
hand with a general lack of economic perspectives 
at home. What is more, there is little general 
public awareness or elite appreciation of the role 
the often substantial inflows of remittances have 
come to play in the income of households. 
Table 2: Europeanization of State Development 
Strategies
3. Visible Pre-Accession 
Europeanization: Capacity 
Building, FDI, and the 
‘Liberal Developmental 
State’
The heart of the initial wave of Europeanization 
literature on CEE was on capacity building, 
institutional development and policy transfer 
and diffusion. While the details of these policy 
areas were unknown to most CEE citizens, the 
actual fact of domestic institutional change 
was quite visible. Most voters understood their 
elites were pursuing institutional adaptation as a 
condition of potential EU membership, and solid 
majorities backed these efforts across most of 
the CEE countries throughout the pre-accession 
period.21 Meanwhile, the main lines of analysis of 
the CEE political economy revolved not around 
Europeanization at all but around transitology, 
shock therapy debates, varieties of capitalism and, 
more recently, the spread of neo-liberalism.22 To 
the extent the CEE literature on Europeanization 
mirrored an existing Europeanization literature 
on the ‘old member states,’ its relative neglect of 
economic topics made sense. To repeat the obvious 
point for emphasis: the EU has not traditionally 
interfered deeply in the domestic economic 
management choices of its member states.
And yet more recently there has been a 
Europeanization literature looking at core 
economic topics. Some of this research on 
economic aspects of Europeanization suggests that 
the EU has ‘exercised remarkable control over the 
economic transformation in [E]CE.’23 Bruszt and 
Vukov (2017) argue that the EU has been 
particularly concerned with strengthening state 
capacities for development, in order to ensure 
that the new member states’ economies would 
21 Grzymala-Busse 2002, Vachudova 2005.
22 The literature here is large, and good recent summaries 
are contained in Ban 2017, Appel and Orenstein 2016. 
23 Jacoby 2010: 418; see also Jacoby 2014, Grabbe 1996, 
Bruszt and Greskovits 2009, Bruszt and McDermott 2012, Bruszt 
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be able to successfully compete with those of 
the old member states, while also abiding by the 
transnational European rules and regulations. 
In their terms, the EU has promoted a ‘liberal 
developmental state.’24 This ‘new type of economic 
state’ combines ‘capacities for increasing the role of 
transnational markets in shaping developmental 
outcomes with the capacities to maintain and 
increase the market power of various categories 
of domestic actors.’25 Specifically, the authors 
show that during the accession process the EU 
sought to strengthen the applicant states’ capacity 
to maintain the rule of law, uphold economic 
freedom, prevent discriminatory practices, 
foster domestic competitiveness and implement 
European rules and policies. In seeking to 
strengthen these capacities, EU actors have left 
much less room for domestic agency than during 
the Southern enlargements of the 1980s. 
A specific aspect of the liberal developmental state 
was the encouragement of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Though Western firms sought to explore 
opportunities stemming from the new low wage 
locations soon after the collapse of communism, 
initially most CEE host countries were cautious. 
This eventually changed, and EU accession played 
an important role in this. Thus, by the mid 1990s, 
almost all applicant countries had set up national 
investment promotion agencies that played a key 
role in persuading reluctant policy makers of the 
benefits of FDI, and in representing the interests 
of foreign investors. EU finance was crucial for 
operation of the agency, and the EU also trained 
its staff.26 
While the EU had no specific legal instruments to 
foster FDI, it relied on instruments developed for 
the accession process to promote foreign capital 
inflows.27 In its Accession Partnerships and Annual 
Reports, the EU encouraged privatization via 
foreign ownership in a number of strategic sectors, 
24 Bruszt and Vukov 2017: 672.
25 Ibid: 672.
26 Drahokoupil 2008: 116-117, Bandelj 2008: 71-72; Medve-
Balint 2014: 41.
27 Bandelj 2010: 478.
and openness to FDI crystallized as one important 
condition for membership.28 EU accession also 
had an indirect effect on FDI inflows. Eastern 
Europe’s compliance with the European rules and 
regulations opened these economies for capital 
flows and provided legal security for investors. All 
this resulted in a massive inflow of FDI from the 
early 2000s onwards. 
Table 3 below gives a bird’s eye view of how 
Europeanization via capacity building and FDI 
inflows has affected the Baltic States and Visegrád 
countries. Overall, as the literature on institutional 
capacity building predicts, we do see an increase 
in government effectiveness, regulatory quality 
and rule of law between 1996 – the last year before 
the accession negotiations – and 2004 – the year 
of EU accession. Clearly for evaluating proper 
progress, more fine-tuned indicators would be 
needed. FDI data show that the inward stock (per 
capita) increased almost tenfold in both groups 
of countries between 1996 and 2004, with the 
Visegrád countries attracting more FDI than the 
Baltic States and having slightly better scores on 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality.29 
At the same time, Visegrád states were actually a 
bit lower on rule of law measures (0.7 versus 0.6), 
and the overall differences in these areas do not 
stand out. This rough parity is in keeping with the 
broad picture of equivalence across the aspirant 
member states in 2004, despite their different 
starting points. In other domains, however, 
differences did appear. 
28 Jacoby 2010, Medve-Balint 2014.
29 The clusters hide some important differences within 
the groups. For example, if measured in inward stock of FDI, tiny 
Estonia was frontrunner in 2004, followed by the Czech Republic 
and Hungary.   
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Table 3: Pre-Accession Europeanization: 
Capacity building and FDI inflow 
Sources: Columns 1-3 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 
“Governance Matters VIII.” Index values for each of the four 
indexes range from -2.5 (minimum) to 2.5 (maximum), 
Source 4 WIIW FDI Database.  
4. Europeanization of 
Capital Flows and Regulatory 
Forbearance
The previous section summarized a broadly 
consensual understanding of economic 
Europeanization through capacity building and 
FDI inflow. However, there is a less well understood 
aspect of pre-accession Europeanization that 
also took place in the area of capital flows. More 
accurately, while the capital flows themselves 
were highly visible – citizens were generally 
aware of major FDI projects through their labor 
market effects and at least somewhat aware of 
portfolio inflows because they made access to 
credit suddenly far easier – neither citizens, nor 
domestic or EU politicians had any coherent grasp 
of the implications of such large inflows for the 
national trade accounts. 
Indeed, relatively few policymakers even 
understand the necessary symmetry between 
capital and current accounts, the latter of which 
includes the goods trade balance that drives many 
headlines. For any country, capital and current 
accounts are equal in size to one another and with 
opposite signs. Countries that export capital (e.g., 
lend it abroad rather than invest it at home) must 
also run a current account surplus (unless they 
simultaneously sell off central bank reserves). 
By contrast, countries that import capital must 
run a current account deficit of the same size as 
their capital surplus.30 Thus, large inflows of FDI 
and of portfolio investment that both stoked 
consumption increases and often swelled housing 
prices must (if not covered by domestic savings) 
manifest themselves in large current account 
deficits. Capital rushing into CEE from EU-15 
economies mean the CEE states had to run trade 
deficits, and they clearly did, as indicated below.
Importantly, capital inflows into the region were 
not restricted to FDI. As noted, accession also 
led to a more generalized credit boom in CEE, 
which was triggered by the combination of a 
‘global wall of money,’ that is excess liquidity 
looking for investment opportunities and the 
ways the EU shaped CEE policies towards their 
financial systems.31 Integrating and globalizing 
Europe’s capital markets has been high on the 
EU’s agenda, and, in Katharina Pistor’s words, in 
the course of EU accession, CEE countries have 
effectively outsourced the governance of their 
financial systems. They opened their borders to 
capital inflows and promoted foreign ownership 
of the domestic banking.32 While the EU has 
‘undertaken major efforts to Europeanize the 
governance of finance by standardizing financial 
regulation and improving coordination among 
national regulators,’33 financial market integration 
nevertheless has created ‘a governance void for 
30 Pettis 2013, Jones 2011, Jacoby 2017.
31 Fernandez and Aalbers 2016.
32 Epstein 2017.






Rule of law Inward stock per 
capita (€)
1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004
Visegrád states 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.6 0.6 0.6 444 3493
Baltic states 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.1 0.3 0.7 312 2767
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individual countries and the region as a whole that 
left them unable to control the risks associated 
with exposure to greater capital flows.’34 This is 
because the governance of the integrated financial 
systems remained incomplete and ‘were not fully 
aligned with the CEE countries.’35 
As a result, CEE countries – much like their 
southern European counterparts in the Eurozone 
– were unable to effectively control the large 
capital inflows stemming from excess supply of 
capital looking for higher returns. Whenever 
foreign capital supply outstrips investment needs, 
negative economic consequences are likely. Such 
surplus capital can incentivize mal-investment 
in unproductive endeavours (public or private), 
blow up asset bubbles, fund consumption booms, 
and generate unemployment through displaced 
demand abroad.36 What is Europeanized here 
is the requirement that capital move freely, a 
fundamental principle of the contemporary EU 
but also an enormously disruptive principle 
that did not have a long and road-tested history 
in Western Europe but was, in fact, relatively 
new.37 Thus, where the bulk of the pre-accession 
literature focused on capacity building – a finding 
with which we agree – we insist equally that 
another form of Europeanization was regulatory 
forbearance, or the denial of its (new) members’ 
ability to control or restrict in any meaningful way 




37 Moreover, the most recent meta-analysis finds no 
evidence for the proposition that transnantional capital flows are 
associated with higher growth rates. See Ray 2014.
38 While CEE states could not erect barriers to the inflow 
of portfolio capital, CEE central banks could try to limit their 
citizens’ access to such loans if they thought lending was excessive. 
Poland took the most aggressive stance here. In 2005, the Polish 
Commission for Banking Supervision forced domestic banks to 
place higher risk weights on foreign-denominated liabilities and 
inform consumers of risks associated with foreign lending and 
also limited access to foreign-denominated loans/mortgages to the 
highest earners. These two moves significantly reduced the flow of 
foreign denominated loans in 2006. We thank Kevin Aslett for very 
helpful conversations on this point. See also Buszko and Krupa 
2016.
Table 4 shows how capital inflows increased 
the vulnerability of the CEE countries. While 
all countries amassed major current account 
imbalances, those of the Baltic states were of a 
magnitude unprecedented in recent economic 
history. Part of the explanation of the different 
magnitude of the current account deficits lies in 
the different composition of capital inflows: in 
the Visegrád countries, an important share of 
FDI was invested in the manufacturing sector 
and integrating parts of these economies into the 
German manufacturing archipelago.39 In contrast, 
most of the investment in the Baltic states went to 
finance and real estate. 
In all CEE countries these portfolio flows 
triggered credit and housing booms, but again, 
in different magnitudes. Once the flow of new 
credit diminished or even reversed, states were 
differentially exposed. All CEE states engaged 
in some form of austerity to try to restore 
competitiveness by means of internal devaluation, 
but some of the Visegrád states – particularly 
Hungary and Poland – also devalued their national 
currencies. Indeed, Hungary’s forint has fallen in 
value by about 20% vis-à-vis the Euro between 
2008 and 2017 while the Polish zloty has fallen just 
over 10%, according to Eurostat data. Meanwhile, 
the Baltic states stuck to their currency pegs in 
spite of more brutal internal devaluations that 
were then required.40 
39 Bohle and Greskovits 2012, Scepanovic 2013
40 Blyth 2012.
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Table 4: Capital inflows and macroeconomic 
imbalances
Sources: Column 1 & 2, WIIW database, Column 3 EBRD 
Transition Report 2009, Columns 4 & 5 European Mort-
gage Foundation Hypostat 2009
These trends have implications for the periodization 
we deploy. This is because in the teeth of these very 
harsh adjustments after the crisis onset in 2007-
08, other Europeanization processes then came to 
the fore. Once again, one of them –buffering by 
the EU Structural Funds – was far more visible 
than the other – the rise of remittances as an 
important compensatory mechanism for some 
of the region’s economies. We thus see the onset 
of the GFC in 2007-08 – and not the onset of EU 
membership in 2004 as the real watershed date for 
a new Europeanization dynamic.
5. Buffering Shocks
The EU undoubtedly helped shelter its poorer 
members by accelerating Structural Fund 
payments after the onset of the GFC. The EU 
(temporarily) made this notoriously inflexible 
and rule-driven policy sector more flexible, and 
structural funds were a crucial buffer for each CEE 
state. As the crisis deepened, the European Council 
accelerated the spending rate of structural funds 
for all member states and even suspended normal 
requirements for state co-financing in most social 
policies, training, human capital investments in 
2009 and 2010. The Commission also increased 
the monetary threshold requiring its approval 
from €25 million to €50 million.41 
41  European Commission 2013a, Jacoby 2014.
Much existing literature tends to emphasize the 
harms that come from austerity but to neglect 
the buffering function that has been available 
especially to the EU’s East. While this particular 
buffering function was an unforeseen dimension 
of the GFC, we argue that such buffering can 
rightly be seen as a form of Europeanization. 
First, the main instrument we explore – the 
Structural Funds – were explicitly intended to 
buffer regions of member states undergoing major 
economic transformation, particularly after the 
newly enhanced Single Market of the late 1980s.42 
Second, the CEE states’ elites and voters saw the 
Structural Funds as a highly desirable potential 
benefit of membership in the run-up to accession, 
even if they understandably had little visibility 
into the details of this complex policy area. 
Third, and related to this complexity, the CEE 
states underwent considerable administrative 
transformation in order to get access to the 
Funds.43 Finally, the CEE states conformed to a 
highly dynamic and unpredictable set of policy 
innovations emanating from the Commission 
after the onset of the GFC and Eurocrisis.
Overall, the structural funds functioned as a 
kind of insurance mechanism against renewed 
42  In other research, we look at other forms of buffering, 
including outmigration, intra-EU remittances, and ECB liquidity 
provision. Bohle and Jacoby 2017.
43  Jacoby 2006.
FDI Current Account 
Balance
Residential mortgage debt
Financial and real estate
(percentage of total inward 
stock, 2007)
Manufacturing











Baltic States 45 20 -18 3 28
Visegrád 
countries
30 39 -5 2 12
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economic slowdowns. Indeed, as state investment 
declined, the structural funds came to provide over 
one-third of state capital investment in most of the 
East-Central European states. A 2011 Committee 
of the Regions survey found 37% of responding 
regional officials thought the structural funds 
had made ‘high’ or ‘very high’ contributions to 
recovery in their specific region.44 For instance, 
total EU spending in Estonia jumped from 2.2% 
of GDP in 2008 to 5.1% in 2009, suggesting a fast 
and substantial response and emphasizing that 
domestic strategies were flanked with important 
counter-cyclical measures at the supranational 
level. 
To further simplify state aid rules, the Commission 
temporarily allowed states to pay lump sum aid 
up to €500,000 per company for 2009 and 2010, 
guarantee business loans at a reduced premium, 
subsidize other loans, in particular for the 
production of green products, and provide risk 
capital aid up to €2.5 million per SME per year 
(instead of the statutory 
€1.5 million) in cases 
where at least 30% (instead 
of the usual 50%) of the 
investment is private.45 
In 2011, the Commission 
announced two states 
(Latvia and Hungary) 
would be among six 
(also Greece, Portugal, 
Romania, and Ireland) 
who could reduce their 
co-financing obligations 
from 50% to as low as 5% 
during the crisis. Of the 
€2.9 billion available, €1.4 
billion would flow to East-
Central Europe.46  
Commission data suggests over 80,000 jobs were 
created by the Structural Funds in CEE between 
44 European Union Committee of the Regions 2011.
45 European Commission Directorate General for Regional 
Policy 2010.
46 European Commission 2011. 
2007-2011—about 20% of the total for the entire 
EU.47 CEE states that had fiscal room for co-
financing after the crisis hit—especially Poland—
were able to increase their use of the Structural 
Funds up to 2.5% beyond what was originally 
programmed; meanwhile, countries unable to co-
finance even at reduced levels—such as Romania—
saw their access to the funds fall.48
Figures 1 and 2 below show for the Baltic States 
and the Visegrád countries, that FDI inflows 
have been very volatile since the crisis, whereas 
Structural Fund inflows have been rising steadily, 
and have replaced the FDI as the most important 
source of foreign finance. In addition, the figures 
show that another source of external finance, 
namely remittances, have assumed a major role in 
Europe’s East, an issue we will turn to in the next 
section. 
Figure 1: Structural Funds, FDI and 
remittances in the Visegrád countries
47 Author calculations based on data in EU Commission, 
2013b. It is impossible to distinguish how many of these jobs may 
be due to ‘extra’ flexibility shown by the EU as an effort to buffer the 
crisis.
48 EU Commission, 2013b : 5.
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Figure 2: Structural Funds, FDI and 
remittances in the Baltic states
Sources for figures 1 and 2: Structural Funds: European 
Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interac-
tive/index_en.cfm, FDI: WIIW FDI Database, Remittances: 
World Bank Remittance Database, http://www.worldbank.
org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/
migration-remittances-data
All are inflows measured in millions of Euros. 
The World Bank Data have been converted to 
euro based on https://www.oanda.com/currency/
average (average annual exchange rates)
External buffering had important consequences for 
the post-crisis recovery, but it plays out somewhat 
differently in the two groups of countries. 
Importantly, structural funds are characterized by 
‘a lack of clear priorities, and significant discretion 
for member states,’ which lends itself to very 
different uses.49 Thus, in the Baltic States, which 
have experienced very deep recessions, structural 
funds had a net compensatory effect. For instance, 
Estonia, hailed as the posterchild of recovery 
through austerity,50 instead benefitted substantially 
from a mix of external policies. Indeed, Kattel and 




recovery and ‘insourced’ additional resources.51 
In particular, Estonia made good use of massive 
EU funding: up to 20% of 
Estonia’s 2012 budget was 
made up of EU transfers, 
and total EU spending in 
Estonia jumped from 2.2% 
of GDP in 2008 to 5.1% 
in 2009, suggesting a fast 
and substantial response 
and emphasizing that 
lean domestic strategies 




The countercyclical effects 
of structural funds were 
also important for the Visegrád countries. For 
instance, a detailed report of the macroeconomic 
effects of Structural Funds in Hungary between 
2007-2015 concludes that overall growth would 
have decreased by almost two percent, rather than 
increasing by more than four percent. In addition, 
investment, employment and public debt numbers 
all improved significantly due to incoming 
Structural Funds.53 However, other sources also 
stress how incoming EU moneys allows the Orbán 
regime to stabilize his economic nationalist and 
increasingly authoritarian course by buying 
support among its core voters and fostering a new 
class of oligarchs.54 
Structural funds have recently become highly 
politicized exactly because the two countries 
Poland and Hungary that have most radically 
challenged their commitment to core European 
values as the rule of law, democracy, and solidarity 
are also the ones that have received the highest 
shares of EU funding. Clearly, however, the irony 
that the EU funds their anti-European course is 
quite lost on the leaders, as the following statement 
51 Kattel and Raudla, 2013
52 OECD 2011: 55. 
53 KPMG 2017. 
54 Magyar and Vasarhely 2017, Johnson and Barnes 2015.
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by Hungary’s prime minister demonstrates: 
‘I don’t think [Hungary] gets money as 
“help” from the West. This is a complete 
misunderstanding. …It’s completely 
obvious that we can’t have honest and fair 
competition between businesses, people 
and countries that have had 40 years to 
become rich while the other group was 
robbed for 40 years. There has to be some 
kind of mechanism that provides fair and 
honest competition for these two groups 
to interact in. If we didn’t have this, they 
would invade us economically. We would 
be a colony if this disparity was allowed to 
stand. They know this too because they’ve 
had colonies.’55 
This and other similar statements have ensured 
that the issue of Structural Funds have remained a 
part of the public discourse, which is really not so 
in our fourth and final cell.
6. Remittances
Next to structural funds, additional buffering for 
CEE countries badly hit by the crisis came from 
labor mobility. Massive emigration, especially 
but not only in the Baltic states has helped to 
keep unemployment rates somewhat under 
control, and remittance flows contributed to 
GDP growth and household consumption. Labor 
migration has arguably been one of the most 
politicized dimensions of CEE’s Europeanization. 
Most old member states have used time-limited 
immigration bans on citizens from CEE to counter 
fears of a downward spiral of wages and working 
conditions and welfare tourism.56 It was only in 
2011 that the last immigration bans were lifted. 
Even after 2011, labor migration has remained 
high on the political agenda. A crucial motivation 
of the British population to vote for Brexit was 
the rejection of immigration from the East, 
and governments across old member states are 
55 Viktor Orban, September 2015, quoted in Novak 2015. 
56 Jacoby 2010.
looking for ways of protecting their welfare states 
and industrial relations against the perceived 
threats from the East. CEE home countries have 
traditionally perceived migration more positively. 
More recently, however, massive labor shortages 
have emerged, threatening the growth models in 
the region.57 
Curiously, while labor migration is highly 
politicized both in the West and the East, 
remittance inflows from the East European 
population working from abroad is not. This 
silence is even more puzzling as remittance inflows 
have become a crucial source of external finance 
in CEE, and are arguably the only positive effect 
of labor migration for the CEE home countries. 
As an increasing number of studies show, the 
East European countries are losing educated and 
younger cohorts, who are more likely to stay 
abroad.58  As figures one and two above show, 
remittance inflows have increased significantly 
since 2010. In the Baltic States, remittances have 
become the most important source of external 
finance, and in the Visegrád countries, remittances 
have become a stable source of external finance, 
repeatedly exceeding that of FDI.59 
It is perhaps not by chance that there is relative 
silence about the role of remittances in East 
Central Europe. The EU’s regime of free movement 
of labor is grounded in neoclassical economics. 
This paradigm sees “migration as a process that 
contributes to the optimal allocation of production 
factors for the benefit of all, in which the process 
of factor price equalization will lead to migration 
ceasing once wage levels are equal at both the origin 
and destination…. The free movement of labour—
in an unconstrained market environment—is 
57 Buckley et al. 2017.
58 E.g. OECD 2013, Dolvik and Eldring 2017. 
59 However, there are also important differences within 
the two country groups. In 2015, two Baltic states and Hungary 
received the highest inflow of remittances as a share of GDP, 
which amounted to 5% in Latvia and above 3% in Lithuania and 
Hungary. In Estonia and the three other Visegrád countries, 
inflow from remittances was between 1.4 and 2.5 % of GDP. World 
Bank Remittance Database, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-
data
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eventually expected to lead to the increasing 
scarcity of labour, which will then lead to a higher 
marginal productivity of labour and increasing 
wage levels in migrant-sending societies. Capital 
flows are expected to go in exactly the opposite 
direction as labour migration.”60 In this paradigm, 
remittances do not play any role. 
An important question is whether remittances 
impact on economic development and social 
improvement in the receiving countries. To put 
it differently, do they, as the above quotation 
might suggest, contribute in a similar way as 
capital movements to the convergence of living 
conditions, thus ultimately reducing the pressure 
on outward migration in the East? There is little 
evidence for this. Existing research in Latvia and 
Lithuania, the countries where remittances have 
become a major source of external revenues, 
far exceeding FDI, shows that remittances 
cannot compensate for the negative impact of 
emigration.61 Rather, they act as “surrogate social 
protection”, cushioning poorer household against 
the consequences of the economic downturn. In 
contrast, only little is spent on investment purposes 
or new jobs.62 Research on the Visegrád countries 
confirms that remittances complement the effects 
of welfare benefits by providing income for poorer 
households in geographically backward areas, 
thus reducing overall income inequalities and 
poverty. The effects are however rather limited.63 
Overall, therefore it seems that while remittances 
may serve as insurance against income shocks and 
complement welfare benefits for a limited group 
of households, they reflect rather than compensate 
for the structural deficiencies of the CEE.64 
60 Hein 2009: 4. 
61 Hazan 2013. 
62 Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2013




Europeanization in CEE has been primarily 
conceived as a process of capacity building. This 
was true of the European institutional actors, who 
said this clearly and consistently in their Annual 
Reports. It was generally true of CEE political elites, 
who saw in the EU requirements a combination 
of sensible long-term reforms and unavoidable 
bureaucratic requirement. And it was true of the 
scholarly community, who emphasized precisely 
this dimension as a way of distinguishing the 
EU from less effective ‘transnational integration 
regimes’ such as NAFTA.65
And yet while no coherent conception of 
Europeanization could exist without this notion 
of capacity building, the near-exclusive focus on 
capacity building risks turning Europeanization 
into an overly static concept. The paper has made 
a number of analytical innovations that should be 
taken into account in order to grasp more fully the 
dynamics of Europeanization and the somewhat 
contradictory results it has produced. The 
conclusion summarizes these points and discusses 
their impact. 
First, we argued that a number of structural 
factors have allowed the initial success of 
Europeanization. Looking only at the narrow 
process of capacity building and investigating 
reasons for compliance with the acquis therefore 
is likely to miss important elements of why 
Europeanization was a success initially and why 
it has turned into a more contested process more 
recently. In particular, we submit that geopolitical 
stability and fast economic growth have provided 
‘easy times’ for pre-accession Europeanization. 
More recent structural developments - geopolitical 
rivalry and war in the Middle East that displaced 
millions of people, the global financial crisis, 
and the rise of populist challenger parties in the 
West have created a new matrix of constraints 
and opportunities for CEE. Europeanization is 
not the only game in town any more. In addition, 
the liberal understanding of the European order, 
65 Bruszt and Vukov 2017, Bruszt and McDermott 2012.
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which are pretty much taken for granted by the 
Europeanization literature is becoming highly 
contested, and an alternative European vision of 
putting the national interest first has risen as an 
alternate project. 
This paper has not explored the consequences of 
these wider structural changes for Europeanization. 
Instead, it has focused on broadening the 
Europeanization concept, arguing that capacity 
building – important as it is – does not exhaust 
the range of influences that can and should be 
captured by Europeanization. We have stretched 
the concept of Europeanization to include 
three other processes, all of which are critical 
to understanding Europe’s important effects 
on the domestic political economics of its CEE 
members states. Thus, during the pre-accession 
period, in addition to capacity building EEC 
has also become quietly Europeanized through 
regulatory forbearance and capital inflows. This 
had contradictory impacts on CEEs political 
economies. To put it in a pointed fashion, capacity 
building has simultaneously been undermined 
by the denial of CEEs’ ability to control or 
restrict in any meaningful way hugely disruptive 
inflows of foreign capital. The concrete impact of 
this simultaneous but contradictory process of 
building and undermining economic capacities 
has differed: The Visegrád countries have been 
able to pursue a developmental agenda building 
on the inflow of FDI in their manufacturing 
sectors, while the Baltic States have been exposed 
to larger and more disruptive capital inflows in 
their banking and real estate sectors. 
The content of Europeanization then changed 
after the onset of the GFC, as the liberal 
developmental states had to confront renewed 
calls for macroeconomic orthodoxy and 
structural adjustment. Interestingly, visible 
and invisible forms of Europeanization again 
have contradictory effects on the CEE political 
economies and development strategies. While 
macroeconomic orthodoxy pushes these countries 
towards very unpopular austerity, the buffering 
through structural funds has allowed them to 
outsource important parts of their recovery. And 
as they learn the hard lesson that capital inflows 
oblige a country to run a trade deficit, they are 
more resistant to such inflows and have generally 
kept their current accounts in rough balance.66 
Again, post-accession Europeanization has played 
out differently in the two groups of countries. In 
the Visegrád countries, especially in Hungary, 
austerity has become politicized, and has led to 
a renunciation of the former Europeanization 
path. “Invisible” European resources are now 
being used to pursue anti-European policies, 
politics and economic strategies. The Baltic States 
have complied with the austerity and structural 
adjustment agenda of the EU. Frontloading EU 
requirements they have fulfilled all requirements to 
join the Eurozone at the time of the euro’s deepest 
crisis. While often being hailed as posterchildren 
of austerity, it is however invisible Europeanization 
that have allowed them to comply. 
66 Indeed, the only EU member state with a substantial 
current account deficit in 2017 was the United Kingdom (-4.3%). 
This is a major reason European-US trade tensions are on the rise, 
as European capital from a number of ‘surplus states’ pours into the 
US economy, which is not capital constrained. Jacoby 2017.
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increases, the advantage of the more developed 
regions in securing EU funds decreases. This 
suggests that economic Europeanization in the 
domain of cohesion policy depends on domestic 
state capacities: while the EU has promoted the 
efficiency principle in the regional distribution 
of funds, the extent to which this has prevailed 
in the Eastern members was contingent on their 
domestic quality of government.
Keywords:  cohesion policy, Eastern Europe, 
regional fund distribution, policy implementation, 
quality of government.
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Introduction
Economic Europeanization stands on three main 
pillars: the first two, market opening and the 
regulation of the expanding market are closely 
connected to each other. In contrast, the third 
pillar aims at counter-balancing the potential 
negative effects of economic integration: it is a 
market-correcting measure intended to reduce 
territorial inequality within and across the EU 
member states. The primary vehicle serving this 
goal is the EU’s cohesion policy. Funds available 
through the policy’s three major instruments1 are 
expected to contribute to competitiveness and 
economic development and assist the catch-up of 
the backward regions.
Transfers from the policy represent one of the 
most visible and most tangible rewards of EU 
membership: they are the ‘carrots’ of compliance. 
This especially holds in the case of the Eastern 
member states where many of the EU’s least 
developed regions are. Accordingly, Eastern 
members are among the top recipients of EU 
funds: both in the 2007-13 and the 2014-20 
programming periods more than half of the total 
1 European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), 
European Social Fund (ESF), and Cohesion Fund (CF)
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Abstract
Regional disparities in economic development 
within the European Union have long posed 
concerns for scholars and policy-makers alike. 
The entry of the relatively poor Eastern European 
countries further amplified the issue of widening 
developmental gaps and put the cohesion policy 
in the forefront of political and scholarly debates. 
However, since the launch of the Lisbon Agenda, 
the EU has promoted competitiveness and 
the efficient use of the funds (efficiency) over 
supporting the most backward regions (equity). 
This has posed an implementation challenge for 
the Eastern members as they needed to reduce 
their generally high territorial disparities while also 
facilitating their economic catch-up with the most 
advanced member states. This paper shows that 
the regional fund eligibility criteria in the 2007-13 
programming period created such circumstances 
for fund distribution in Eastern Europe which 
were beneficial for the relatively more prosperous 
areas. At the same time, the paper also finds 
that this outcome was conditional on domestic 
quality of government. As quality of government 
109
cohesion policy budgets were allocated to them.2 
The objectives of the policy emphasize the 
stimulation of economic activity in the least 
developed regions, which would imply that the 
financial transfers benefited the most backward 
areas. This is the principle of equity which would 
require concentration of spending in the laggard 
regions. However, the territorial distribution of 
the funds is not purely subject to this principle. 
Recently, considerations about fund absorption 
capacity and efficiency have also gained salience. 
This is because regional policies face a traditional 
trade-off between supporting the least developed 
regions with low absorption capacity and targeting 
the more prosperous areas to raise overall 
economic competitiveness.3 
This paper shows that the implementation of the 
cohesion policy in the Eastern member states has 
benefited the relatively more developed regions 
thus the policy has failed to comply with its 
original objectives. The main reason for this lays in 
the fund eligibility criteria which were established 
according to an EU-wide benchmark. Relative to 
this benchmark the vast majority of the Eastern 
European regions are backward. As a consequence, 
the most prosperous and the most laggard Eastern 
regions were grouped together into the same 
eligibility category. The empirical evidence in this 
paper demonstrates that this ‘level playing field’ 
has proved advantageous for the economically 
more advanced regions with superior absorption 
capacity: they competed more effectively for the 
funds and secured more EU grants than their 
weaker counterparts.
2 In 2007-13 the EU fund allocation of the Eastern 
member states reached 50.8% of the combined budget of the three 
financial instruments while this share climbed to 55% in the 2014-
20 programming period. Source: the author’s own calculation 
based on data published by the European Commission (National 
Strategic Reference Frameworks for 2007-13 (http://ec.europa.
eu/regional_policy/sources/atlas2007/fiche/nsrf.pdf, accessed 
5 October 2017); and InfoRegio site for data on 2014-20 (http://
ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/available-budget/ 
accessed 5 October 2017)).
3 Harry W. Richardson, ‘Aggregate Efficiency and 
Interregional Equity’, in Spatial Inequalities and Regional 
Development, ed. Hendrik Folmer and Jan Oosterhaven (Springer 
Netherlands, 1979), 161–83. 
While the fund eligibility criteria has favoured 
the more prosperous regions, the paper also 
reveals that the advantage of the most developed 
regions in obtaining EU grants diminishes with 
increasing state capacity. This suggests that state 
administrations in ‘stronger’ Eastern European 
states may compensate their most deprived 
regions for their competitive disadvantage in 
racing for the EU funds. This implies that the 
implementation of the cohesion policy in terms of 
whether the transfers rather support the more or 
less developed regions is conditional on domestic 
state capacities. Although by classifying nearly all 
the regions into the same support category the EU 
has created very similar structural conditions for 
fund distribution in Eastern Europe, economic 
Europeanization in this domain has not been 
uniform. States have struck the balance between 
the objectives of equity and efficiency differently: 
while higher state capacity is associated with more 
emphasis on the former goal, lower capacity seems 
to be advancing the principle of efficiency.
The paper is structured as follows. The first 
two sections lay the conceptual and theoretical 
framework by offering an overview about the 
economic rationale for the cohesion policy 
and by discussing the recently growing conflict 
between the equity and efficiency objectives with 
consequences for the Eastern European member 
states. This is followed by the empirical analysis of 
the regional distribution of EU funds in the East 
in the 2007-13 programming period. The final 
section concludes and outlines some potential 
future lines of inquiry.
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Cohesion or competitiveness? 
Shifting priorities of the 
cohesion policy
In market economies spatial disparities emerge 
naturally. However, high or growing levels of 
territorial inequality may raise concerns among 
policy-makers and provide reasons for introducing 
market-correcting redistributive measures that 
aim to narrow the widening developmental gap 
between the most advanced and the poorest 
regions. European integration and especially the 
creation of the single market were expected to 
exacerbate economic disparities which required 
the strengthening of the EU’s redistributive 
mechanisms to lower territorial inequality within 
and across the member states.
By eliminating all the barriers to the free flow of 
goods, labor, capital, and services, the single market 
has released those spatially divisive economic 
forces that had been previously contained within 
national borders. This is because the integration 
of domestic markets expands the economic space 
for agglomeration effects. This means that factors 
of production, innovation, and know-how tend to 
concentrate in certain privileged locations that will 
experience faster growth than the less preferred 
areas.4 If the direction of these flows does not 
change, then they generate spatial polarization 
and divergent economic development. European 
integration was expected to produce similar 
outcomes at least in the short and medium run 
because it has opened up national borders to these 
spatially divisive forces.5 The anticipated widening 
of the development gaps between the poor and the 
rich countries and regions had to be addressed by 
adequate policy measures. 
4 Paul Krugman, ‘Increasing Returns and Economic 
Geography’, Journal of Political Economy 99, no. 3 (1991): 483–99; 
Robert E. Lucas, ‘On the Mechanics of Economic Development’, 
Journal of Monetary Economics 22, no. 1 (1988): 3–42; Gunnar 
Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (London: 
Duckworth, 1957); Paul M. Romer, ‘Increasing Returns and Long-
Run Growth’, The Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 1002–1037.
5 Mariassunta Giannetti, ‘The Effects of Integration on 
Regional Disparities: Convergence, Divergence or Both?’, European 
Economic Review 46, no. 3 (1 March 2002): 539–67.
In order to prevent divergence and to compensate 
for the negative territorial effects of integration, 
the cohesion policy became the key tool for the 
EU to address spatial imbalances. The Treaty of 
Rome laid down its main objectives by stipulating 
that the policy should address economic, social, 
and territorial cohesion across the member states. 
The Treaty stressed a territorially-oriented policy 
which redistributes financial resources from the 
more developed countries and regions to the 
backward areas: Article 174 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union prescribes that 
“[i]n particular, the Union shall aim at reducing 
disparities between the levels of development of 
the various regions and the backwardness of the 
least favoured regions”.6 
Funds distributed through the cohesion policy 
were expected to enhance economic growth in the 
backward regions and facilitate their catch up with 
the most prosperous areas.7 In essence, a European 
development policy was an attempt to “match the 
territorial scale of the response with the source of 
the economic problems”.8 The signing of the Single 
European Act in 1986 paved the way for the single 
market, thereby cohesion policy became one of 
the most important redistributive instruments of 
the EU taking more than one third of its entire 
budget.
Deepening integration amplified the intrinsic 
tension of the cohesion policy: should it assist 
the economically lagging regions in their often 
futile attempts to catch-up with the prosperous 
ones or should it instead reward the leading 
regions and the fast-growing areas to generate 
further economic growth and raise overall 
competitiveness of the domestic economies? Both 
6 European Council, ‘Consolidated Versions of the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union Treaty’, Official Journal of the European Union, no. 
C 83 (30 March 2010): 47–199.
7 David Allen, ‘Structural Funds and Cohesion Policy. 
Extending the Bargain to Meet New Challenges’, in Policy-Making 
in the European Union, ed. Helen Wallace, Mark Pollack, and 
Alasdair Young, 6th edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 226–49.
8 Iain Begg, ‘Cohesion or Confusion: A Policy Searching 
for Objectives’, Journal of European Integration 32, no. 1 (2010): 81.
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options involve certain drawbacks. Commitment 
to the efficiency principle may deepen regional 
disparities while continued support to the 
backward areas may create disincentives for 
investing in growth and competitiveness.9 In the 
case of the Eastern member states „a parallel 
compromise has to be sought between the goals 
of economic efficiency and distributional equity, 
between external convergence of the country 
with the EU and internal convergence in terms of 
domestic regional disparities”.10
Balancing between these two objectives is not 
isolated from the broader socio-economic agenda 
and long-term strategic vision of the EU which 
have affected reforms of the cohesion policy. 
The launch of the Lisbon Strategy in March 2000 
marked a turning point. The primary goal set 
by the Strategy was to make the EU the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world.11 Although it mentioned 
the promotion of greater social cohesion, the main 
emphasis was placed on enhancing economic 
growth and competitiveness. The Lisbon Strategy, 
from which the spatial dimension was missing, 
shifted the delicate balance between equity and 
efficiency towards the latter. Since the 2007-13 
programming period, instead of targeting the most 
backward regions, the cohesion policy has adopted 
a so-called place-based approach and began 
promoting growth in all the EU regions regardless 
of their level of development.12 Due to the changes 
introduced to the geographical eligibility rules, for 
the first time in the EU’s history, every European 
region became eligible for some funding through 
9 John Bachtler and Fiona Wishlade, ‘Regional Policy in 
Europe: Divergent Trajectories? Annual Review of Regional Policy 
in Europe’, EoRPA Paper (European Regional Policy Research 
Consortium, University of Strathclyde, 2011), 52.
10 Martin Ferry and Irene Mcmaster, ‘Implementing 
Structural Funds in Polish and Czech Regions: Convergence, 
Variation, Empowerment?’, Regional & Federal Studies 15, no. 1 
(2005): 19-39.
11 Council, ‘Lisbon European Council Presidency 
Conclusions’ (Brussels: European Council, 23 March 2000), http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm#a.
12 Bachtler and Wishlade, ‘Regional Policy in Europe: 
Divergent Trajectories? Annual Review of Regional Policy in 
Europe’. EoRPA Paper, 2011/1, Glasgow: University of 
Strathclyde.
the cohesion policy instruments.
Especially the net contributors to the EU budget 
urged these policy changes because, on the one 
hand, they wanted to avoid further deterioration 
in their net paying position (which was likely to 
happen with the Eastern enlargement), and, on 
the other hand, they were concerned by the funds’ 
ability to generate economic growth.13 The net 
payers demanded more efficient spending while 
the traditional net beneficiaries (the Southern 
member states) wanted to preserve their privileged 
position. In the end, a major re-orientation in the 
allocation of funding from the more developed 
South to the East did not occur: per capita levels 
of assistance for the Southern members remained 
comparable to that in the pre-accession period. One 
may therefore argue that with the Lisbonization 
of the cohesion policy the richer member states 
managed to “successfully legitimize and defend 
their share in cohesion funding”.14
The shift in the cohesion policy away from the 
territorial focus continued with the financial 
and economic crisis in 2008. As the economic 
output of the member states plummeted, the 
European Commission accelerated spending 
from the cohesion policy instruments by relaxing 
some of the payment rules and granting access 
to advanced payments. By doing so, the funds 
served as a buffer against the external economic 
shock and represented a notable compensation 
for declining public consumption in the member 
states, particularly in Eastern Europe.15 
Territorial cohesion thus suffered a further blow 
as in the post-crisis context the funds increasingly 
became a vehicle for fostering economic growth 
instead of narrowing regional disparities. 
13 John Bachtler, Carlos Mendez, and Fiona Wishlade, 
‘National Interests in Cohesion Policy and the Positions of Member 
States’, in EU Cohesion Policy and European Integration: The 
Dynamics of Budget and Policy Reform (Ashgate, 2013), 163–200.
14 George Andreou, The New EU Cohesion Policy: Enlarge-
ment, ‘Lisbonization’ and the Challenge of Diversity, vol. Deliver-
able No. 15b (EU-CONSENT - Constructing Europe Network, 
2007), 27, http://www.eu-consent.net/library/deliverables/D15b_
Team3.pdf.
15 Wade Jacoby, ‘The EU Factor in Fat Times and in Lean: 
Did the EU Amplify the Boom and Soften the Bust?’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, no. 1 (2014. : 52-70).
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Originally a market-correcting instrument 
aimed at reducing territorial inequality, the 
cohesion policy has gradually transformed into 
an external ‘top-up’ for member state budgets. It 
follows that the recent reforms of the cohesion 
policy’s regulatory framework may not serve the 
needs of the most backward regions. Because of 
the declining attention to spatial inequality and 
cohesion, and the greater salience attributed to 
increasing economic growth and competitiveness, 
some scholars even argue that the ‘Lisbonization’ 
of the policy may maintain or even widen existing 
regional disparities.16
The ‘Lisbonized’ cohesion 
policy and the regional 
distribution of funds in 
Eastern Europe: developing 
hypotheses
The Eastern enlargement raised the political 
and economic significance of the cohesion 
policy further because the EU had to integrate 
relatively poor countries into the European 
markets while also ensuring cohesion within and 
across the new members and the EU as a whole. 
The double challenge of fostering economic 
development and catch-up in Eastern Europe 
while maintaining territorial cohesion exposed 
the internal inconsistencies (equity vs. efficiency) 
of the policy. There were two fundamental issues 
to resolve in the case of the Eastern members: 
the amount of funding allocated to each country 
and the geographical spread of the funds. In 
both instances the arrangements echoed the 
Lisbonization process. 
While in principle the poorer member states can 
expect a larger cohesion policy budget, domestic 
absorption capacity appears as a conditioning 
factor that may restrict their entitlement for the 
funds. It was argued that the effective utilization 
16 Vasilis Avdikos and Anastassios Chardas, ‘European 
Union Cohesion Policy Post 2014: More (Place-Based and 
Conditional) Growth – Less Redistribution and Cohesion’, 
Territory, Politics, Governance 4, no. 1 (2016): 97–117.
(absorption) of the funds becomes onerous for 
member states if the funds reach beyond 4% of 
GNP.17 This is the reason why an absorption cap was 
introduced that set the maximum fund allocation 
at this level. While the limit applied to the Eastern 
members as well, some further considerations 
played a role in determining their final budgets 
for the 2007-13 programming period, the first full 
cycle that they benefited from.18
As recent research shows, institutional quality 
both at the local and the national level may 
influence development trajectories19 and may 
also limit the fund absorption capacity of a 
country or a region. This implies that EU funds 
may contribute to economic growth only in those 
areas that demonstrate a sufficiently high level of 
development20 and institutional capacity.21 The 
quality of local and regional institutions seems to 
be a key mediating factor for the growth-generating 
potential of the funds: “greater levels of cohesion 
expenditure would, in the best-case scenario, only 
lead to a marginal improvement in economic 
growth, unless the quality of the government is 
significantly improved”.22 On the one hand, the 
scholarly literature reinforces the efficiency-based 
17 George Andreou, ‘The EU New Economic Governance 
and EU Cohesion Policy: More Effectiveness and Less Solidarity?’ 
DRAFT PAPER for ECPR Annual Conference, September 2017, 
Oslo. (https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/de5f5e73-38c1-
403b-9503-dd610456be47.pdf).
18 Eight Eastern countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) that 
joined the EU in 2004 received funding from the cohesion policy 
already between 2004 and 2006, while Bulgaria and Romania, 
which entered the EU in 2007, became entitled for funds in the 
2007-13 programming period.
19 Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, ‘Do Institutions Matter for 
Regional Development?’, Regional Studies 47, no. 7 (2013): 1034–
47.
20 Aadne Cappelen et al., ‘The Impact of EU Regional 
Support on Growth and Convergence in the European Union’, 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 41, no. 4 (2003): 621–44.
21 Sjef Ederveen, Henri L.F. de Groot, and Richard Nahuis, 
‘Fertile Soil for Structural Funds? A Panel Data Analysis of the 
Conditional Effectiveness of European Cohesion Policy’, Kyklos 59, 
no. 1 (2006): 17–42.
22 Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Enrique Garcilazo, ‘Quality 
of Government and the Returns of Investment: Examining the 
Impact of Cohesion Expenditure in European Regions’, Regional 
Studies 49, no. 8 (2015): 1274-1290.
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arguments of the net payers who preferred to 
promote economic growth and competitiveness 
instead of targeting the most backward areas 
which also often demonstrate inferior institutional 
quality and, as a consequence, funds are likely 
to be spent less efficiently there than in more 
prosperous regions. On the other hand, the overall 
fund absorption capacity 
of a member state may be 
conditional on the quality of 
government.
In the final budgetary 
arrangements for the 2007-
13 programming period, 
concerns about absorption 
capacity played a more 
important role than the 
level of backwardness of 
the Eastern member states. 
Although poorer countries 
were supposed to receive 
higher funding allocations, 
their inferior absorption 
capacity compromised their 
budgets: in per capita terms 
those Eastern members 
benefited from larger fund 
allocations where the 
quality of government and, 
presumably, the absorption 
capacity was higher (Figure 
1). To put it differently, at 
similar levels of GDP per capita, higher quality 
of government led to higher per capita budgets. 
This is why the national allocations for Bulgaria 
and Romania were much lower in per capita 
terms than it may have been expected from their 
heavily backward position.23 Fund allocation to 
23 Surely, the inter-governmental negotiations over the 
budget also involved complex considerations where national 
interests and coalitions between net payers and net beneficiaries 
determined the final fund allocations (see for instance Vasja 
Rant and Mojmir Mrak, ‘The 2007–13 Financial Perspective: 
Domination of National Interests’, JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies 48, no. 2 (2010): 347–72.). Nevertheless, concerns 
about absorption capacity appeared as a dominant factor during 
the negotiations that the final national budgets also reflect.
the Eastern European members thus followed 
efficiency considerations which were justified by 
the anticipated variation in the countries’ fund 
absorption capacity.
Figure 1: Quality of government and total EU 
funds per capita allocated for 2007-13 in the 
Eastern member states (without Croatia)
Regarding the regional eligibility criteria, which 
determined the level of support to subnational 
regions, Lisbonization played an indirect 
role. Before discussing these aspects, the EU’s 
NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics) territorial classification has to be briefly 
introduced. The NUTS divides the territory of the 
member states into a hierarchical system whose 
goal is to harmonize regional statistical data across 
the EU. The system consists of three divisions: 
NUTS 1, 2, and 3, where higher figures represent 
smaller units. The NUTS 3 regions are thus nested 
Note: Quality of government refers to the mean scores for government effectiveness, 
rule of law and control of corruption in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
dataset
Source: the author’s own calculation based on data from Eurostat, WGI and European 
Commission
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in the larger NUTS 2 regions which are embedded 
in NUTS  1 areas. Among these territorial levels 
the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 are the most important 
because they inform several EU policies. Regional 
eligibility for the cohesion policy is defined at the 
NUTS 2 level, but, for instance, the competition 
policy’s regional ceilings of state aid are set at the 
NUTS 3 level.
Before each programming period, the European 
Commission and the Council jointly determine 
the fund eligibility of each NUTS 2 region. In 
the 2007-13 programming period, NUTS 2 
regions were classified into three categories: 
convergence regions, competitiveness and 
employment regions and so-called phasing-out 
regions. The latter category applied to mostly 
those Southern European regions which would 
have been convergence regions had the Eastern 
enlargement not taken place. The convergence 
regions, whose GDP per capita was lower than 
75% of the EU average, were eligible for the highest 
level of support while the regions falling into the 
competitiveness and employment category were 
entitled to significantly less funding.24
The European benchmark (EU average GDP per 
capita) that determined fund eligibility did not 
distinguish among the regions according to their 
domestic positions. In other words, the EU did not 
account for within-country regional disparities 
when it classified the regions into the above three 
categories. This crucially affected the classification 
of the Eastern regions because in most of them 
GDP per capita was well below 75% of the EU 
average. In the end, among the 54 Eastern European 
NUTS 2 regions25 51 became convergence regions 
and only three of them were grouped into the 
competitiveness and employment category.26 
On the one hand, this was advantageous for the 
Eastern members because with few exceptions 
24 For more information consult the webpage of DG 
Regional and Urban Policy: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/
en/policy/how/is-my-region-covered/2007-2013/ (accessed on 23 
June 2017)
25 Excluding the two Croatian NUTS 2 units.
26 Central Hungary, Bratislavsky, and the capital city of 
Prague
the entire territory of these countries was eligible 
for the highest level of support and this evidently 
maximized their budgets. On the other hand, the 
most backward Eastern regions were grouped 
together with more developed ones, thus weak 
and strong regions had to compete for the funds 
under the same rules.
The above circumstances resemble imperfect 
competition because the laggard regions 
presumably have lower absorption capacity than 
the richer areas; they may also have less own 
resources, and are less competent in preparing 
project applications. Yet, they face the same rules 
as the richer ones. As absorption capacity, own 
resources and know-how in project preparation 
and management are concentrated in the 
advanced areas, the ‘level playing field’ seem 
to be advantageous for them. This situation is 
analogous to that observed in capital-intensive 
industries where market competition tends to 
favour the bigger economic actors.27  However, if 
the more prosperous areas in the East outcompete 
the backward ones by securing more funds, 
then the implementation of the cohesion policy 
will not serve its original objective of reducing 
regional disparities. If this hypothesis holds, then 
the geographical eligibility criteria applied to 
the Eastern European member states promotes 
efficiency at the expense of equity. Although 
such an outcome would be consistent with the 
“Lisbonized” cohesion policy, it would also imply 
that an originally market-correcting transnational 
financial instrument reinforces spatially divisive 
mechanisms in the Eastern members.
In short, the first expectation assumes that by 
grouping most of the Eastern regions into the same 
eligibility category, the funds will concentrate in 
the more developed areas having higher economic 
power and absorption capacity. However, as it has 
already been discussed, the quality of government 
influences the overall fund absorption capacity 
27 See for instance Frederic M. Scherer, Industrial Market 
Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand 
McNally, 1980); Zoltan J. Acs and David B. Audretsch, ‘Innovation, 
Market Structure, and Firm Size’, The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 69, no. 4 (1987): 567–74.
IMPLEMENTING EU COHESION POLICY IN THE EASTERN MEMBER STATES:  
QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT BALANCING BETWEEN EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY - Gergö Medve-Bálint
115
of a member state. If this is the case, then it 
may also affect the territorial distribution of 
EU financial transfers. This is because national 
governments enjoy considerable freedom in the 
implementation of the cohesion policy: while 
the EU sets the external regulatory environment 
including the fund eligibility criteria, it does not 
have any legal mandate to demand harmonization 
of the domestic institutional systems responsible 
for policy implementation.28 
This suggests that in the case of the cohesion policy, 
economic Europeanization boils down to where 
the member states strike the balance between 
equity and efficiency. To put it differently, the 
externally set classification of the NUTS 2 regions 
into the same funding category pushes Eastern 
European states towards efficiency instead of 
promoting the least backward regions. But within 
these constraints they might shift the balance back 
by channelling support to the most deprived areas. 
On the one hand, this can be achieved by positive 
discrimination of the laggard regions through the 
operational programmes although this option was 
applied only in Poland and to a limited extent.29 
On the other hand, states with higher capacities 
(i.e. higher quality of government) are expected to 
be more capable of steering EU funds to the most 
deprived areas by providing additional assistance 
to those regions through various capacity-building 
programmes. Conversely, a weaker state may 
be more likely to reward the prosperous regions 
with funds, because of its greater exposure to the 
lobbying power of powerful economic agents 
that are likely to be concentrated in the more 
developed, economically strong regions. 
Indeed, several empirical works have found 
a positive relationship between quality of 
28 James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon, 
‘Conditionality and Compliance in the EU’s Eastward Enlargement: 
Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-National Government’, 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 42, no. 3 (2004): 523–
51; Martin Ferry and Irene McMaster, ‘Cohesion Policy and the 
Evolution of Regional Policy in Central and Eastern Europe’, 
Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 8 (2013): 1502–28.
29 In 2007-13, Poland implemented a multi-regional 
operational programme providing exclusive funding to the most 
backward five Polish voivodships. However, only 3.4 percent of 
the total Polish cohesion policy budget was allocated for this 
programme. (See Ferry and McMaster, ‘Cohesion Policy and the 
Evolution of Regional Policy in Central and Eastern Europe’.).
government and fund absorption. For instance, 
recent quantitative research has shown that higher 
government capacity is associated with higher fund 
absorption rates. 30 Similarly, qualitative evidence 
for the same relationship has been established 
both at the country31 and the regional32 level. 
Furthermore, quality of government understood 
as administrative capacity is related to financial 
compliance with the cohesion policy: in countries 
with greater administrative capacity irregularities 
and infringements of the EU law are less likely to 
occur during the implementation stage.33 These 
findings about the role of quality of government 
inform the second hypothesis: in member states 
with higher quality of government the advantage 
of the most prosperous areas in securing funds 
diminishes. In other words, stronger state 
administrations may be able to counter-balance 
the imperfect cross-regional competition for EU 
funds that the geographical eligibility rules created 
in Eastern Europe.
A limited number of scholarly works have 
already found evidence for the funds benefiting 
the wealthier municipalities34 and regions35 
30 Jale Tosun, ‘Absorption of Regional Funds: A 
Comparative Analysis’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 
52, no. 2 (2014): 371–87.
31 John Bachtler, Carlos Mendez, and Hildegard Oraže, 
‘From Conditionality to Europeanization in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Administrative Performance and Capacity in Cohesion 
Policy’, European Planning Studies 22, no. 4 (2014): 735–57; 
Neculai-Cristian Surubaru, ‘Administrative Capacity or Quality 
of Political Governance? EU Cohesion Policy in the New Europe, 
2007–13’, Regional Studies 51, no. 6 (2017): 844–56.
32 Simona Milio, ‘Can Administrative Capacity Explain 
Differences in Regional Performances? Evidence from Structural 
Funds Implementation in Southern Italy’, Regional Studies 41, no. 4 
(2007): 429–42.
33 Carlos Mendez and John Bachtler, ‘Financial Compliance 
in the European Union: A Cross-National Assessment of Financial 
Correction Patterns and Causes in Cohesion Policy’, JCMS: Journal 
of Common Market Studies 55, no. 3 (2017): 569–92.
34  Stephen Bloom and Vladislava Petrova, ‘National 
Subversion of Supranational Goals: “Pork-Barrel” Politics and EU 
Regional Aid’, Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 8 (2013): 1599–1620; 
Judit Kálmán, ‘Derangement or Development? Political Economy 
of EU Structural Funds Allocation in New Member States - Insights 
from the Hungarian Case’, CPS Working Paper Series (Budapest: 
Center for Policy Studies, Central European University, 2011), 
https://cps.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/publications/cps-working-
paper-eu-structural-funds-hungary-2011.pdf.
35 Laila Kule, Zaiga Krisjane, and Maris Berzins, ‘The 
Rhetoric and Reality of Pursuing Territorial Cohesion in Latvia’, in 
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in the Eastern member states. However, these 
works are limited in their scope because they 
are at best comparative case studies of two 
countries and they do not account for quality of 
government influencing fund distribution. This 
paper contributes to the debate by examining 
the regional distribution of the 2007-13 EU 
grants across all the Eastern European regions 
by incorporating government quality into the 
analysis. The next section introduces the data and 
the analytical approach which is followed by the 
empirical analysis and the conclusion.
Analysis of the regional 
distribution of EU funds in 
the Eastern members 
The Eastern member states have enjoyed a massive 
inflow of cohesion policy funds since their entry 
to the EU. Nevertheless, their net beneficiary 
position in per capita terms varies considerably 
(Table 1). This is partly because of the cross-
country differences in fund absorption and partly 
because of the differences in the cohesion policy 
budgets which were determined by the countries’ 
GDP and anticipated absorption capacity. Still, 
except for Croatia, which is the most recent entrant 
to the EU, in all the Eastern members the balance 
of total EU funds received and the total national 
contributions paid to the EU budget is positive. 
As the positive overall balances suggest, EU 
funds have contributed to the Eastern members’ 
economic output and in this respect have served 
their catch-up with the more advanced member 
states. But the internal distribution of the EU 
funds offers a more nuanced picture: it reveals 
the subnational variation in EU grants and shows 
which regions have benefited the most from them.
Territorial Developmemt, Cohesion and Spatial Planning, ed. Neil 
Adams, Giancarlo Cotella, and Richard Nunes, Regions and Cities 
(Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2011), 291–319. 
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Table 1. Cumulative national contributions 
to the EU budget and total payments to the 
Eastern member states from the cohesion 
policya (2004-2015)
When discussing the regional distribution of 
the funds, there are two alternative choices for 
the units of analysis: one may either consider 
the NUTS 2 or the NUTS 3 regions. Although 
the bulk of regional statistical data in the EU are 
collected for the NUTS 2 territories and income 
disparities across these regions represent the key 
concern for decision makers involved in cohesion 
policy, there are some inherent problems with the 
NUTS 2 classification. Most importantly, in several 
instances these regions are not real subnational 
units. Currently, a single NUTS 2 area covers the 
whole territory of six member states36 and further 
two members (Croatia and Slovenia) have only two 
NUTS 2 regions. The NUTS 2 level is therefore a 
36 Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and 
Malta.
mixture of small countries and larger subnational 
regions. What is more, some city-regions such 
as Prague, Berlin or Brussels are NUTS 2 units 
themselves thus in practice the NUTS 2 level 
extends from whole countries to single cities. This 
is a serious problem for the comparability of these 
units because different territorial levels are present 
in the same category.
The above problems appear in the case of the 
NUTS 3 regions to a lesser extent because each of 
them is a genuine subnational entity.37 Choosing 
the NUTS 3 level as the unit of analysis is 
therefore beneficial not only because it increases 
the number of observations but also because the 
NUTS 3 areas offer a more detailed picture of the 
37 With the exception of Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta 
that represent a single NUTS 3 entity.
a Payments from European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund
b Payments and contributions in 2007-2015
c Payments and contributions in 2013-2015
d The former Polish system of 66 NUTS 3 regions. As of 2015, there are 72 NUTS 3 regions in Poland
e Total GDP for 2007-2015 in the case of Bulgaria and Romania; and 2013-2015 in the case of Croatia
Note: Population data was calculated as the annual average population in 2004-2015
Source: the author’s own calculation based on Eurostat (population and GDP) and EU budget data
Country Number 
of NUTS 2 
regions
Number 







to EU budget 





Balance in % 
of total GDP 
produced during 
EU membershipe 
Bulgariab 6 28 5,825 3,122 362 .75
Croatiac 2 21 537 971 -101 -.33
Czech Republic 8 14 24,868 13,854 1,060 .63
Estonia 1 5 3,954 1,607 1,756 1.24
Hungary 7 20 25,835 9,577 1,626 1.37
Latvia 1 6 5,457 2,075 1,587 1.41
Lithuania 1 10 8,042 3,017 1,598 1.42
Poland 16 66d 76,499 34,921 1,091 1.02
Romaniab 8 42 14,338 10,692 177 .29
Slovakia 4 8 11,711 6,111 1,039 .75
Slovenia 2 12 4,485 3,619 426 .21
Total 56 232 181,552 89,565 877 .80
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subnational dynamics of EU fund distribution in 
Eastern Europe. For these reasons, in this study the 
NUTS 3 regions of the Eastern members constitute 
the units of analysis. This choice, however, also 
involves certain compromises because the rather 
low availability of comparable cross-regional 
data at the NUTS 3 level poses limitations for 
the empirical analysis. Nevertheless, the range of 
accessible data is still sufficient for the purposes of 
this work.
The main explanatory variable is regional GDP 
per capita in 2006 (the year before funding 
commenced), which is both an indicator of the 
level of development and informs about the 
regional fund absorption capacity. Using GDP 
as a proxy for economic development has often 
been criticized on the grounds that it does not 
adequately reflect social well-being and progress. 
Alternative measures have been proposed by 
leading economists38 but the role of GDP has 
remained influential in public policies and 
economics.39 At the same time, more sophisticated 
indicators considering a broad range of economic 
dimensions show high correlation with GDP 
unless the alternative measures include individual 
dimensions of welfare relating to life satisfaction.40 
This implies that in spite of its shortcomings, GDP 
is still one of the best single indicators capturing 
the level of economic development. In addition, 
the national and regional eligibility criteria for 
receiving EU funds also rely on GDP per capita. As 
an alternative indicator, the regional Gross Value 
Added (GVA) per capita will also be used. This is 
a measure of the contribution of the private sector 
to the GDP: it shows the total value of goods and 
services produced after deducting intermediate 
consumption and the costs of inputs that went 
into the production of those goods and services. 
38 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, 
‘The Measurement of Economic  Performance and Social Progress 
Revisited: Reflections and Overview’ (Paris: OFCE, 2009).
39 Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh, ‘The GDP Paradox’, 
Journal of Economic Psychology 30, no. 2 (2009): 117–35.
40 Jörg Döpke et al., ‘Multidimensional Well-Being and 
Regional Disparities in Europe’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies,55, no. 5 (2017): 1026-1044.
Besides GDP and GVA per capita, a binary 
indicator is also introduced which shows whether 
the region was classified as a competitiveness and 
employment unit. Only three  Eastern European 
NUTS 3 regions fell into this category but because 
of their lower level of eligibility, they should have 
secured less funding than the other regions. In 
addition, the total regional population, population 
density, and an indicator of regional employment 
(all values are for 2006) are considered.41 Population 
density captures the level of urbanization and in 
this respect reveals whether there is a difference 
between rather rural or more urban regions in 
their ability to obtain funds. The size of population 
controls for the high cross-regional differences in 
the number of inhabitants. Finally, the employment 
indicator tests whether funds are concentrated in 
areas that suffer from structural challenges such as 
low employment levels.
At the country level, two indicators are introduced: 
GDP per capita and an index of quality of 
government. As previously discussed, overall fund 
absorption capacity is positively related to GDP per 
capita and also partially determines the cohesion 
policy budgets. In principle, countries with higher 
GDP should receive less support through EU funds 
thus the size of the funds that can be distributed 
across the regions should reflect this aspect. The 
quality of government index represents the mean 
of the 2006 Worldwide Governance Indicators for 
government effectiveness, rule of law, and control 
of corruption. This dataset is commonly used 
for estimating state capacity and quality of state 
institutions and has also been applied in cohesion 
policy studies.42 As Figure 1 has revealed, the 
quality of government is positively associated with 
the total per capita funds allocated to the Eastern 
member states. Moreover, this variable is the key to 
test the second hypothesis about whether quality 
of government assists the equity or the efficiency 
objective.
As for the dependent variable, it captures the total 
41 For the description of the variables please consult the 
Appendix
42 see for instance Tosun, ‘Absorption of Regional Funds’.
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per capita EU funding disbursed between 2007 and 
2014 from the European Regional Development 
Fund and the Cohesion Fund to beneficiaries 
registered in the corresponding regions. This 
indicator is thus an aggregate of the EU funds 
obtained by various actors in a NUTS 3 region. 
Data for the Croatian regions are also included even 
though the country became an EU member only 
in July 2013. However, the European Commission 
set aside funds for Croatia to be disbursed from the 
2007-13 cohesion policy budget thus its exclusion 
from the analysis would not be justified even 
though the country received little support relative 
to the other Eastern members. The dataset suffers 
from certain limitations in that it does not contain 
projects funded from the European Social Fund, 
which represented 15% of the total allocation43 
for Eastern Europe in 2007-13 and served as the 
primary instrument for financing employment 
and human capital projects. Because of this, the 
regional employment indicator may not show 
any significant relationship with the dependent 
variable. 
A visual representation of the total EU funds 
and regional GDP per capita provides some 
preliminary evidence for the first hypothesis 
that the richer regions benefited more from EU 
grants (Figure 2). The association between the 
two indicators is positive: the more advanced 
regions tended to secure more funds per capita.44 
The positive and significant correlation coefficient 
of the two indicators (r = .552, p  < .001, N = 
43 The author’s own calculation based on the National 
Strategic Reference Frameworks (European Commission DG 
Regio, Cohesion Policy 2007-2013. National Strategic Reference 
Frameworks (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/regional_
policy/atlas2007/fiche/nsrf.pdf.
44 The data portrayed in Figure 6 accounts for expenditures 
from the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion 
Fund but does not include projects from the European Social 
Fund. However, a recent analysis (Medve-Bálint, Gergő (2015). 
Converging on Divergence: The Political Economy of Uneven 
Regional Development in East Central Europe After the Change 
of Regime (1990-2014), PhD Dissertation, Budapest: Central 
European University) of the territorial distribution of the EU 
funds in four ECE countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovakia), which also accounted for ESF expenditures, reached 
similar conclusions.
211 (without Croatia) and r = .277, p  < .001, N 
= 232 (with Croatia)) seems to confirm this 
observation.45 If the funds were concentrated in 
the backward regions then there should be an 
inverse relationship between the regional level of 
development and per capita EU support. It seems 
that some of the most prosperous Eastern regions 
have been among the greatest fiscal beneficiaries 
of the funds while the least advanced ones were 
lagging behind. This is in line with the first 
expectation but the positive association between 
GDP and EU funds is partially driven by the 
fact that Bulgaria and Romania, the two poorest 
Eastern members where some of the EU’s most 
backward regions are located, received the lowest 
per capita support in the 2007-13 funding period. 
This is also reflected in their low regional values of 
per capita funds and this is why a more thorough 
analysis is necessary that controls for other 
potential drivers of fund distribution.
45 The strength of association between the two indicators 
is lower if Croatian regions are included in the calculation. This is 
because Croatia became eligible for the cohesion policy support in 
2013 and her per capita funds are substantially lower than the other 
Eastern members with similar levels of development but longer 
fund eligibility. 
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Figure 2. GDP per capita (2006) and total EU 
funds per capita spent in the Eastern European 
NUTS 3 regions between 2007 and 2014 (without 
Croatia)
Because the NUTS 3 regions are nested in countries, 
the dataset shows a hierarchical structure: 
variation in EU funds per capita appears both at 
the country and the regional level. Moreover, this 
variation is systematic: the differences in national 
cohesion policy budgets are responsible for 
country-level variation in the dependent variable 
while the regional factors are responsible for 
variance at the regional level. Consequently, the 
empirical analysis has to simultaneously account 
for country-level and regional effects. Hierarchical 
linear models meet these criteria 46 thus their 
application seems an appropriate strategy given 
the nested data structure.
The results of the regression models (Table 2) 
confirm both hypotheses. In the first model 
(Model 1) only the regional-level explanatory 
variables were included. The positive and 
46 Joop Hox, Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and 
Applications, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2010).
Note: The same chart including data for the Croatian regions is available in the Appendix
Source: the authors’ own calculation based on EU fund data provided by DG Urban and Regional Policy (http://ec.europa.
eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/expost2013/wp13_2_db_nuts3_ae.xlsx) and Eurostat data.
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significant coefficient for initial regional GDP 
per capita shows that holding all things constant, 
richer regions – on average – secured more 
per capita EU funds than the poorer ones. On 
average, a one percent increase in the 2006 per 
capita GDP is associated with a nearly .6 percent 
rise in total EU funds per capita. To put it simply, 
the more developed a region, the more support it 
obtains. The dummy for the competitiveness and 
employment regions also shows a significant albeit 
negative association with the dependent variable. 
This suggests that limiting eligibility produces 
the intended outcome as regions in the lower 
funding category secured fewer funds per capita 
than the convergence regions. In other words, if a 
convergence region would lose its status to become 
a competitiveness and employment region, then 
its per capita EU funds will on average decrease 
by 57 percent, all else being equal.47 Because only 
three regions qualified as competitiveness and 
47 If the dependent variable is logarithmic and the value 
of the dummy switches from 0 to 1, then its impact is as follows: 
100 * [exp(coefficient) - 1] percent (see David E. A. Giles, ‘The 
Interpretation of Dummy Variables in Semilogarithmic Equations: 
Unbiased Estimation’. Economics Letters 10, no. 1–2 (1982): 77–
79.).
employment units in the 2007-13 programming 
period, this effect does not apply to the vast 
majority of the Eastern regions. As for the other 
regional indicators, size of population shows a 
negative association with the funds at the 90% 
significance level but population density and – as 
expected – the employment indicator demonstrate 
a statistically not significant relationship with the 
dependent variable.
Table 2: Results of the multi-level models. 
Dependent variable: regional (NUTS 3) EU 
funds per capita (distributed until end of 2014)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B SE B SE B SE B SE
Constant 7.091*** .271 26.130*** 9.238 24.991** 9.741 27.291*** 1.223
Regional level effects
GDP/capita (regional) .568** .236 .553** .240 .689*** .163
GVA/capita (regional) .684*** .164
Competitiveness regiona -.452** .175 -.451** .183 -.233 .186 -.242 .182
Population -.123* .065 -.108* .060 -.117* .066 -.119* .066
Population density -.044 .076 -.037 .075 -.030 .073 -.030 .072
Employment .044 .271 .021 .266 .130 .233 .129 .236
Country level effects
Quality of government 2.996** 1.196 2.946** 1.268 3.022** 1.283
GDP/capita (country) -2.295** 1.102 -2.159* 1.166 -2.418** 1.222
Interaction effects
Qual. of gvt. & GDP/capita (reg.) -.639*** .213
Qual. of gvt. & GVA/capita (reg.) -.616*** .210
Random effects
Regional-level variance .166*** .040 .167*** .040 .161*** .041 .161*** .041
Country-level variance .654 .489 .244 .106 .264 .121 .268 .127
N 232b 232 b 232 b 232 b
Wald Chi-squared 42.16*** 56.73*** 603.25*** 617.52***
Reference group: Convergence regions
b The Polish data covers the former 66 NUTS 3 level regions 
(in effect until 31 December 2014). 
Except for the dummy and the quality of government 
index, all explanatory variables are logged and centred on 
their mean. Logged dependent variable.
Unstandardized coefficients, robust standard errors; *** p < 
.01; ** p < .05; *p < .01
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The introduction of the country-level explanatory 
variables (Model 2) does not modify the formerly 
established relationships: both the coefficients and 
the significance level for the regional indicators 
remain virtually unchanged. However, the 
country-level variables demonstrate the expected 
association with EU grants: holding all else 
constant, regional EU funds per capita declines if 
country-level GDP increases. Government quality 
reveals an opposite relationship: in countries 
with better quality of government the regional 
EU funds per capita are, on average, higher.48 
These results confirm what Figure 1 already 
suggested: the EU allocated a larger budget for 
those Eastern members whose anticipated fund 
absorption capacity was higher. At the same time, 
GDP per capita posed a limitation to budget 
expansion. This is why the two richest Easterners, 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia, whose quality 
of government were also relatively high, did not 
receive even more EU support.
Next, a cross-level interaction term between 
regional GDP per capita and quality of government 
is introduced (Model 3) to test the second 
hypothesis. If the regional distribution of the 
funds is more equitable in those Eastern members 
where the quality of government is higher, then 
government quality would reduce the effect of 
regional GDP per capita on the dependent variable 
thus the interaction term should be negative. The 
model produces exactly this result: the significant 
negative interaction term reveals that as the 
quality of government increases, the positive 
association between regional GDP and EU funds 
per capita decreases. In the end, at relatively high 
levels of government quality, the GDP’s effect on 
the funds becomes zero (Figure 3). The regression 
48 Quality of government and GDP per capita are strongly 
correlated with each other. However, the Variance Inflation 
Factor for the two indicators do not show excessive problems 
with multicollinearity (VIF = 4.43 for government quality and 
VIF = 6.13 for GDP). Collinearity typically inflates the standard 
errors and increases the likelihood of committing Type II errors. 
However, both variables produce a significant coefficient in each 
model thus collinearity does not seem to be a reason for concern 
here.
model produces the same results if regional GDP 
per capita is substituted with GVA per capita 
(Model 4). 
As a robustness check, estimates were obtained 
for Model 3 by bootstrapping, too. This method 
is a process which draws samples from the 
observations with replacement and calculates the 
parameter estimates from those bootstrapped 
samples (the size of each bootstrapped sample 
equals to the total number of observations). 
Because of replacement, each observation has the 
same probability to enter the sample and each 
observation has the same probability to be picked 
again to the same sample. In this particular case, 
each NUTS  3 region may be drawn more than 
once in each bootstrapped sample or, because of 
the replacement procedure, may not be drawn at 
all. Bootstrapping allows for establishing reliable 
confidence intervals to calculate significance tests 
if the data violates normality assumptions or the 
sample is limited.49 Here, bootstrapping served as 
a robustness check for the significance levels of the 
coefficients obtained in Model 3. 
49 Michael Wood, ‘Statistical Inference Using Bootstrap 
Confidence Intervals’, Significance 1, no. 4 (2004): 180–82.
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Figure 3: Average marginal effect of regional 
GDP per capita with quality of government on 
EU funds per capita (Model 3)
After generating 5000 bootstrapped samples, 
the bootstrapped standard errors50 reinforced 
the already established relationships between 
the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable: regional GDP and quality of government 
is positively related to EU funds per capita while 
country-level GDP shows a significant negative 
relationship. Most importantly, the interaction 
term between regional GDP and quality of 
government remained significant at the 99 percent 
confidence level. This reinforces the finding that as 
quality of government increases, the advantage of 
the more developed regions in securing EU funds 
decreases. In short, higher quality of government 
50 Available on request from the author
counter-balances the imperfect competition 
created by the geographical eligibility rules that 
benefit the more prosperous Eastern European 
regions.
Conclusion
The regional distribution of the cohesion 
policy funds in Eastern Europe was one of the 
key  questions of post-accession economic 
Europeanization. It was not merely about how 
the gains from one of the most visible rewards 
of membership would be distributed across the 
subnational regions of the Eastern members but also 
about how the regulatory circumstances and the 
formal and informal expectations expressed by the 
EU would influence the domestic implementation 
of the policy. This paper has argued that recently 
the EU has shifted its cohesion policy priorities 
because since the launch of the Lisbon Agenda 
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it has placed the emphasis on raising economic 
competitiveness through the efficient use of EU 
funds. The new orientation of the cohesion policy 
implied that its original guiding principle of equity 
embodied in the objective of promoting the most 
backward regions would be sidelined to a certain 
extent. The growing tension between equity and 
efficiency posed an implementation challenge for 
the Eastern members in that they had to strike a 
balance between the two principles.
The paper has shown that by applying a European 
benchmark to the regional fund eligibility criteria 
in the 2007-13 programming period, the EU did not 
distinguish between the Eastern European regions 
according to their relative domestic developmental 
positions. In practice, the vast majority of these 
regions were classified as backward and grouped 
into the same support category. This has created 
an imperfect competition for the funds because 
the most backward regions had to compete with 
the most advanced ones under the same rules. 
Because of their greater fund absorption capacity, 
these structural conditions set by the eligibility 
criteria were beneficial for the more prosperous 
regions at the expense of the laggards. In this way, 
the EU promoted the efficiency principle in Eastern 
Europe which also manifested in the allocation of 
the national budgets as those Easterners whose 
anticipated fund absorption capacity was higher 
enjoyed a larger cohesion policy budget.
The empirical analysis demonstrated that the 
more developed Eastern regions were indeed able 
to secure more funds per capita, all else being 
equal. However, the paper has also shown that the 
advantage of the advanced regions in obtaining 
EU grants diminishes as the domestic quality of 
government increases. This suggests that the effect 
of the geographical eligibility rules on regional 
fund distribution is conditional on state capacity. 
In essence, Eastern members with higher quality 
of government may be able to shift the balance 
back from efficiency to equity by reducing or 
even eliminating the competitive edge of their 
most advanced regions in securing the funds in 
order to narrow internal disparities in economic 
development through EU grants. On the one 
hand, this implies that the implementation of 
the cohesion policy in terms of the territorial 
distribution of funds varies across Eastern Europe 
and this variation is linked to government quality. 
On the other hand, while the ‘weaker’ states seem 
to comply with the efficiency objective that is 
currently being promoted by the EU, the ‘stronger’ 
states may counter-balance this by advancing the 
original goal of supporting the backward areas.
These findings are consistent with recent empirical 
research on the role that domestic institutional 
quality plays in the use of EU funds. Moreover, 
the results reinforce previous findings about the 
variable outcome of Europeanization in the East 
being conditional on domestic circumstances. 
However, the paper faces some obvious 
limitations. Most importantly, because of its 
quantitative focus, it does not provide qualitative 
evidence on the exact mechanisms through 
which domestic quality of government influences 
fund distribution. It needs to be established how 
the implementation of cohesion policy in the 
Eastern member states favours the more or the 
less developed regions and what measures these 
states have introduced (or failed to introduce) 
to assist the backward areas and increase their 
absorption capacity. This potential line of inquiry 
may offer a more nuanced picture on cohesion 
policy implementation and would also empirically 
inform both the literatures on post-accession 
Europeanization and institutional quality.
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Appendix
Description of the variables
Name Description Source
EU funds per capita The total amount of ERDF and Cohesion Fund 
grants per capita in EUR allocated until 31 
December 2014 from the 2007-2013 cohesion 
policy budget
the author’s own calculation based on data 
obtained from DG Regional and Urban Policy 
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/
docgener/evaluation/pdf/expost2013/wp13_2_
db_nuts3_ae.xlsx, Accessed 7 October 2017)
GDP per capita 
(regional)
Gross Domestic Product per capita in PPS in 
2006
Eurostat
GVA per capita 
(regional)
Gross Value Added per capita in 2006 Eurostat
Population Total population on 1 January 2006 Eurostat
Employment Number of employed persons per 1000 active 
inhabitants (from 15 to 64 years)
the author’s own calculation based on Eurostat 
data
GDP per capita 
(country)





Mean score of government effectiveness, rule of 
law and control of corruption
the author’s own calculation based on Worldwide 
Governance Indicators
Descriptive statistics (variables are in their 
original scales)
Name Min. Max. Mean SD
EU funds per capita 
(EUR)
42.12 5,281.5 1,437.04 929.17
GDP per capita 
(regional)
4,234.22 42,398.98 11,599.28 5,629.14
GVA per capita 
(regional)
1,762.23 28,733.66 5,826.13 3,400.58
Population 51,173 1,930,390 453,069.1 281,125.9
Population density 10.1 8,459.5 249.44 745.14
Employment 257.29 1,092.3 439.47 116.75
GDP per capita 
(country)
3,400 15,500 7,365.52 2,912.26
Quality of government 
(country)
-.164 1.106 .334 .375
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Histogram of the dependent variable (total EU 
funds per capita in EUR, logged transformed)
















































Population density .590*** 1
GDP per capita .275*** .559*** 1
Employment .191*** .258*** .301*** 1
GVA per capita .221*** .475*** .963*** .163** 1
Convergence region -.213*** -.280*** -.323*** -.270*** -.272*** 1
*** p < .01; ** p < .05
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Abstract
Ever since the launching of the Single Market, 
European integration has implied the restructuring 
of developmental state capacities, taking away 
the capacities for traditional development 
strategies based on protecting domestic markets 
and promoting national champions, and instead 
offering EU development funds for disadvantaged 
regions. While for the old member states this state 
restructuring came about primarily through the 
creation of supranational sanctioning mechanisms 
as well as supranational development funds, in 
case of the East European new members, state 
restructuring represented deep transformation of 
developmental capacities at the national level. As 
the East European countries started the process 
of adjustment to the EU legislation already prior 
to the accession, a distinctive feature of Eastern 
enlargement has been the building up of national 
institutions for monitoring the compliance of 
public policies with the EU acquis, resulting in a 
deep Europeanization of national development 
instruments such as state aids. Furthermore, 
through its financial assistance for economic 
restructuring and institution building, the EU 
strengthened East European state capacities to 
forge developmental alliances with multinational 
corporations. The transnationalized development 
capacities of East European states contributed 
to the emergence of transnationalized, FDI-
based economies, which in a path-dependent 
way locked-in state transformation. While the 
effects of political Europeanization waned, with 
a number of new member states experiencing 
democratic backsliding, the Europeanization of 
economic state capacities appears to have a long-
lasting effect even after the EU accession.
Keywords: Eastern Europe, economic 
development, Europeanization, state aid, state 
capacity
Introduction 
Ever since the launching of the Single Market, 
European integration has implied the restructuring 
of developmental state capacities, taking away 
the capacities for traditional development 
strategies based on protecting domestic markets 
and promoting national champions, and 
instead promoting horizontal policies based on 
empowerment and strengthening the capacity to 
participate in the transnational markets. While 
for many commentators, the EU would simply 
represent the reduction of state capacities to govern 
their economies or engage in developmental 
actions1, more nuanced analysis shows that the EU 
instead still allows and even promotes certain kind 
of development strategies. Rather than relying 
solely on market-based mechanisms as the means of 
generating growth and increased competitiveness, 
the EU aimed to actively foster transformation 
1 See F. W. Scharpf ‘The European Social Model. Coping 
with the Challenges of Diversity’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 40 (2002) 645–670., W. Streeck, ‘Competitive Solidarity: 
Rethinking the European Social Model’ MPIfG Working Paper 
99/8, Cologne, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies 
(1999), and W. Streeck and D. Mertens ‘Public Finance and the 
Decline of State Capacity in Democratic Capitalism’, in W. Streeck 
and A. Schafer (eds.), Politics in the Age of Austerity (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2013) 26–58.
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towards knowledge-based economy via its support 
for research and development, investment in 
skills and retraining of workers, support for small 
and medium enterprises etc. Although ‘vertical’, 
selective support for specific sectors and firms was 
heavily regulated with the aim of gradually phasing 
it out, the EU nevertheless promoted ‘horizontal’ 
industrial policy based on market-friendly 
support for firms awarded on competitive basis, 
subsidies for technological upgrading, investment 
in R&D etc. Such attempts were apparent already 
early on with the empowerment being the key 
principle behind the Structural Funds reforms 
in the 1980s and with the adoption of the Lisbon 
Agenda in 2000. After the 2008 economic crisis 
such tendency was only strengthened, with the 
new emphasis on industrial renaissance, smart 
growth and investment featuring high in the EU 
agenda2.
Yet, if by Europeanization we understand 
the approximation to the EU policy goals: 
integrated and competitive European market; and 
instruments: horizontal and non-discriminatory 
industrial policies, somewhat paradoxically 
developmental capacities and economic 
models of the New Member States appear more 
Europeanized that that of the old.   As will be 
demonstrated below, East European states are 
champions of using horizontal industrial policy as 
a cornerstone of their development model, while 
at the same time being perfectly compliant with 
the EU state aid regulation. Their economies also 
appear to be deeply integrated in the European 
Single Market, not only through trade and exports, 
but also via large amounts of foreign direct 
investments in export-oriented manufacturing, 
integrating East European economies in the pan-
European production chains. Where does this 
deep Europeanization come from?
This paper aims to contribute to explaining this 
puzzle by focusing in particular on the agency 
of the EU in creating such deeply Europeanized 
development capacities and economic models in 
2 European Commission, Towards an Industrial 
Rennaisance (Bruxelles, 2014)
the East. With respect to their economic models, 
existing literature on the political economy of 
Eastern Europe demonstrates that the emergence 
of transnationalized capitalism in the region has 
been far from self-evident, apolitical development 
in which mobile capital simply goes to countries 
with relative scarcity of capital that promise the 
highest returns. Rather, the creation of FDI-based 
dependent market economies3 has been mired in 
complex political struggles among multinational 
corporations, domestic economic interest groups 
and political parties with different ideas about the 
kind of development models these countries can or 
should pursue and the kind of policies that would 
serve their goals best. By now an ample literature 
emerged that testifies to these struggles and the 
politics of economic transnationalization in the 
East, focusing in particular on the role of social 
networks in foreign investment4, the interplay of 
multinationals’ strategies and domestic political 
agency567, or the role of domestic political parties8. 
The role of the EU in these struggles has however 
been largely downplayed and the EU accession 
figured primarily as an additional attraction 
factor in the economic studies of determinants of 
foreign investment in the East. Only more recent 
literature started to explore the role of the EU 
and in particular the political agency of the old 
member states or supranational institutions in 
shaping the domestic politics of transnationalized 
3 A. Nölke. and A.Vliegenthart, ‘Enlarging the varieties of 
capitalism: The emergence of dependent market economies in East 
Central Europe’, World Politics 61 (2009): 670–702.
4 N. Bandelj, From Communists to Foreign Capitalists: 
The Social Foundations of Foreign Direct Investment in Postsocialist 
Europe. (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2008)
5 D. Bohle and B. Greskovits Capitalist Diversity on 
Europe’s Periphery (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2012)
6 J. Drahokoupil, Globalization and the State in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment (London: 
Routledge, 2009)
7 H. Appel, Tax Politics in Eastern Europe. Globalization, 
Regional Integration and the Democratic Compromise (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2011)
8 V. Vukov, Competition States on Europe’s Periphery: Race 
to the Bottom and to the Top (PhD Dissertation. Florence: European 
University Institute, 2013)
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capitalism. Jacoby9 focuses on the EU backyard 
management as a way of managing globalization 
by increasing opportunities and reducing threats 
of integration of the East in the EU, while 
Medve-Balint10 highlights the role of the EU 
conditionality / coercion through legal and quasi-
legal instruments and subsequent regulatory 
convergence in fostering remarkable FDI inflow 
in the region. Bruszt and Vukov11 compare the EU 
enlargement strategy in the East with the one in 
the Southern periphery and argue that while the 
two enlargements shared similar challenges and 
goals, the EU was much more active in building 
market-making and EU-conform institutions in 
the East as well as in managing developmental 
consequences of integration, contributing to the 
emergence of their liberal developmental states. 
This paper aims to contribute to this emerging 
literature by highlighting less explored mechanisms 
through which the EU shaped developmental 
models and policies in the new member states, 
in particular the influence of pre-accession 
assistance in facilitating domestic developmental 
realignments, as well as the institutional legacy 
of some aspects of pre-accession harmonization 
which resulted in deeper Europeanization of 
developmental instruments in the new than in 
the old member states. As the East European 
countries started the process of adjustment to 
the EU legislation already prior to the accession, 
a distinctive feature of Eastern enlargement has 
been the building up of national institutions for 
monitoring the compliance of public policies 
with the acquis, rather than relying only on 
the sanctioning powers of the supra-national 
institutions. The pre-accession conditionality 
required not only that East European states 
9 W. Jacoby, ‘Managing Globalization by Managing Central 
and Eastern Europe: the EU’s Backyard as Threat and Opportunity’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 17 (2010), 416-432
10 G. Medve-Balint, ‘‘The Role of the EU in Shaping FDI 
Flows to East Central Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies 
52(2014): 35–51.
11 L. Bruszt and V. Vukov, ‘Making states for the Single 
Market: European integration and the reshaping of economic states 
in the Southern and Eastern peripheries of Europe’, West European 
Politics 40 (2017) 663-687
converge in their practices with the EU regulation, 
but it also required the building of specific national 
institutions that would act as the guardian of the 
acquis, in some cases performing the role that for 
the old member states was played by the European 
Commission. State aid is a case in point: while 
for the old member states the monitoring and 
sanctioning of state aid is done by the European 
Commission, all the new member states before 
accession had to adopt national institutions for 
monitoring the compliance of their state aid 
rules with the EU acquis. Thus, pre-accession 
conditionality that required the establishment of 
national institutions mimicking the work normally 
done by the European Commission simultaneously 
functioned as the channel of domestic capacity 
building and it subsequently strengthened the 
ability of East European states to engage in activist 
market-friendly developmental policies, while 
being perfectly in compliance with the EU rules 
of market regulation. The resulting developmental 
capacities of the East European states are thus 
actually more Europeanized than those of the 
old member states and this has contributed also 
to the much deeper transnationalization of their 
economies, with much higher shares of FDI 
than in the West and also much stronger export 
orientation than the South European periphery. 
The existing literature on Europeanization 
focuses predominantly on the mechanisms of 
adoption and compliance with the EU rules12, 
both before and after accession and it has already 
noted surprisingly good performance of the new 
member states when it comes to implementing 
12 See L. Andonova, Transnational Politics of the 
Environment: The EU and Environmental Policy in Central 
and Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), F. 
Schimmelfening, F., and U. Sedelmeier eds. The Europeanization 
of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2005), M. Blauberger, ‘Compliance with Rules of Negative 
Integration: European State Aid Control in the New Member 
States’. Journal of European Public Policy, 16, 7 (2009) 1030–46.
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EU regulations13. Sedelmeier14 argues that the 
continued compliance after conditionality has 
to do with the pre-accession building up of 
administrative capacities for coordinating the 
implementation of the EU law, as well as the 
socialization effect of being perceived as a good 
community member. While broadly concurring 
with Sedelmeier’s argument on the importance of 
pre-accession administrative capacities, this paper 
stresses not only the relevance of capacities for 
overall coordination of EU law implementation, but 
also the specific capacities for implementing parts 
of EU regulations that were created in the new, but 
not in the old member states. Furthermore, the 
creation of such national institutions was not only 
the result of domestic executives’ efforts to cope 
with the demands of the accession15; but in some 
areas, such as state aid, it was actually the result of 
direct EU requirements as agreed in the Europe 
Agreements. On the other hand, when it comes to 
state aid, Blauberger16 argues that post-accession 
compliance has to do with good supranational 
sanctioning mechanisms in the field of state aid. In 
contrast, this analysis shows that the exceptionally 
good performance of the new member states 
cannot be explained only by the supranational 
institutions as these are the same for all member 
states. Rather, it is the pre-accession institution 
building, as well as the effects of this institution 
building on economic development models 
and consequent transformation of the domestic 
13  See U. Sedelmeier ‘After Conditionality: Post-Accession 
Compliance with EU Law in East Central Europe’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 15:6 (2008) 806–825, U. Sedelmeier, 
Compliance after Conditionality: Why Are the European Union’s 
New Member States so Good? No. 22, May 2016, ‘Maximizing 
the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons of and 
prospects for enlargement and beyond’ (MAXCAP, 2016), and 
M. Blauberger, ‘Compliance with Rules of Negative Integration: 
European State Aid Control in the New Member States’. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 16, 7 (2009) 1030–46.
14  U. Sedelmeier, Compliance after Conditionality: Why 
Are the European Union’s New Member States so Good? No. 22, May 
2016, ‘Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: 
Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond’ (MAXCAP, 
2016)
15  See U. Sedelmeier (2016) and R. Zubek, Core Executive 
and Europeanization in Central Europe, Palgrave MacMillan, 2008
16  M. Blauberger (2009)
economic actors that sustain compliance even 
after membership.
Finally, the study also aims to contribute to 
the Europeanization literature by putting more 
emphasis on the developmental aspects of 
Europeanization and on the political economy 
implications of compliance. In particular, the 
paper argues that the deep Europeanization of 
developmental capacities in Eastern Europe is 
sustained thanks to the path dependency and 
the increasing returns mechanisms17. Once 
countries have embarked on the path of FDI-
based export-oriented growth models and 
once their economic landscape has changed 
accordingly, it becomes increasingly more difficult 
to shift onto another path and to dismantle the 
Europeanized development strategy put in place. 
The policies of the more recently elected populist 
governments that espouse economic nationalism 
and engage in openly anti-multinationals rhetoric 
do attempt to make changes at the margins, in 
particular in the service sector where foreign 
investment was predominantly market-seeking. 
However, they still stop short of jeopardizing in 
any way the existing instruments for attracting 
manufacturing FDI and helping the upgrading 
within the transnational production chains. 
The core of the East European transnationalized 
development models thus remains intact and their 
Europeanized developmental capacities continue 
to persist, notwithstanding the apparent reversal 
of their democratization achievements. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next 
section presents an overview of Europeanization 
of development, demonstrating that in the EU 
we can speak about specific ‘European’ (i.e. EU-
level) developmental goals and the promotion 
of a specific set of development instruments, 
rather than only about the limitation of national 
development strategies. While such restructuring 
of development capacities is primarily a matter of 
supranational regulations and policies in the case 
17  P. Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and 
the Study of Politics.” American Political Science Review 92:4 
(2000) 251-267.
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of the old EU members, the reconfiguration of 
national development institutions through direct 
interventions has been a distinctive feature of 
Eastern enlargement. The third section focuses in 
particular on the case of state aid as one of the key 
developmental instrument and shows how pre-
accession conditionality resulted in much deeper 
internalization of EU regulations on state aid in the 
new than in the old member states, increasing their 
capacity to use EU-conforming state aid as the key 
pillar of their development strategy after accession. 
The fourth section discusses the contemporary 
challenges to Europeanization in some of the East 
European member states that have seen the rise 
of economic nationalism and argues that while 
there are changes in the margins, the core of their 
development models continues to persist, with 
the deep economic transnationalization locking-
in the Europeanization of their developmental 
capacities. The final section concludes. 
Europeanization and 
developmental capacities
The main premise of the European integration 
since the 1980s has been the creation of the 
common market where the flow of goods, capital, 
services and labour would not be hindered by 
the nation-specific regulations and where any 
discrimination against non-domestic economic 
actors from other EU member states would be 
abolished, thus creating a level-playing field 
across the entire continent. The complex legal 
architecture of the EU with its common rules 
and regulations, mutual recognition of standards, 
and the rulings of the European Court of Justice 
all worked towards the effective abolishment of 
any discriminatory state actions that would try to 
favour national against other European firms or 
workers. Many scholars thus concluded that the 
building of the Single European Market, and the 
embedding of national states into transnational 
markets and regulatory regimes, are responsible 
for the uniform dramatic weakening of state 
capacities to govern their national economies18.
From a political economy perspective and in 
particular from the point of view of development, 
this Europeanization of market regulation 
meant that traditional development strategies 
apparent in the 19th century Western European 
latecomers, but also in the large share of the 
Global South19 became nearly impossible, as they 
were all based on the protection of domestic firms 
from outside competitors, selective promotion 
of national champions or the luring of MNCs 
based on providing domestic, national-specific 
market regulations. With the deepening of the 
European market integration all of these practices 
were however rendered illegal as the EU acquis 
communautaire regulated precisely against such 
discriminatory development instruments. 
This is not to say that the European integration 
made any kind of developmental action impossible. 
First, the EU has very early on established 
instruments and financial resources that would 
help less developed, less competitive regions in 
their convergence with their more developed 
counterparts. Such instruments were however 
based primarily on the principle of empowerment, 
strengthening the capacity of weaker actors to 
participate in the common market, rather than on 
the principle of protection from the vagaries and 
insecurities of market competition20. Secondly, 
the deepening of European integration was also 
18 See F. W. Scharpf ‘The European Social Model. Coping 
with the Challenges of Diversity’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 40 (2002) 645–670., W. Streeck, ‘Competitive Solidarity: 
Rethinking the European Social Model’ MPIfG Working Paper 
99/8, Cologne, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies 
(1999), and W. Streeck and D. Mertens ‘Public Finance and the 
Decline of State Capacity in Democratic Capitalism’, in W. Streeck 
and A. Schafer (eds.), Politics in the Age of Austerity (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2013) 26–58.
19 See, P. Evans, Dependent development: the alliance 
of multinational, state, and local capital in Brazil (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979) and A. Amsden, The Rise of ‘the 
Rest’. Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
20 Delors Report, Report on Economic and Monetary Union 
in the European Community. Committee for the Study of Economic 
and Monetary Union. (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications 
of the EC, 1989)
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coupled with a number of strategies designed to 
make the EU as a whole a competitive, knowledge-
based economy, from the Lisbon strategy in 2000 
till Europe 2020 strategy 10 years later. Rather 
than relying solely on market-based mechanisms 
as the means of generating growth and increased 
competitiveness, the EU aimed to actively foster 
such transformation towards knowledge-based 
economy via its environmental policies, the 
support for research and development, investment 
in skills and retraining of workers, support for 
small and medium enterprises etc. While ‘vertical’, 
selective support for specific sectors and firms was 
thus heavily regulated with the aim of gradually 
phasing it out, the EU nevertheless promoted 
‘horizontal’ industrial policy based on market-
friendly support for firms awarded on competitive 
basis, subsidies for technological upgrading, 
investment in R&D etc. In the late 1990s and early 
2000s such EU industrial policy persisted but 
was perhaps less salient than the macroeconomic 
conditionality associated with the EMU or the 
efforts at regulating the Single Market. Yet, the post-
2008 economic crisis brought industrial policy 
firmly back on the EU agenda. The Commission 
strategy ‘For a European Industrial Renaissance’ 
sets as its key priorities mainstreaming industrial 
competitiveness; maximising the potential of the 
internal market, implementing the instruments of 
regional development in support of innovation, 
skills, and entrepreneurship, promoting access to 
critical inputs in order to encourage investment 
and facilitating the integration of EU firms in 
global value chains21.
Both the cutting off the old and the promotion 
of new developmental capacities within the 
EU (i.e. for the old member states) happened 
primarily through the establishment of the EU-
level supranational mechanisms for sanctioning 
the first and enabling the second. With regards 
to the sanctioning, the European Commission as 
the guardian of the Treaties has been in charge of 
monitoring the compliance of the member states 
21 European Commission, Towards an Industrial 
Rennaisance (Bruxelles, 2014)
with the EU regulation, while the European Court 
of Justice commands the authority to rule in cases 
of non-compliance. Discriminatory practices 
that would appear similar to the traditional 
development strategies are thus in principle ruled-
out, but in practice this works primarily through 
the possibility that the European Commission and 
the ECJ would a posteriori sanction the member 
states that try to engage in such practices. On the 
other hand, the EU rules and regulations still leave 
open the possibility of using national instruments 
aligned with the principle of horizontal industrial 
policy (in particular in the field of state aid). 
Furthermore, the EU itself provides financial 
resources in the form of Structural Funds and the 
low interest-rate European Investment Bank loans 
that the member states can make use of in their 
pursuit of liberal developmental policies. 
The situation was however different in the countries 
that were not yet EU members, but aspiring to 
become ones – namely, the current New EU 
member states. There, the compliance with the EU 
rules and regulations had to happen already before 
the formal accession, thus taking place when 
EU-level sanctioning mechanisms were still not 
sovereign on the territory of the then-candidate 
states. Consequently, the EU could not rely on the 
Commission and the ECJ to sanction possible non-
compliance and instead the Agreements between 
the EU and the candidate states typically provided 
for the establishment of national level institutions 
that were in charge of monitoring and ensuring 
the compatibility between the domestic policies 
and the common European market regulations. In 
some policy fields thus, the Eastern enlargement 
involved the building of national institutions that 
were not existing in the old member states and 
were not even required to exist by the EU rules 
but were rather mimicking the functions that were 
in the old member state provided by supranational 
institutions.   
As a result, national developmental strategies in 
the new member states turned out to be much 
more deeply Europeanized than those of the 
old member states. Furthermore, the European 
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Commission had a number of instruments, 
including both conditionality and assistance to 
further the adoption of policies and institutions 
promoting liberal, FDI-based development, rather 
than any kind of ‘independentist’ model.
The cutting off of old capacity to promote and 
protect domestic actors was thus internalized 
more deeply in the East, as apparent in particular 
in the regulation of state aid (more on this 
below). Furthermore, the adoption of policies 
and instruments that effectively abolish non-tariff 
barriers, including common regulation, standards, 
or environmental protection was also coupled 
with a historically unprecendented exercise of 
extensive institution building in the acceding 
countries22.  From public administration23, to 
independent judiciary and efforts at curbing 
corruption24 to different regulatory institutions or 
regional development agencies, the EU monitored 
institutional changes in the region and invested 
substantive amount of financial and human 
resources into aligning these changes with the 
practices established in the old member states 
and with the requirements of the EU acquis 
communautaire. 
Besides ensuring compliance with EU regulation, 
the pre-accession conditionality and assistance 
also fostered the building of liberal developmental 
states25, as European pre-accession assistance 
programs aimed in particular to help weak Eastern 
economies adjust to the competitive pressures 
in the Common Market. In contrast with any 
previous episode of enlargement, the EU created 
clear conditionality for the aspiring candidate 
states, with economic parts of the conditionality 
including the capacity to implement the acquis 
communautaire, but also the existence of a 
22 L. Bruszt and V. Vukov (2017) 
23 J. H. Meyer Sahling, The Sustainability of Civil Service 
Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe Five Years after Accession 
(Paris: SIGMA Publications, 2009)
24 M. Vachudova and A. Spendzharova, ‘The EU’s 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism: Fighting Corruption 
in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession’, European Policy 
Analysis, 1 (2012) 1–20.
25 L. Bruszt and V. Vukov (2017)
functioning market economy able to withstand 
competitive pressures within the Common Market. 
Both of these aspects were clearly to be helped by 
the pre-accession financial assistance programs 
that aimed in particular to help the restructuring 
of these economies in a way that would enable 
their successful insertion in the Single Market. 
The economic conditionality of the EU did not 
include meeting specific indicators: the EU was 
not telling the candidate states what exactly should 
be the share of private sector in total economy or 
what export shares they should achieve in order to 
be considered competitive enough. Nevertheless, 
privatization and attracting FDI were clearly 
promoted by the EU as these were by and large 
seen as the fastest ways to introduce market 
principles, ensure that the enterprises face hard-
budget constraints, as well as foster the transfer of 
technology and know-how to the East European 
economies.
As is widely acknowledged in the literature26, 
the initial privatization in most East European 
countries was not very open to foreign investors 
and with the exception of Hungary and Estonia, 
the predominant strategy was either the creation 
of national capitalisms with privatization to 
domestic owners, or delayed reforms and sluggish 
privatization to begin with. The coercive power 
of the EU through its economic conditionality 
and demand for liberalization reforms in order 
for countries to be considered as ‘functioning 
market economies’ played an important role 
in strengthening the political clout of liberal 
reformers and fostering reorientation towards 
FDI attraction27. The reports on the progress of 
candidate countries in complying with the EU 
economic conditionality regularly monitored the 
trends in privatization and the share of private 
sector in the economy as well as trends in the 
openness for foreign investment. The strategy of 
the EU however involved more than just coercion 
and conditionality and the influence of the EU 
26 See D. Bohle and B. Greskovits (2012), J. Drahokoupil 
(2009), G. Medve-Balint (2014)
27 G. Medve-Balint (2014)
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on building institutions and fostering foreign 
investment began much before the accession 
conditionality kicked in. In particular, the EU 
financial assistance programs served as an 
important complement facilitating reorientation 
towards FDI-based strategies. 
Already in the early 1990s, the EU provided 
financial and technical assistance to privatization 
agencies, programs for industrial restructuring, 
as well as investment promotion agencies, the 
key institutions in FDI-oriented strategies28. The 
financing of the latter was particularly important 
since at the time they faced rather unfriendly 
political environment and it was precisely EU 
assistance that enabled their existence and the 
accumulation of expertise. The EU thus helped 
maintain the institutional basis for an alternative, 
marginal development models which could then 
became predominant in the late 1990s when 
most national capitalisms failed and the broad 
consensus around the need to attract FDI emerged 
in the region. In the Czech Republic in particular 
the EU financing was pivotal for the survival of 
the CzechInvest during the 1990s, when the ODS 
government was openly hostile towards the Agency 
and its functioning entirely depended on PHARE 
program which provided 90% of its financing29. 
The agency was a key actor in negotiating with 
interested multinationals and even though its 
success in FDI attraction was minor at the time, 
it served an incubator for the training of officials 
in negotiations with MNCs as well as provided 
space for the development of alternative economic 
ideas about activist FDI attraction. Once the 
development model and the political climate 
shifted, CzechInvest experience and the activist 
approach towards FDI attraction it maintained 
throughout the decade became the cornerstone of 
the new transnationalized development strategy.
Besides financing investment promotion agencies, 
the EU pre-accession financial assistance provided 
substantive support for the processes of industrial 
28 See J. Drahokoupil, (2009) and European Commission, 
The PHARE Program: An Interim Evaluation. (Brussels: European 
Commission. DG External Relations, 1997)
29 See J. Drahokoupil (2009) and V. Vukov (2013) 
restructuring which was seen as a key aspect 
of economic conditionality of accession and 
was often granted in coordination with other 
international financial organizations such as the 
IMF and the World Bank. The EU in this respect 
again turned out to be much more politically and 
socially sensitive than the mere idea of coercion 
and conditionality would suggest. Particularly in 
South Eastern Europe where privatization was 
often stalled due to the inability of their weak state 
to resist the demands from domestic managers 
and trade unions30, not only conditionality, but 
also the financial assistance helped strengthen 
state capacity to engage in privatization, including 
making deals with foreign investors. Both Bulgaria 
and Romania in the late 1990s resorted to the 
World Bank and the IMF and the EU included the 
compliance with the arrangements with IFIs into 
their requirements for progress towards accession. 
Furthermore, in order to complement the IFI 
loans, the EU provided additional finance through 
its macro-financial assistance as well as through 
PHARE program for industrial restructuring. The 
Commission was however also aware of the high 
social costs of economic transformation and open 
to addressing social and political problems that 
might emerge in the processs. For instance, when 
Romanian liberal government argued that the 
restructuring required by the Commission might 
present serious political problems, the Commission 
accepted their arguments and assigned part 
of the PHARE funds also for cushioning the 
adverse social effects and financing trainings and 
redundancy compensation for workers31. The 
availability of such financing strengthened both 
administrative and political state capacity for 
engaging in industrial restructuring. In addition, 
it created resources that states could use to foster 
the creation of developmental alliances between 
multinationals and domestic actors for whom 
social costs of privatization contracts represented 
key obstacle for reaching a deal with multinationals 
interested in brownfield investment32.
30 D. Bohle and B. Greskovits (2012)
31 Interview with former EU officials, DG Enlargement, 
June 2015
32 V. Vukov, Towards a Transnational Developmental 
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Both conditionality and assistance thus helped in 
reorienting East European policies and institutions 
towards those conducive with the FDI-based 
growth models. However, besides helping the 
emergence of this transnationalized capitalism, 
the pre-accession institution building in the East 
also played a key role in strengthening the capacity 
for sustaining such model and supporting the 
activities of multinational corporations well after 
the accession. The ability to provide investment 
incentives in the form of various types of EU-
conform state aid represents a key element of such 
developmental capacity. The next section thus 
looks into the case of state aid compliance in more 
details. 
Conditionality and 
development – the case of 
state aid
The transformation of state aid policy represents 
one of the key aspects of the Europeanization 
of developmental state capacities, for two main 
reasons. First, after the abolition of tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers to trade and the harmonization 
of product and process regulation, state aid is one 
of the very few developmental instruments still 
left in the hands of the EU member states and 
one of the few means through which they can still 
actively foster certain types of economic activities, 
such as investment in R&D, technological 
upgrading, or training of the workforce. Secondly, 
the Europeanization of state aid is a process that 
simultaneously entails both the abolishment of 
old developmental strategies based on selective 
subsidies to domestic enterprises, as well as 
enables new development strategies based on FDI 
attraction and horizontal subsidies for investment 
that promises positive externalities. 
For the majority of the existing literature, state 
aid is perceived primarily as an instrument 
Alliance? EU Integration and Automotive Industry in Romania’ 
(paper presented at the workshop ‘Manufacturing development: 
How transnational market integration shapes developmental 
agency at Europe’s peripheries’. Freie Universitat Berlin, Berlin, 18-
20 October 2016).
of traditional independentist developmental 
strategies which the EU is trying to abolish. 
However, the argument here is that the state aid 
regulation in the EU should be understood in a 
more nuanced way as the EU is not merely trying 
to reduce the levels of state aid. Rather, the EU is 
actually engaged in the process of institutional 
conversion33, where the goals and the purpose of 
state aid shifts from the one of subsidizing specific 
sectors or enterprises to the one of supporting 
investment in higher-value added activities. 
While the levels of total state aid in the EU today 
is much lower than in the 1980s, amounting to 
around 0.6 % of the EU GDP, it is nevertheless 
6 times higher than a comparable figure in the 
USA34. Moreover, this is still twice higher than 
the Structural Funds resources, which amount to 
only around 0.3% of the EU’s GDP. Thus, state aid 
in the EU still represents an important element 
of activist state approach to industrial policy, but 
the key difference is that this activism is no longer 
discriminatory and serving the ‘independentist’ 
development model. Rather, the state aid has, at 
least in some countries, become an important part 
of the liberal developmental model.
Around 90% of the state aid in the EU today is 
given for the so called horizontal objectives, 
including regional development, research and 
development, employment, training aid etc. The 
horizontal objectives of the state aid as well as 
the ban on state aid that distorts trade among 
EU member states mean that state aid today 
increasingly serves not for promoting domestic 
firms and building national champions but rather 
as incentives for foreign investment. Indeed, 
the majority of investment incentives in the EU 
today come in the form of regional development 
aid, with locational competition for investments 
becoming fiercer in the EU over time35.
33 W. Streeck and K. Thelen, Beyond Continuity. 
Institutional change in Advance Political Economy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005)
34 R. Stöllinger, R. and M. Holzner ‘State Aid and Export 
Competitiveness in the EU’. WIIW Working Paper No 106. 
(Vienna: WIIW, 2013)
35 See K. Thomas, Competing for Capital. Europe and 
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By governing state aids at the supranational 
level and by regulating aid intensity, the EU 
certainly limited cut-throat 
competition in investment 
incentives as apparent 
among the USA states36 and 
provided a threshold above 
which the states cannot go. 
However, the EU cap on 
state aids has much less of 
an effect in the competition 
for investment among the 
EU member states as they 
are all exposed to the same 
rules. These limitations also 
frame the expectations of the 
firms as to what they actually 
can get within the EU. The 
game within the EU thus becomes the one of who 
is capable (and willing) to provide investment 
incentives that would fully use the space still left 
by the EU regulations of state aid and that would 
be compatible with the EU goals and policies.
East European member states in this game appear 
in a particularly favourable position and the data 
demonstrate that they indeed spend higher share 
of their GDP on state aid than the old member 
states. While this has been the case already before 
the accession, in the final years before the accession 
the candidate states were typically reducing their 
levels of state aid, cutting the aid incompatible with 
the EU regulations and reorienting it towards the 
EU conform goals.  Whilst there was thus a brief 
convergence in the levels of state aid in 2005-2006, 
and throughout the first crisis years, since 2010 
divergence appears again with the new member 
states recording much higher shares of state aid in 
GDP than the old ones. 
North America in the Global Era (Washington DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2000) and K. Thomas, Investment Incentives and 
the Global Competition for Capital. (Palgrave MacMillan, 2011)
36 K. Thomas (2000)
Figure 1. Total state aid as a % of GDP.
Source: Author’s calculation based on the European Union 
State Aid Scoreboard
At the same time, however, this was not simply the 
result of the crisis measures. Rather, divergence 
is particularly apparent with regards to the state 
aid given for the so called horizontal objectives, 
or block-exempted aid which the European 
Commission itself considers non-distorting 
and which is thus exempt from the notification 
requirement. Block-exempted state aid includes 
aid for SMEs, regional aid, aid for R&D, training 
aid, aid for disadvantaged workers, environmental 
protection and similar. It is precisely in this kind 
of aid that new member states by far outperform 
the old ones in the level of aid they provide. 
EUROPEANIZING DEVELOPMENT: EU INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL STATE CAPACITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE - 
Visnja Vukov
137
Figure 2. Block-exempted aid as a % of GDP
Source: Author’s calculation based on the European Union 
State Aid Scoreboard
Figure 3. State aid negative decisions January 
2005 – May 2017
Source: Author’s calculation based on the cases in the 
European Union State Aid Scoreboard
While the rise of ‘horizontal’ state aid is apparent 
across both old and new member states, it is 
much higher in the new ones, 
already from their first years 
of accession. 
Furthermore, despite rela-
tively higher levels of state 
aid (as a share of GDP) in the 
new member states, they typ-
ically score among the best 
performers when it comes 
to the negative decisions on 
state aid received by the Eu-
ropean Commission37. 
There are two main reasons 
as to why East European NMS appear in a 
particularly strong position to offer generous state 
aid to investors. First, the EU rules on state aid 
actually favour less developed states, where due 
to their lower levels of GDP more regions qualify 
for the derogations and higher aid intensity 
37 Member states can in principle avoid Commission’s 
negative decision by withdrawing state aid before such decision. 
The European Commission data however show that cases from 
new member states are a small minority among the withdrawn 
cases, accounting for 14 out of 112 total withdrawn cases. I am 
most grateful to Gergo Medve-Balint for pointing out the relevance 
of withdrawal cases.
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ceilings. Second, the East European member 
states internalized the EU rules about state aid 
much deeper in their national legislation than 
the old member states. The experience of early 
harmonization of state aid rules with the EU 
policies played an important role in increasing the 
capacity of the East European states to grant EU-
conform investment incentives. Before joining the 
EU, candidate states were subject to the provisions 
on state aid stemming from the Europe Agreement. 
This means that they harmonized their legal 
definition of state aid with the EU rules, stipulating 
that the criteria for evaluating the effects of state 
aid are those arising from the application of the EC 
Treaty - including the EU secondary legislation, 
Commission policy guidelines and decisions, and 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ. Furthermore, they 
were required to establish a national monitoring 
authority for state aid, which in the old member 
states did not need to exist. The EU regulation of 
state aid was thus deeply internalized into national 
legislation, creating a somewhat paradoxical 
situation in which national bodies were in charge 
of evaluating the compliance of their state aid with 
the ‘common interest’, the function which would 
normally fall upon the European Commission38. 
The enforcement of the state aid provisions 
contained in the Agreement relied on the 
cooperation between the state aid authorities of 
the associated parties – the European Commission 
from the side of the EU and the relevant body 
in the candidate state, usually an independent 
Competition Agency or a department within 
the Ministry of Economy or Finance. Europe 
Agreement thus obliged candidate countries 
to establish an institutional framework for the 
monitoring of state aid similar to the functions of 
the Commission within the EU39. Before granting 
the authorization of state aid, the national bodies 
always obtained the opinion from the European 
Commission and had long discussions with the 
Commission in order to be sure that the state 
aid was in line with the EU rules40. Such an 
38 M. Cremona, ‘State Aid Control: Substance and 
Procedures in the Europe Agreements and the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements’. European Law Journal, 9 (2003) 265–287.
39 M. Cremona (2003)
40 Interviews with competition authorities in Bucharest, 
approval was in the interest of the candidate states’ 
authorities since upon accession the competence 
for state aid was to be transferred to the European 
Commission and the state had to take the necessary 
steps to avoid the problems with specific state aid 
cases later on. The consultations with the EC were 
also crucial for the local bureaucrats to get used 
to thinking in the European terms and a number 
of East European experts were sent for training to 
the DG Competition41.  Similarly, Appel42 reports 
how this early harmonization played a key role in 
the capacity of the Czech Investment Promotion 
Agency to grant investment incentives, with local 
officials travelling to Brussels to check if every 
paragraph of their draft legislation on state aid was 
in line with the EU state aid regulation.  
During the accession negotiations the EU thus 
helped to strengthen the position of competition 
authorities which became the key institutions 
for the authorization of state aid schemes and 
individual grants before the accession43. The EU 
technical assistance granted to the competition 
authorities helped to transfer the knowledge of 
the EU legislation and policies so that after the 
accession new member states could continue to 
offer relatively generous packages that would still 
be compatible with the acquis communautaire. 
Furthermore, many of them incorporated the 
acquis on state aid into their own legal system by 
adopting State aid laws whose provisions mimicked 
the relevant articles of the EU Treaty. Even though 
the laws on state aid were subsequently changed 
due to the direct effect of the EU legislation 
which precludes parallel legislation at the national 
level, national offices for state aid maintained 
their position of controlling state aid prior to the 
notification to the Commission, as well as advising 
relevant government bodies about the state aid 
compatibility with the EU law44.
July 2015 and Zagreb, April 2014
41 Interviews with competition authorities in Bucharest, 
July 2015 and Zagreb, April 2014
42 H. Appel (2011)
43 Interviews with competition authorities in Bucharest, 
July 2015 and Zagreb, April 2014
44 See J. Bednar, D. Lagzina, S. Cemnolonskis, State Aid 
Control Procedures in the Czech Republic, Latvia and Lithuania 
before and after Accession. Vol 2 European State Aid Law Quarterly 
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The data on state aid demonstrate this deep 
Europeanization. While some existing studies asses 
Europeanization by looking at the convergence in 
the levels of state aid45, the argument here is that 
it is not levels but the compliance of state aid with 
EU regulation that we should focus on. A state 
that is capable of granting high amounts of state 
aid, while nevertheless receiving very few negative 
decisions from the European Commission should 
actually be considered more deeply Europeanized 
than the one that is simply not able to provide 
any aid that would be compatible with the acquis. 
Czech Republic is a good case in point: with its 
1.15 % of GDP spent on state aid it counts among 
the highest spenders in the EU. Yet, out of the 
140 total decisions the European Commission 
made about state aid granted in the country, 
there was no (zero) negative decision included. 
Similarly to Blauberger46 study for the early post-
accession years, this analysis shows that the good 
performance of NMS continues well after the 
accession. Furthermore, not only do East European 
countries display equally good or even better 
conformance with the EU norms when it comes 
to their decisions to grant aid – they actually do 
so, while giving much higher shares of their GDP 
to state aid than the EU-15. Europeanized state aid 
has indeed become one of the cornerstones of their 
developmental model and while it has initially 
contributed to the emergence of FDI-led export-
oriented growth, it is that same growth model with 
the continuous inflow of foreign investment that 
ensures the sustained reproduction of compliance. 
Blauberger47 attributes the continued compliance 
to the effective Commission’s mechanisms of 
surveillance – yet, the Commission’s oversight 
cannot account for the large variation within 
the EU when it comes to state aid compliance, 
and the exceptionally good performance of the 
East European countries in this respect. Rather, 
(2005) 265-273 an E. Hargita, Z. Remeti Filep, State Aid Control in 
Hungary, Vol. 4 European State Aid Law Quarterly 585-590 (2004)
45 M. Botta and G. Schwellnus, ‘Enforcing state aid rules in 
EU candidate countries: a qualitative comparative analysis of the 
direct and indirect effects of conditionality’, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 22:3 (2014) 335-352
46 M. Blauberger (2009) 
47 M. Blauberger (2009) 
it is the particular features of pre-accession 
harmonization and embeddedness of EU state 
aid rules in national institutions of East European 
countries that accounts for this ability to comply. 
While the role of pre-accession institutions has 
been highlighted as an important element of 
coercion, helping to reduce state aid in the pre-
accession period48, the argument here is that 
these institutions also served as the channel of 
transmission of information about EU regulations. 
Chart 1 depicting the levels of state aid can thus be 
read as the learning curve of the EU new member 
states, first decreasing the old-style discriminatory 
aid, and then increasing the new EU-conforming 
aid for horizontal objectives. Instead of merely 
cutting the state aid levels or bringing them to 
the EU average, deep Europeanization of state aid 
rules in the East actually increased the capacity 
of these states to grant relatively generous and 
credible incentives to investors, which would later 
on not be overruled by Bruxelles. The continued 
monitoring and advisory role of the national 
institutions established before the accession in the 
New Member States (but not in the old ones) thus 
ensured the continued compliance 
Path dependency: Is 
the transnationalized 
development model seriously 
challenged?
The transnationalized development capacities 
of East European states contributed to the 
emergence of transnationalized, FDI-based 
economies, which in a path-dependent way 
locked-in state transformation. The liberalisation 
of capital markets, coupled with the failure of 
domestic attempts at building national capitalism, 
prompted strong regional competition for foreign 
direct investment49. The simultaneous imposition 
of the EU rules that prevented the discriminatory 
treatment of non-domestic firms dramatically 
altered the composition of players in the domestic 
economies. In the most developed new member 
48 M. Botta and G. Schwellnus (2014)
49 J. Drahokoupil (2009)
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states 60% to 80% of productive assets are in the 
hands of non-domestic actors, mainly MNCs. The 
share of FDI stock in all non-financial sectors in 
these countries is above the EU-15 average50. 
The rapid transnationalisation of the new member 
states’ economies changed the domestic demand 
side for state developmental capacities. While 
FDI is very high in different sectors, including 
manufacturing as well as services, the distinct 
strength and the most important source of growth 
in Central and Eastern Europe has certainly 
been the export-oriented manufacturing sector, 
predominantly foreign-owned and tightly 
integrated into the European transnational 
production chains. The concept of Dependent 
Market Economies51 captures this growth model 
rather well, although it represents an overly static 
image since many of these economies experienced 
substantive upgrading, rather than being stuck 
in the production of low-skill, low-value-
added goods. Furthermore, while for Nolke and 
Vliegenthart only the Visegrad countries would 
quality as DMEs, more recently other EU-10 states 
such as Romania have also displayed some of the 
key features of that model52. 
State aid represents a key aspect of state capacities 
for the creation and maintenance of such a model. 
In particular, automotive industry has been 
notable for its exceptional levels of investment 
in EU-10, and an important role it played both 
in terms of investment and the reproduction of 
‘dependence’, as well as upgrading in the local 
industry53. Automotive industry however is 
a sector in which firms do not even consider 
investing if a government is not willing and capable 
50 G. Medve-Balint (2014)
51 A. Nölke. and A.Vliegenthart (2009)
52 See C. Ban, ‘From Cocktail to Dependence: Revisiting 
the Foundations of Dependent Market Economies’ available at 
SSRN 2233056 (2013) on Romania as well as on the criticism of 
DME
53 V. Scepanovic, FDI as a solution to the challenges of late 
development: catch-up without convergence? (PhD Dissertation, 
Budapest, CEU, 2013) and L. Bruszt et. al. The developmental 
impact of the EU integration: Insights from the automotive industry 
in Europe’s peripheries. WP 16, (MAXCAP Working Papers Series, 
Berlin, 2015)
to provide substantive investment incentives54 and 
not surprisingly automotive industry turned out 
to be one of the biggest beneficiaries of various 
state aid schemes. In Romania, for instance the 
share of automotive industry in total state aid 
between 2008 and 2014 rose to impressive 60%55, 
while in Hungary automotive sector accounts for 
one-third of the total jobs created in the projects 
managed by the Hungarian Investment Promotion 
Agency56.  Yet, since accession, Romania witnessed 
only one negative decision with regards to its aid 
to automotive industry (privatization of Craiova 
factory for below-the-market price) and even 
in that case, despite the ordered recovery of 57 
million EUR, the same plant in the same year 
managed to benefit from another 137 million EUR 
of regional aid57.
Interestingly enough, investment incentives 
(i.e. state aid) for foreign investment in the 
manufacturing sector continue to remain the 
linchpin of development strategies of these 
countries, political changes and the rise of populism 
and economic nationalism notwithstanding. 
In Slovakia, populist left government of SMER 
retained the same development model as its 
predecessors, somewhat increasing corporate 
tax rate, but maintaining investment incentives. 
In its more recent big investment deal, Slovakia 
bid against Poland for the investment of Jaguar 
Land Rover, with Prime Minister Fico personally 
appearing in the negotiations and convincing the 
car maker to choose Slovakia, offering 125 million 
EUR in subsidies58. 
Hungary is probably the best case in point, with 
its substantive democratic backsliding and the 
open economic nationalism proclaimed by its 
controversial Prime Minister Viktor Orban. 
In response to the economic crisis, Orban’s 
54 K. Thomas (2011)
55 V. Vukov (2016)
56 Financial Times ‘Hungary seeks rapprochement with 
bruised foreign investors’ 12 May 2016, Accessed on 15 June 2017
57 V. Vukov (2016).
58 Financial Times, ‘How Slovakia Overtook Poland in 
Jaguar Land Rover Factory Race’, 17 November 2015
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government engaged in a series of measures 
that could be qualified as instances of economic 
nationalism, from asking for the closure of the 
IMF office in Budapest to the specially designed 
crisis tax which targeted predominantly foreign-
owned multinationals. Yet, the multinationals 
targeted by the tax were in particular those in 
the service sector: banking, telecommunications 
and retail sector, while the investment incentives 
and favourable treatment foreign manufacturing 
firms enjoy have so far not be challenged. And 
while it is true that more recently the number 
of state aid cases with EC negative decisions in 
Hungary rose, these again refer primarily to the 
attempts at discriminatory taxation of foreign 
owned firms in retail and telecommunication, not 
in manufacturing. The government declared as its 
official goal to rise the share of manufacturing in 
the economy from 26 to 30 % of GDP, and with 30 
% of manufacturing in Hungary constituted by a 
highly transnationalized automotive sector59, even 
a self-proclaimed enemy of foreign multinationals 
such as Orban, is left with no other choice but 
to continue rolling out generous investment 
incentives.
Similarly, Polish conservative right government 
also announced increased taxation on banks, but 
it nevertheless retained generous state aid schemes 
for investments, in particular in automotive sector, 
aviation, biotechnology, electronic and household 
appliances, food processing, and research and 
development60. 
Rather than changing economic model, what 
might present a bigger challenge for compliance 
with the EU regulation of state aid are the attempts 
of the Hungarian government to curb the freedom 
of speech and encroach upon political liberties. 
In 2016 the European Commission made a 
negative decision with regards to the Hungarian 
progressive advertisement tax, which it deemed 
59 HIPA, ‘General overview for investors in Hungary’s 
manufacturing sector’ Online resources, accessed 15 June 2017
60 Polish Investment and Trade Agency, online resource 
http://www.paih.gov.pl/index/?id=3f4bd1f117b18afa131c48
de15486652. Accessed on 15 June 2017.
incompatible with the EU state aid rules as it 
gave unfair advantage to some media companies 
while disadvantaging the others, in particular 
big international media like the RTL. Hungarian 
government thus had to adjust the law, lowering 
the tax so that the total amount of state aid would 
fall within the boundaries of the de minimis state 
aid, which the European Commission permits. 
This case demonstrates two things: first, East 
European states have got fairly skilful when it 
comes to using state aid by the EU rules in order 
to advance their own objectives, as the adjustment 
afterwards suggests, and second, departure 
from the rules and ‘disobedience’ reflects more 
the governments’ reversals with regards to 
political Europeanization than with regards to 
the economic one. The Europeanization of East 
European development models, which relies on 
participation in European production chains and 
efforts at upgrading in those chains in line with 
the EU industrial policy goals and state aid rules, 
remains largely intact and none of the populist 
leaders appears willing to challenge it. While the 
continued compliance with the EU state aid rules 
stems from the institutional legacy of pre-accession 
harmonization and the concomitant monitoring 
exercised by national state aid institutions, the 
continued reliance on generous state aid schemes 
as the key economic policy is rather the result 
of the governments’ reluctance to change the 
development model that has produced growth 
and increased competitiveness of these countries.




The analysis above suggests that Europeanization 
of developmental capacities - understood as 
approximation to the EU policy goals and 
instruments - goes further in the East European 
new member states than in the old ones. New 
member states are both more deeply integrated 
in the common European market than the old 
ones and rely more strongly on the usage of 
EU-conforming horizontal and non-
discriminatory industrial policies. Such deep 
Europeanization can in turn be attributed to the 
direct actions of the European Union itself, as 
well as to the specific institutional and economic 
legacies that in a path-dependent way locked-in 
Europeanization beyond accession.
With respect to the EU actions, both general 
economic conditionality and financial assistance 
before accession played a key role in shifting 
domestic developmental strategies from internally 
to externally oriented ones. At the same time, as 
part of pre-accession regulatory harmonization, 
the EU required the building of national 
institutions that mimicked the monitoring and 
sanctioning capacities of European Commission 
but at the domestic level. Even if the scope of work 
of these national institutions somewhat changed 
upon accession, their continuous monitoring role 
and pre-accession administrative capacities still 
represent institutional legacy which locked-in 
continued good compliance of the new member 
states61.
Yet, while pre-accession institutional legacy helps 
account for the compliance with EU rules, it does 
not on its own guarantee continued generosity 
of horizontal state aid schemes as the means 
to lure multinational corporations in the new 
member states and continue their economic 
transnationalization. Particularly in the context 
of the rise of populism and elements of economic 
nationalism in some of the East European 
countries, one might expect the reversal of such 
61 See also Sedelmeier (2016) on the role of administrative 
capacities as the mechanism for continued compliance
development strategies. Yet, preliminary evidence 
suggests that this has not been the case, as even 
self-proclaimed enemies of foreign investors retain 
generous investment incentives and still strive to 
attract manufacturing FDI. Once East European 
countries embarked on the Dependent Market 
Economy model62, with more and more production 
and employment coming from the activities of 
manufacturing multinational corporations in the 
region, the domestic demand side also changed 
in favour of Europeanized industrial policy. Deep 
economic transnationalization thus provides 
another path-dependent mechanism that locked 
in new member states’ reliance on Europeanized 
development policies. While the effects of 
political Europeanization seem to be waning63, 
the Europeanization of economic state capacities 
appears to have a long-lasting effect even after the 
EU accession. 
62 A. Nolke and A. Vliegenthart (2009)
63 T. Wozniakowski, F. Schimmelfennig and M. Matlak, this 
issue, this issue
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Abstract
To what extent has Europeanization occurred 
in Euro Adoption policies in the ten member 
states that joined the EU in May 2004? This 
paper examines how to explain the cross-country 
differences in the degrees of Europeanization 
in this policy area. The findings are mixed: a 
majority of the member states have experienced 
Europeanization, defined as a process whereby 
EU norms and policies as well as EU institutions 
and patterns have influenced the domestic setting. 
Three member states have not yet to join the euro 
area. Europeanization occurred in all of the ten 
NMS that joined in 2004, but not to the same 
degree or the same outcome. In the early-ins there 
was an early choice to adopt the euro, which was 
predominantly decided domestically by political 
elites. Subsequently they were affected by extreme 
Europeanization and they were able to adopt the 
euro within a few years. The late-comers were 
keen to join but due to a variety of domestic and 
structural factors were unable to meet the criteria 
at an earlier stage. Europeanization affected them 
as well and eventually led to euro adoption. The 
remaining three outs, did not get exposed to as 
much Europeanization, but in part it was due to not 
having made a firm domestic commitment to euro 
adoption. Yet some Europeanization occurred in 
recent years as these member states, despite not 
having set a euro adoption date, have managed to 
meet a number of the convergence criteria.
1. Introduction
Today the euro area (EA) counts nineteen member 
states. Twelve of the then European Union (EU) 
fifteen member states were part of the EA when 
banknotes and coins started circulating in 2002. 
When the EU expanded in 2004 the Accession 
Agreements included provisions that stipulated 
that each of the ten acceding member states 
would join the EA eventually. Because there were 
no deadlines, the time-table of euro adoption 
was unclear. Yet there was a sense, early on, that 
new member states would likely try to join as 
soon as possible.1 Indeed, by 2009 four countries 
had already adopted the euro (Slovenia, Cyprus, 
Malta and Slovakia) and the three Baltic States 
had joined by 2015.2 Three member states – the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – however, 
still remain outside the EA. This paper does not 
consider member states that have joined the EU 
after 2014.
1 Gallup Europe “Heading to the euro-zone, hopes and 
fears about the euro in the new member states” (2007).
2 Slovenia joined the euro area in 2007, Cyprus and 
Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 
2014 and Lithuania in 2015.
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In keeping with the overall theme of this Special 
Issue ‘Europeanization revisited’, and based on 
about one hundred interviews with participant 
observers, this paper examines to what extent 
Europeanization has occurred in this policy area, 
in these ten member states that joined in 2004.3 
Europeanization is defined here as a process of a 
change of the political and economic systems of 
European states, which is brought about through 
EU membership, or a credible prospect of joining.4 
It asks two further sub questions (a): Has there 
been convergence towards policy outcomes that 
can be described as “European”, either in terms 
of EU norms and policies or in terms of policies, 
institutions, and patterns we find in the member 
states that have already joined the euro area (or do 
we see divergence from the rest of the EU)? (b) To 
what extent can these findings be attributed to a 
Europeanization process, (i.e. a process of direct, 
pro-active policy of the EU or its member states or 
a process of indirect, unintended diffusion from 
the rest of Europe to the new member states), or 
is it due to an independent domestic development 
or a development influenced from outside the EU?
The second large set of questions that is asked 
here is what the relevant mechanisms are that 
have led to this Europeanization process. That is, 
to what extent do these mechanisms include a) 
coercion or legal enforcement; b) conditionality 
or incentives-based effects; c) external assistance/
support; d) socialization, i.e. “teaching” and 
persuasion processes designed to change beliefs 
and preferences. Among the indirect mechanisms, 
we distinguish mechanisms of e) competition, f) 
learning or adaptation based on “lesson-drawing” 
3 Kenneth Dyson has in an earlier article considered the 
Europeanization framework to explore euro adoption in member 
states. See K. Dyson (ed.), Enlarging the Euro Area: External 
Empowerment and Domestic Transformation in East Central Europe 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). K. Dyson, (ed.) The Euro 
at 10: Europeanization, Power and Convergence. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008).
4 For a discussion of the many definitions of 
Europeanization see J.P. Olsen “The many faces of Europeanization”, 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2002): 921-52. 
See also K. Featherstone, and D. Papadimitriou, The Limits of 
Europeanization: Reform Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece, 
(Houndmills: Palgrave 2008).
or search for efficient/effective institutional 
or policy solution; g) emulation based on the 
adoption of appropriate or legitimate ideas, 
institutions, and policies. Here special attention is 
given on domestic mechanisms (that is, cultural, 
institutional, political, economic, mechanisms) 
that give rise to resistance. In other words, what 
are the relevant factors or conditions of (non-) 
Europeanization in the process of euro adoption 
in the ten member states that joined in 2004?
In addressing these questions this paper seeks to 
contribute to the literature that compares economic 
and political aspects of Europeanization.5 Based 
on the preceding analysis this paper seeks to draw 
some tentative conclusions about how to explain 
the cross-country differences in the degrees of 
Europeanization in this policy area.
The structure of the paper is as follows: the next 
section provides an overview of euro adoption 
in the ten member states broken up into three 
groups of countries. Section three examines 
whether from a theoretical point of view we can 
attribute the developments in euro adoption 
policies to the process of Europeanization. The 
next section examines what mechanisms are at 
work, highlighting also some specific domestic 
mechanisms. The final section concludes.
2. An overview of euro 
adoption policies in the new 
member states
The ten member states that joined in 2004 can be 
categorised in three groups, based on their euro 
adoption policies: fast movers (or ‘early ins’); 
adopters after setback (‘late-comers’); and the outs 
(some call them ‘laggards’). The section below 
discusses each of the three groups of countries in 
turn.
5   R.A. Epstein, and W. Jacoby, “Eastern Enlargement 
Ten Years On: Transcending the East–West Divide?” JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 52 (2014): 1–16.
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2.1. The First Four Fast Movers: 
Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta and 
Slovakia
As was mentioned above, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, 
and Slovakia were the first to adopt the euro. 
The process of euro adoption in those ‘early ins’ 
suggests that a few factors have been crucial in euro 
adoption. First, they had joined the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism-2 (ERM-2) early on and in most cases 
they had been keen to maintain stable exchange 
rates. Second, the government of the day in these 
countries considered it an important symbol to 
adopt the euro, so as to have their nation-state 
be seen as closer to the ‘core’ of the EU. In some 
cases there was a change in the government that 
briefly contemplated a modification in euro 
adoption policy. Yet those governments realized 
quickly that financial markets would ‘punish’ 
them for u-turning on the matter.6 In some cases, 
the national government consisted of a number of 
policy entrepreneurs who were keen to adopt the 
euro. In some of them, such as Slovenia, they put 
democratic processes to the side in order to push 
through the legislation needed to facilitate euro 
adoption.7 In that particular case, the Slovenian 
currency was also subject to a lot of volatility 
before joining the EU. The advantage of adopting 
the euro was more clearly made in this particular 
case. In the cases of Cyprus and Malta, there had 
been a long period of stable exchange rates, pegged 
first to the European Currency Unit (ECU) later 
6 (e.g. Slovakia in June/July 2006, interviews with 
Slovakian policy makers, November 2009).
7 Interviews with Slovenian policy makers, July 2009; 
.M. Mrak, M. Rojec and C. Silva-Jáuregui (eds) Slovenia: From 
Yugoslavia to the European Union, (Washington: The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The World Bank, 
2004). Bank of Slovenia, Annual Report, (Ljubljana 2003). Bank 
of Slovenia and the Republic of Slovenia (2003), ‘Programme for 
ERM II Entry and Adoption of the Euro. Joint Programme of the 
Slovenian Government and the Bank of Slovenia.’, November. Bank 
of Slovenia (2003) Annual Report, Ljubljana; Bank of Slovenia 
(2005) ‘Basic Plan’, January. For a similar account of the disciplinary 
working of having joined the ERM before the elections and the 
restrictive effect it had on the incoming government, see also Juliet 
Johnson, Priests of Prosperity: The Transnational Central Banking 
Community and Post-Communist Transformation”. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2017).
the euro. In all four cases, there were no major 
domestic veto points blocking euro adoption and 
both the central banks and the governments agreed 
on the main policies regarding euro adoption and 
did not have major disagreements. Moreover, the 
majority of the ruling elites were in favour of euro 
adoption and which is why the changes in the 
ruling coalitions (after elections) did not change 
the policies in regards of that – which might have 
caused delays in euro adoption. 
2.2. The Baltic States: Adoption 
after Set-back 
Despite its commitment to join the euro in 2006, 
Lithuania was rejected for euro membership 
because the European Commission judged that it 
had missed the inflation criterion by 0.1 per cent.8 
As mentioned above, it nevertheless managed to 
meet the criteria in 2014 and joined the euro on 1 
January 2015. The Estonian government was also 
aiming to join the euro sooner rather than later 
but in the 2006 period was still having difficulties 
meeting the inflation criterion. When it became 
clear that Lithuania did not qualify for euro 
adoption with its inflation performance, Estonia 
also quickly decided to delay. Yet this country 
remained committed to the ultimate goal of euro 
adoption and by 2008-2009, during the financial 
crisis realised that inflation would come down and 
it then targeted euro adoption as a policy objective. 
It eventually was approved in the midst of the 
financial crisis and joined on 1 January 2011. 
The case of Latvia diverges from the first two in 
that this country did not make the same serious 
attempt to meet the criteria as Lithuania did in the 
middle of the first decade of the 2000s. However, 
in 2009, the aftermath of the onset of the financial 
8 European Commission “2006 Convergence Report 
on Lithuania” European Economy, Special Report No 2: 9. This 
judgement came across as rather harsh as the three member 
states with the best performance in terms of price stability were 
Sweden, Finland and Poland (two of which are not even a member 
of the euro area). Although the Commission spelled out that the 
long-term concerns played a role as well: “The 12-month average 
inflation in Lithuania has been above the reference value since April 
2005 and is likely to stay above it in the months ahead. Lithuania 
does not fulfil the criterion on price stability.”
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crisis, and at the start of what would become a very 
turbulent period in the history of the euro, Latvia 
was hard hit by the effects of the global financial 
crisis – harder than any other EU member state 
in 2009. Thus it was initially unwilling and unable 
to concentrate on euro adoption. Remarkably, 
however, and against the recommendation of 
the European Commission and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), it chose not to abandon 
its exchange rate regime but instead maintain its 
commitment to euro adoption (interviews with 
Latvian officials, October 2009). It subsequently 
made steady progress to meet the convergence 
criteria and ultimately joined the euro in 2014. 
In the three cases, while the domestic political 
commitment to adopt the euro was present in the 
three cases, only Estonia managed to join early 
(1 January 2011) followed by the other two (2014 
and 2015). The main reason for the delayed euro 
adoption in the other two cases was missing the 
convergence criteria, in particular in regarding the 
inflation rate criterion. Meeting this criterion in 
these three countries was difficult mostly due to the 
nature of real convergence catch-up even though 
there were some contributing factors related to 
domestic policy choice by the government (for 
instance regulated prices of transportation or 
energy). Later on, the low inflation was a result 
of the financial crisis which dampened growth 
and hence inflation. The ‘late-comers’ would have 
been happy to be among the ‘early-ins’ but a mix of 
seeking to catch up and not being given leeway by 
the EU-institutions, made them take a little longer 
to join.
2.3 The Euro Outs – Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland 
There is no clear political consensus within the 
Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland on euro 
adoption.9 All three countries have had domestic 
9 R.A. Epstein, and J. Johnson “Uneven integration: 
economic and monetary union in Central and Eastern Europe”. 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 48(2010): 1237–1260; 
J. Johnson, “Two-track diffusion and central bank embeddedness: 
the politics of euro adoption in Hungary and the Czech Republic” 
Review of International Political Economy 13(2006): 361–386.
problems and internal struggles that have made 
euro adoption difficult. The Czech Republic has 
been close to meeting the convergence criteria 
but has waivered; initially being more positive, 
but then for clearly domestic political reasons 
becoming more opposed to euro adoption, without 
any change attributable to macroeconomic 
conditions.10 The Czech Republic experienced a 
long-time conflict between the Czech National 
Bank (CNB) on one hand11 and the government 
and the former president on the other – before 
the monetary board was changed during the 
two presidential terms of Václav Klaus (2003-
2013).12 In the period since Klaus resigned, the 
sitting Czech government did not take action to 
take further steps to join the euro even though 
many of the criteria were met.13 With the end 
10  Czech National Bank. “The Czech Republic’s updated 
euro-area accession strategy: a (joint document of the Czech 
Government and the Czech National Bank, 29 Aug 2007”). Czech 
National Bank “Assessment of the fulfilment of the Maastricht 
convergence criteria and the degree of economic alignment of 
the Czech Republic with the euro area: a joint document of the 
Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic and the Czech National 
Bank approved by the Government of the Czech Republic on 16 
December 2008”; Czech Ministry of Finance “Assessment of the 
fulfilment of the Maastricht convergence criteria and the degree 
of economic alignment of the Czech Republic with the euro area: 
a joint document of the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic 
and the Czech National Bank” approved by the Government of 
the Czech Republic on 21 December 2009. See also T. Haughton, 
For business, for pleasure or for necessity? The Czech Republic’s 
choices for Europe. Europe-Asia Studies 61 (2009): 1371–1392 
and A. Pechova, “Legitimising discourses in the framework of 
European integration: The politics of Euro adoption in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia” Review of International Political Economy 
19 (2012): 779-807.
11 A. Geršl, A. Political pressure on central banks: the 
case of the Czech National Bank. Czech Journal of Economics and 
Finance 56 (2006): 18–39.
12 V. Klaus, The Future of Euro: A View of A Concerned 
Outsider, Prague 20 November 2003 http://www.klaus.cz/
clanky/439, last accessed 22 June 2017. S. Hanley, The New Right 
in the New Europe: Czech Transformation and Right-wing politics, 
1998-2006. (London and New York; Routledge 2007). Prague Daily 
Monitor Czech euro adoption date to be set in Nov. (2 January 
2009). M. Feldstein, “Vaclav Klaus and the Euro”. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, March 2011) http://www.nber.org/feldstein/
essaysinhonorofVaclavKlaus.pdf  accessed 6 December 2011. 
13  A. Dandashly and A. Verdun. “Boarding the euro 
plane: euro adoption in the Czech Republic and Slovakia” Review 
of European and Russian Affairs 9 (2015): 1-25. Dandashly et al. 
“Euro Adoption in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland”. D. 
Král, The Czech 2010 elections: beginning of a new political era? 
EUROPEANIZATION AND EURO ADOPTION - Amy Verdun
147
of Klaus’ term, the new president Milos Zeman 
(who is more pro-euro), and with the arrival of 
a centre-left government of Bohuslav Sobotka in 
2014, some elites became a little more favourable 
to euro adoption, but the public and others in the 
government remained sceptical.14 PM Bohuslav 
Sobotka went on record saying that euro adoption 
should be decided upon by the next government.15 
With elections on 20-21 October 2017, and some 
parties against euro adoption, the timetable for the 
Czech Republic will depend much on the stance 
towards the euro of the winning political party 
(coalition government).
Hungary had a macroeconomic situation that could 
have made it easy to adopt the euro sooner rather 
than later but the government did not pursue the 
policies needed to enable early euro adoption.16 In 
the Hungarian case, the political battles among the 
main political parties to try to win over the voters 
during election years in the run up to the financial 
crisis resulted in major electoral commitments at 
considerable cost to public coffers – a mounting 
budgetary deficit and public debt, which pushed 
European Policies Initiative Policy Brief 22, June 2010. See also J. 
Horvath, “Global financial crisis: implications for the Hungarian 
and the Slovak economy”. 
14 J. Harper “Czech Republic is not preparing to join 
Eurozone” Financial Observer.eu, 28 January 2017, accessed 22 June 
2017. Prague Post “A decade after EU entry, the Czech Republic 
has yet to take steps toward the single currency”. 16 August 2014. 
See also the latest “Assessment of the Fulfillment of the Maastricht 
Convergence Criteria and the Degree of Economic Alignment of 
the Czech Republic with the Euro Area (December 2016) which 
concluded: “In view of the above facts, the Ministry of Finance 
and the Czech National Bank, in line with the Czech Republic’s 
Updated Euro-area Accession Strategy, recommend that the Czech 
government should not set a target date for euro area entry for the 
time being. This recommendation implies the conclusion that the 
Czech Republic should not attempt to enter ERM II during 2017.” 
On Zeman: “Zeeman says Czechs are irrationally afraid of euro 
adoption” Prague Daily Monitor, 23 June 2017.
15 “PM: Next government to decide on euro adoption” 
Prague Daily Monitor, 19 May 2017.
16 B. Greskovits, “The first shall be the last? Hungary’s road 
to EMU”. In: K. Dyson (ed.) Enlarging the Euro Area: External 
Empowerment and Domestic Transformation in East Central 
Europe. pp. 178–196. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006); B. 
Greskovits, “Hungary and Slovakia: compliance and its discontent”. 
In: K. Dyson (ed.) The Euro at 10: Europeanization, Power and 
Convergence. pp. 274–291. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2008).
Hungary further away from the prospect of 
joining. Furthermore, with the right wing party 
in government (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége 
(Fidesz)), euro adoption seems to be further 
delayed. Remarkably, however, in recent years, the 
government has been pursuing policies so as to 
meet the convergence criteria, on all criteria but 
joining the exchange rate mechanism or central 
bank legislation. The government of Viktor Orbán 
is positioning his country as needing to ‘catch up’ 
before it can join the euro. The issue of the euro is 
a relatively small one compared to the many issues 
that the Orbán government has with the EU as a 
whole. Orbán’s stance to European integration has 
been one of defying the EU and concentrating on 
new nationalism. The issue of euro adoption is very 
low on the radar of the Hungarian government. 
Some prominent Hungarians have recently started 
to lobby for a referendum to join the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism.17
In Poland, several domestic challenges led to euro 
accession delays, even though its government 
was initially quite keen to join the euro sooner 
rather than later.18 It experienced a struggle 
between the National Bank of Poland (NBP) 
and the government during various periods; 
clashes between the consecutive Civic Platform 
(Platforma Obywatelska, PO) governments and 
the opposition; and some constitutional issues 
that need resolving before joining the euro.19 In 
17 “Should Hungary adopt the euro?” Hungarian Free Press 
5 September 2017. Those advocating for joining the ERM include 
Péter Balázs, (former minister of foreign affairs 2009-2010), Péter 
Ákos Bod (former Governor of the Hungarian National Bank) and 
György Surányi (former Governor of the Hungarian National Bank 
1990-1991 and 1995-2001). This referendum is also supported by a 
small political party called Polgári Világ (Civic World) and hopes to 
gain some support in the April 2018 national elections. J. Horvath, 
Global financial crisis: implications for the Hungarian and the 
Slovak economy. In: A. Dandashly, A. Surdej and H. T. Właszczuk 
(eds.) Global Financial Crisis and Euro Zone Enlargement. 
(Krakow, Poland: Adam Marszalek Publishing House 2009), pp. 
47–59.
18 Polish Ministry of Finance “The roadmap for Poland’s 
euro adoption: policy outline”. Warsaw, October (2008).
19 R. Zubek, R. “Poland: from pacesetter to semi-
permanent outsider”. In: The Euro at 10: Europeanization, Power 
and Convergence. K. Dyson (ed.) pp. 292–306 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2008).
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order to join the ERM-2 a two-thirds majority in 
parliament is required to amend the constitution. 
Furthermore, observers were concerned to 
remain ‘stuck’ in ERM-2 as a two-thirds majority 
is also needed to move from the ERM to the euro 
area and fear the that Poland might not meet 
the criteria at that point or then would lack the 
willingness to adopt the euro.20 They only would 
like to join the ERM-2 the shortest time; in other 
words when there is a good chance they could 
join the euro two years after being in the ERM-
2.21 With the euroskeptic party Law and Justice 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) in government, 
euro adoption has been delayed further in 
Poland.22 Yet more recently the business sector 
and its population is showing increased support 
for euro adoption23 although the general public 
in this country has been more negative in recent 
years.24
It is difficult to gauge when the three ‘outs’ may 
be seeking to adopt the euro. What has been 
remarkable in recent years has been the policies 
towards securing convergence criteria. Although 
the rhetoric has been profoundly euro sceptic 
the behaviour by these governments has been to 
ensure that their national economy complies with 
many of the convergence criteria. It seems that 
20 Dandashly and Verdun “Boarding the euro plane”: 
Dandashly and Verdun et al. “Euro Adoption in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland”; Zubek, R. (2006) “Poland: 
unbalanced domestic leadership in negotiating fit”. In: K. Dyson 
(ed.) Enlarging the Euro Area: External Empowerment and 
Domestic Transformation in East Central Europe. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 197–214. Z. Polański, “Poland and the euro 
zone enlargement: monetary policy, ERM II, and other issues”. 
Atlantic Economic Journal 32(2004): 280–292.
21 Interview by the author with former Polish central bank 
official, 7 June 2016.
22 Financial Times “Euro Entry Looms large in Polish 
election campaign”, (20 July 2015). Also, interview with Polish 
former national central bank official with the author 20 June 2016.
23 P. Polaczek “Poland: Is it ready, and is it time to adopt 
the euro?” Emerging Europe, 30 January (accessed 22 June 2017)
24 European Commission “Introduction of the euro in the 
Member States that have not yet adopted the common currency”. 
Flash Eurobarometer 418, Brussels (2015). “Eurobarometer: 
Support for the euro varies greatly among the seven newer EU 
Member States” http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/
euro/2016-05-20-eurobarometer_en.htm.
the decision to join the ERM has been reserved to 
when there might be the political will to join the 
euro soon. There has not been a plan to join the 
ERM much in advance of the plan of joining the 
euro.
3.  Is Euro Adoption 
Europeanization?
This section examines to what extent 
Europeanization has occurred in this policy area, 
in these ten member states. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Europeanization is defined here as 
‘a process of a change of the political and economic 
systems of European states, which is brought about 
through membership, or its credible prospective, in 
the European Union. Let us turn to examine what 
that means in this particular case. 
The concept Europeanization is used in various 
contexts, but in particular in those cases when 
one cannot use the term European integration 
whilst still observing a process whereby the EU 
or membership in the EU affects the member 
states. Drawing on Ladrech, Kevin Featherstone 
and Claudio Radaelli define it as “Processes 
of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles ‘ways of doing 
things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are 
first defined and consolidated in the making of EU 
public policy and politics and then incorporated in 
the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political 
structures, and public policies.”25 The first question 
thus should be, should a development this policy 
area perhaps simply be referred to as European 
integration. An argument could be made for it. 
After all, the process of euro adoption (the three-
staged process towards Economic and Monetary 
Union or EMU) has been set out very clearly in 
the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent treaties and 
there is no ambiguity about the expectation that 
member states should prepare to join. From earlier 
25 C.M. Radaelli “The Europeanization of Public Policy” 
in K. Featherstone and C.M. Radaelli (Ed.) The Politics of 
Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 30.
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research on when “Europeanization” is used rather 
than “European Integration”, one finds that when 
there is top-down (hierarchical steering) with 
either the EU supranational institutions giving 
clear instructions to member states or when 
policy-making or competence is transferred to the 
supranational level that can be labelled “European 
integration”.
The reason that in this case one can still talk about 
Europeanization, however, is that this policy area 
is characterised by differentiation, in that not all 
member states are participating in EMU.26 As is well 
documented, Denmark and the United Kingdom 
(UK) have a formal opt-out whereas Sweden has 
not. Yet the latter has been behaving as if it has 
an opt-out. By not joining the ERM, for instance, 
and not adjusting its central banking laws in line 
with the Treaty requirements it does not meet 
the convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht 
Treaty.27 Indeed, to be considered eligible to join 
euro area a member state must meet the so-called 
Maastricht convergence criteria. Besides the 
criterion of remaining two years in the normal 
bandwidth of the ERM, the other criteria refer to 
budgetary deficit, public debt, low inflation and 
some compatibility with legal provisions such as 
central bank independence. Once every two years, 
or at the request of the member state in question, 
the Council will assess based on a report by the 
Commission (after consulting and discussing 
with the European Central Bank, the European 
Parliament and the European Council) to what 
extent a member state is ready to join the euro. 
Over the past years it has become clear that the 
divergence in experiences of euro adoption is such 
that one can use the Europeanization framework 
as a useful analytical tool to assess euro adoption 
policies.
In terms of the questions raised in the introduction, 
(a): Has there been convergence towards policy 
26 J.-V. Louis “Differentiation and the EMU” in The Many 
Faces of Differentiation in EU Law (43-64) B. De Witte, D. Hanf and 
E. Vos (ed.) (Antwerpen/Oxford/New York: Intersentia, 2001).
27 European Commission “Convergence Report” European 
Economy, Institutional Paper, 026, June, 2016.
outcomes that can be described as “European”, 
either in terms of EU norms and policies or in 
terms of policies, institutions, and patterns we 
find in the member states that have already joined 
the euro area (or do we see divergence from the 
rest of the EU)? One can answer this question in 
the following way. We have identified three groups 
of euro adoption policies. The first group, which 
Dyson and Johnson each separately have called 
“pace-setters”28 we call “the early ins” worked hard 
to meet all the criteria and join as soon as possible. 
The second group, we call the “late-comers”, have 
done exceptional work to adjust to the convergence 
criteria, despite extraordinary challenges induced 
by the financial crisis. The third group, (by Dyson 
and Johnson called “laggards”29) the “outs” have 
not been able, nor have had a government willing 
and able, to conduct policies to be ready to adopt 
the euro. Within each of these groups of member 
states there were specific processes that took 
place that were on some level idiosyncratic, but 
on the whole, for the purpose of this paper, we 
will concentrate on the outcome. In other words, 
two of the three groups have ensured that there 
were policies in place that enabled them to meet 
the convergence criteria. The most challenging 
part for each of these member states has been to 
produce the domestic circumstances, including 
often policy reform that led to that outcome. It has 
in no case been very easy to pursue the policies 
that led to meeting the convergence criteria. In the 
case of the early ins and the late-comers it required 
a governing political party strongly committed 
to meeting the criteria and in most cases even 
the opposition party or parties had some buy-in. 
The outs have not had a government party who 
has been effective in both having a policy claim 
towards euro adoption or the effective meeting 
28 Dyson “Euro Area entry in East-Central Europe: 
Paradoxical Europeanisation and Clustered Convergence” West 
European Politics 30 (2007): 153-74. Johnson “The remains of 
conditionality: the faltering enlargement of the euro zone” Journal 
of European Public Policy 15 (2008): 826-841.
29 Ibid. See also A. Dandashly and A. Verdun “Euro 
adoption in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland: Laggards 
by default and laggards by choice”, Comparative European Politics, 
2016 DOI: 10.1057/cep.2015.46.
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of the convergence criteria. The developments in 
recent years are a bit different in that more focus 
has been meeting the convergence criteria (even if 
not the ERM) without a political commitment to 
set a date for euro adoption. In most these cases 
it only makes sense to set a date when such a date 
can be achieved within the electoral term of the 
next government.
4.  Mechanisms of 
Europeanization
(b) To what extent can these findings be attributed 
to a Europeanization process, (i.e. a process of 
direct, pro-active policy of the EU or its member 
states or a process of indirect, unintended diffusion 
from the rest of Europe to the new member 
states), or is it due to an independent domestic 
development or a development influenced from 
outside the EU?
Turning to the second large set of questions that 
is asked here, namely is what are the relevant 
mechanisms that have led to this Europeanization 
process? Let us discuss to those one by one. For a 
schematic portrayal see figure 1 below.
4.1 Coercion or legal enforcement
The common denominator here for the early 
ins and the latecomers that the member states 
sought to meet the criteria themselves. There 
was no pressure or coercion from the European 
Commission or other member states for these 
countries to join the euro. If there was any legal 
enforcement or coercion it was rather on applying 
the convergence criteria in a rather strict fashion 
thereby not permitting member states to adopt the 
euro unless they met all the criteria completely. 
The Commission has also been a weak enforcer 
of member states who could easily meet the 
criteria but have simply dragged their feet, such 
as the case of Sweden. Another case of a member 
state that could probably easily meet the criteria 
is the Czech Republic. Again, the Commission 
has not been coercing these member states into 
euro adoption and is not planning to do so, even 
though there were some leaked news to that effect 
in the run up to the publication of the reflection 
paper on the future of EMU issued in May 2017.30 
Yet there has been an increasing talk of whether 
EU member states should be trying be part of the 
euro by 2025.31
4.2 Conditionality or incentives-
based effects
To what extent has conditionality32 or an 
incentives-based effect been effective? This 
question is difficult to assess. From a high level 
of abstraction one would argue that there is 
obviously the attraction of obtaining the euro as 
a ‘prize’ for having met the convergence criteria. 
Add to that, the fact that some EU member states 
right away worked very hard to join the euro, and 
one would say, ‘yes’ there is that effect. Yet the 
literature judges the matter differently. Johnson 
asks “Why did the conditionality of Maastricht 
prove less potent than that of Copenhagen?” Her 
answer is that the smaller member states did a 
cost-benefit analysis, and concluded that the euro 
adoption was beneficial for them. By contrast she 
argues that the laggards experienced the euro area 
conditionality as having the opposite effect.33 The 
difficulties set up by the EU and the convergence 
criteria assessment process made it more difficult 
for those not yet in to embark on the process to 
prepare for entry. 
30  Various European newspapers reported that a message 
was leaked to the press that the Commission was planning to coerce 
member states to all have adopted the euro by 2025. These leaks 
were quickly contradicted stating that it was about a goal or target 
rather than coercion, see Business Insider Nordic “EU leak: Sweden 
has to adopt the euro by 2025” http://nordic.businessinsider.com/
leaked-document-sweden-and-denmark-to-be-forced-into-the-
euro-by-2025-2017-5/ 22 May 2017 (accessed on 22 June 2017).
31  Jean-Claude Juncker “State of the Union Address 2017”, 
13 September 2017.
32  F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, “Governance 
by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, 11 
(2004): 661-679.
33  Johnson “The remains of conditionality…”
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4.3 External assistance and 
support
Since the new member states joined the EU in 
2004 there was increasingly less support from EU 
level institutions for an early euro adoption.34 The 
Commission did start offering technical support 
once the member state in question had decided, 
and had been approved by the Council, to have its 
derogation lifted, meaning that it could prepare 
for the change-over. The example of Lithuania in 
2006 is perhaps a clear case in point. Rather than 
enabling Lithuania to work with the Commission 
to adjust to the very small difference between 
the convergence criteria and their inflation 
performance, the decision was simply not to 
be permitted to join the euro area at that time. 
Lithuania would take another 9 years before it 
introduced the euro. In 2009 when speaking to 
experts in face-to-face interviews they indicated 
not having received much support to get ready 
to meet the convergence criteria. There have 
been some reports of twinning (finance ministry 
government employees spending some time in 
other EU member states to learn about how it 
works in other member states, especially to learn 
about how to do the change-over). In face-to-face 
interviews officials in Brussels mentioned that one 
reason why the Lithuania case was held up to such 
high standards is to set an example for the larger 
member states (they mentioned in particular 
Poland) that were still to adopt the euro.
4.4 Socialization
In terms of socialization it seems that there are 
only few opportunities for direct socialization. 
Above it was briefly mentioned that some of 
the government employees have been offered 
‘twinning’ opportunities. In interviews with 
Estonian experts it was mentioned that the 
Estonians made a real effort to learn about how to 
behave in “Brussels” and build good relationships. 
They felt the Lithuanian experience showed that 
34 Interviews with various policy-makers in the ten member 
states. See also Johnson “The remains of conditionality…”
the Lithuanians had not fully understood that the 
Commission would be measuring the convergence 
criteria very precisely. The Estonians commented 
on how in their assessment the Lithuanians may 
have left to chance a few government policies that 
could impact the inflation rate, which meant that 
they were at risk at having an inflation rate in a 
convergence report year, that was just that little bit 
higher than needed.35 But it was not clear if this 
matter would have been dealt with successfully 
through socialization or not. Furthermore, seen 
that most of the adjustments would be domestic, 
and the path that needs to be taken to meet the 
convergence criteria is quite country specific, 
it is not immediately clear, other than the above 
example, how socialization would generate 
changes in behaviour or policy within each of the 
member states in question.
4.5 Competition
The mechanism of competition may have some 
impact, although it is a bit of a double-edged sword. 
There may be some elements of competition if euro 
adoption is perceived as joining the core of a two-
speed Europe. Another element of competition 
during the height of the financial crisis was 
whether member states without the euro were 
doing as well, better or worse, than those that were 
staying outside the euro area. In the case of Poland, 
a member state that had not adopted the euro, but 
never went into recession during the euro crisis, 
it meant that euro adoption did not seem to be so 
desirable. So again, a bit mixed to say so. With the 
rebouncing of the EU in a more integrationalist 
direction, with Macron as President of France, 
with strong integrationist language of Juncker in 
his State-of-the-Union speech, with the re-election 
of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and thus 
with a sense that the integration motor has started 
up again, possibly with a stronger Franco-German 
integration force, the factor of competition might 
start to play a more important role favouring the 
35 Interviews with government officials, 6 October 
2009
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pull towards adopting the euro.36 But at the time of 
writing it is still too soon to tell. 
4.6 Learning and adaptation
 This mechanism may have more of a role to play. 
Member states did learn from other member 
states’ experiences in a few ways.37 Those adopting 
the euro from 2007 onwards could learn from 
those who had adopted the euro in 1999-2002 
for instance about the concerns about rising 
prices. Experts from those countries that had 
already adopted the euro would come over to the 
ones aspiring to introduce the euro to assist the 
latter with the technicalities and best-practices 
associated with the change-over. As we saw in 
the Lithuania-Estonia case, aspiring states also 
learnt from other cases that failed to enter the 
euro area. They also frequently adapted (although 
it did mean that they adapted to a new and 
different equilibrium that ended up having three 
groups of euro adoption groups, the early-ins, the 
36 Financial Times “Berlin cheered by prospect of Macron 
reviving Franco-German motor”, 24 April 2017 (last accessed 22 
June 2017)
37 A. Zito, and A. Schout, “Learning theory reconsidered: 
EU integration theories and learning”. Journal of European Public 
Policy 16 (2009): 1103–1123. C.M. Radaelli, “Measuring policy 
learning: regulatory impact assessment in Europe”, Journal of 
European Public Policy 16 (2009): 1145–1164.
latecomers and euro-outs). The euro-outs in fact 
had learnt from Sweden and adapted to a new 
situation that few had actually expected upfront to 
happen. Thus one can see a different equilibrium 
having emerged, one that assumes differentiated 
European integration. Whether learning and 
adaptation will soon change the equilibrium 
remains to be seen. It is perhaps worth noting that 
the Czech Republic and Hungary are each seeking 
to meet the convergence criteria, just in case, even 
though there is no political will I the short run to 
join the euro area.
4.7 Emulation
Needless to say, for those that have adopted the 
euro, and in order to meet the convergence criteria, 
those seeking to join the euro have emulated 
policies and laws so as to be ready to join the euro. 
Those who joined the euro changed their central 
banking laws and altered institutions and policies 
to qualify. Perhaps more interestingly, even those 
who are not yet seeking to join have also already 
changed some policies and institutions, but not all. 
Figure 1: Mechanisms of Europeanization and 
Euro Adoption 
Europeanization mechanism: Applicable in euro adoption in ten member states?
a) coercion or legal enforcement; No.
b) conditionality or incentives-based 
effects;
No. If criteria were met, the euro could be adopted (incentive)
c) external assistance/support; Not much. 
Commission and twinning occurred after a Council to join the euro. Few 
opportunities for support before decision.
d) socialization Mixed. Few opportunities for direct socialization as most of the adjustments would 
be domestic and it is not immediately clear how socialization would generate that 
in the member state in question.
e) competition Mixed. Some elements of competition if perceived that staying outside the euro 
area meant being in a lower league. Also the feeling was that each member state 
wanted to perform as good as possible along macroeconomic criteria and euro 
adoption is a tool to achieve those goals.
f) learning or adaptation Yes. Member states did learn from other member states’ experiences, either about 
the change-over or being ready for meeting the convergence criteria
g) emulation Yes. In order to meet the convergence criteria and have the policies and laws in 
place to join the euro spurs emulation based on the adoption of appropriate or 
legitimate ideas, institutions, and policies occurs.
EUROPEANIZATION AND EURO ADOPTION - Amy Verdun
153
What the above analysis of the mechanisms of 
Europeanization in the case of euro adoption 
in the ten new member states shows, is that 
some mechanisms are more salient than others. 
Especially compared to the impact of conditionality 
and its mechanisms on member states seeking 
to join the EU the process of euro adoption has 
not had as stark an impact. Yet there has been a 
process of learning, emulation and to some extent 
competition and socialization. There has been 
little to no coercion and very little support prior 
to deciding and having been approved to join the 
euro. A study by Dandashly and Verdun38 suggests 
that domestic mechanisms deserve special 
attention. There are cultural, institutional, political, 
economic, mechanisms that give rise to resistance 
to euro adoption. In particular the domestic 
political setting, the elections time-table, and the 
size of the government and opposition, and any 
constitutional requirements, are of importance in 
making it more difficult for some member states to 
join the euro. In other words, what are the relevant 
factors or conditions of (non-) Europeanization in 
the process of euro adoption in the ten member 
states that joined in 2004?
The above analysis suggests that a mix of economic 
and political factors contribute the fast or slow 
adoption of the euro in the ten member states that 
joined in 2004. It seems however that the political 
issues are more prominent than the economic 
issues in determining the euro adoption path. 
The cases of Czech Republic and Slovakia indicate 
that a simple cost-benefit analysis for instance 
is insufficient to determine whether a member 
state would adopt the euro, which is a finding of 
interest to the literature that compares economic 
and political aspects of Europeanization.39 Based 
on the preceding analysis we can start to draw 
38 A. Dandashly and A. Verdun, Joining the Euro Area? 
Central and Eastern European Countries and their Quest for Euro 
Adoption. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
39 R.A. Epstein, and W. Jacoby, “Eastern Enlargement Ten 
Years On: Transcending the East–West Divide?” JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 52 (2014): 1–16. See also A. Dandashly 
and A Verdun “Boarding the euro plane: euro adoption in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia” Review of European and Russian 
Studies, 9 (2015): 1-26.
some tentative conclusions about how to explain 
the cross-country differences in the degrees of 
Europeanization in this policy area.
5. Conclusion: The 
Europeanization of Euro 
Adoption in Ten Member 
States
This paper examines to what extent 
Europeanization has occurred in euro adoption 
in the ten member states that joined the EU in 
2004. Has there been convergence towards policy 
outcomes? The result is mixed. In this policy 
area we find a majority of the member states 
having experienced Europeanization, defined as 
a process whereby EU norms and policies as well 
as EU institutions and patterns have influenced 
the domestic setting. However, there are still three 
member states that have decided not yet to join and 
they have over time become more entrenched in 
their opposition than would have appeared when 
they first joined the EU in 2004 or even in the years 
right after. The experience of being laggards, and 
the experience of the euro area, as well as the lack 
of EU encouragement in earlier years, may have 
further solidified the stance of the government 
that has positioned itself as firmly outside the euro 
area. In the past year we have seen the first attempt 
by the European Commission to seek to find ways 
to encourage these outs to consider joining the 
euro, or signal that they might risk becoming part 
of a more firmly entrenched two-tier system.
Can both these sets of findings be attributed to a 
Europeanization process, (i.e. a process of direct, 
pro-active policy of the EU or its member states or 
a process of indirect, unintended diffusion from 
the rest of Europe to the new member states), or 
is it due to an independent domestic development 
or a development influenced from outside the 
EU? Again the result is mixed. In this paper we 
saw different outcomes of euro adoption policies 
in the ten member states that joined the EU in 
2004. First, countries that joined the Exchange 
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Rate Mechanism-2 (ERM-2) soon after joining 
the EU found it much easier to adopt the euro 
in comparison to those that did not. Second, 
having a pro-EU government is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition to adopt the euro. Third, 
the existence of veto points in the domestic 
political system reduces the likelihood of fast euro 
adoption. Fourth, until recently, the European 
Commission has treated euro adoption as a 
domestic affair without any clear encouragement 
or support prior to being officially ‘approved’ to 
join (after assessment of the convergence report). 
It is only very recently that the Commission is 
putting pressure (and presumably will eventually 
assist these members) to adopt the euro. One 
could argue that the Commission previously was 
harsh in its assessment of aspiring members which 
was not at all seen as encouraging. 
Thus this paper shows that the underlying 
domestic political reasons for those results have 
been different. Reflecting on these ten cases 
in order to understand euro adoption strategy 
a domestic politics approach offers valuable 
insights into de facto euro adoption outcomes, 
still leaves us the possibility to speak to the value 
of the Europeanization framework in this regard. 
As we saw that a focus on convergence criteria 
is insufficient to explain why NMS change their 
stance on euro adoption. Countries like the 
Czech Republic have been close to meeting the 
convergence criteria early on but have waivered – 
initially being more positive, but then for clearly 
political reasons becoming more opposed to 
euro adoption, without any change attributable 
to macroeconomic conditions. Analyses of 
government euro adoption policies as well as 
constitutional factors make it easier to explain 
the outcome. We find that various domestic 
factors play important roles in the process of euro 
adoption even if some factors are more important 
than others. The most important factor in these 
cases is the stance of the government in power. 
Where the government is pro-European there 
is a much stronger likelihood that it will aim for 
euro adoption. By contrast, having a eurosceptic 
government (or president) in place poses as a 
real obstacle to euro adoption. Yet merely having 
a pro-European government is insufficient. 
Governments also have to be willing to pursue a 
genuine effort to meet the convergence criteria, 
often at the expense of other government goals. 
In some cases (e.g., the case of Poland) the 
government is restricted more than others by the 
need for a constitutional change and ensuing two-
thirds parliamentary majority required. Thus in 
such a case the dynamics between government 
and opposition play a larger role than in those 
cases where there is no such need. Still in recent 
years the outs have pursued policies that have 
made them meet many more of the convergence 
criteria but still at the time of writing there is no 
official euro adoption date in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, or Poland
Turning to the value of the Europeanization 
framework to explain the outcome we find that 
various mechanisms have been of differing 
importance. For instance, until very recently (and 
it is still too early to say if there is any real change) 
‘coercion’ had not been of importance in the euro 
adoption policies. As mentioned, only in 2017 
things may have changed, but to date we cannot 
differentiate yet between empty language and 
real coercion. More difficult is the assessment of 
‘conditionality’, which scholars, such as Johnson, 
find less influential in this domain. Similarly, 
‘socialization’ and ‘competition’ worked in some 
cases much more than in others. Mechanisms 
such as ‘learning’ or ‘emulation’ seem to have been 
taking place, but have not in all cases led to the 
policy of euro adoption. These mechanisms are 
useful lenses to look through so as to identify how 
Europeanization might be occurring. 
Europeanization occurred in all of the ten NMS 
that joined in 2004, but not leading to the same 
degree or the same outcome. In the early ins there 
was an early choice to adopt the euro, which was 
predominantly decided domestically by political 
elites. Once they decided that, they were affected 
by extreme Europeanization and they were able to 
adopt the euro within a few years. The late-comers 
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in a sense were extremely keen to join but due to 
a variety of domestic and structural factors were 
unable to meet the criteria at an earlier stage, but 
did not fundamentally disagree with the goal. They 
were prepared to hold on to the euro adoption 
original rules, even when presented with various 
options. They were prepared to meet the criteria 
and wait till they were in. The remaining three 
outs, discussed here, went through turbulent early 
years whereby a mix of factors led them sometimes 
to have an early adoption date; other times not so 
much; but in each of these cases they eventually 
abandoned a date. The financial crisis and the lack 
of a clear signal by the EU institutions may have 
contributed to the rise of more Eurosceptic parties 
which in turn further fuelled the current position 
whereby not one of them has a date to adopt the 
euro. 
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